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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the devastation caused by environmental catastrophes, these phenomena have yet 
to garner significant attention as a subject of criminological inquiry.  This thesis is framed 
by the following question:  How can we problematize the notion of “natural” disaster to 
arrive at a criminological understanding of human culpability in the production of harm?  
I argue that the degree of human suffering caused by natural disasters is aggravated by 
imperialistic state crimes, which predispose populations to conditions of vulnerability and 
dependency.  I substantiate this argument with an analysis of Haiti and demonstrate how 
its history of imperialistic exploitation by the US amounted to a pattern of state crime 
victimization that marginalized Haitians and, consequently, shaped their suffering from 
the 2010 earthquake.  The story of Haiti exemplifies the relationship between the 
contemporary hardships of a natural disaster and the historical injustices of state crime, 
thus illuminating the relevance of a criminology of catastrophe.  
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PREFACE 
 
On September 26, 2009, I woke up to news of a “state of calamity” declared in the 
Philippines after the country was flooded by a month’s worth of rainfall within 12 hours.  
Typhoon “Ondoy” Ketsana wreaked havoc on my family’s homeland, its consequences 
manifested in the destruction of over two million homes and the deaths of at least 300 
Filipinos.  However, given my first-hand exposure to the nation’s poverty and a hidden 
populace comprised of the poor, homeless, and abandoned, I could only imagine how 
many lives had truly been affected by the disaster.  I knew that despite every statistical 
measure of damages and casualties, the intensity of suffering could never be adequately 
quantified and all efforts in calculation would reflect gross underestimates at best.  
From this mindset emerged a frustrated response to colleagues who inquired about 
the well-being of my fellow Filipinos in the aftermath of the typhoon.  “They are dying,” 
I would cynically reply.  Apart from having to state the obvious, I was most bothered by 
the fact that those three words captured an enduring reality for the Philippines.  Yes, 
indeed, the Filipinos are suffering.  Yes, of course, the Philippines is in trouble.  But, in 
the history of their underdevelopment, when has this not been true for this nation?  Thus, 
any gratitude for the international attention finally paid to the impoverished conditions of 
the Philippines was eclipsed by resentment because it took a natural disaster of tragic 
proportions for the stability of a country and the humanity of its people to be deemed 
worthy of consideration.  Given their reactive manifestations, I began questioning the 
integrity of the collective compassion and humanitarian spirit displayed by governments, 
non-governmental organizations, media, and lay peoples—including myself.  The burden 
of our guilt in witnessing the trauma of disaster victims, I suspected, was rooted in our 
indifference to their suffering before the disaster and, ultimately, our incapacity to care. 
And so it was on that day of the 26th that I was re-awakened to the tragedy of 
human suffering.  Four months later, my collection of unsettling thoughts would serve as 
preliminary considerations for one of the world’s most devastating natural disasters—the 
January 12, 2010 Haiti Earthquake.  The urgent need to develop a critical criminological 
understanding of natural disasters thus became abundantly clear.  This thesis represents 
my personal contribution to that endeavour.  
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AN INTRODUCTION TO NATURAL DISASTERS 
 
Criminology, in a general sense, is the study of crime and its corollaries of offending 
behaviour and victimization.  In response to the question of what is crime, the easiest 
route towards an answer is to defer to the black letter law and its codified definitions of 
wrongful behaviour.  These so-called illegalities are accorded a sense of legitimacy as 
they are backed by the force of the state—i.e., the power to penalize prohibited acts 
through sanctions.  In pursuit of the proverbial less travelled path, however, critical 
scholars opt to escape from the confining boundaries of the legal realm in order to 
discover and expose the hidden dynamics of power that influence common 
understandings of that which is essentially perceived as “bad.”  Critical criminologists, in 
particular, are not so much concerned with what is wrongful based on interpretive 
subjectivity but rather with what is harmful in actuality (Einstadter & Henry, 2006; 
Hillyard, Pantazis, Tombs, & Gordon, 2004; Hillyard & Tombs, 2007; Pemberton, 2007).  
The fundamental notion of harm—that is, the degree of social injury and suffering caused 
by human behaviours—is therefore the point of analysis from which these scholars depart 
in their quest to understand social phenomena and the systems of oppression, structures 
of inequality, and injustices that they nurture.  It is under the umbrella of this critical 
criminological paradigm that I tread towards my study of natural disasters. 
For all of the efforts that criminologists dedicate towards the analysis of 
victimization and social harm, scant attention has been paid to the extremities of human 
suffering caused by natural disasters.  Among the earliest attempts to explicitly link 
natural disasters with crime are Penny Green and Tony Ward’s (2004) chapter on 
“Natural Disasters as State Crime” and Green’s (2005) subsequent elaboration on the role 
of state power, corruption, corporate power and organized crime in three major Turkish 
earthquakes.  More recently, Kelly Faust and David Kauzlarich (2008) framed 
governmental negligence during Hurricane Katrina’s collision into the Gulf Coast of the 
United States (US) as a state crime of omission.  All of these works have emerged as part 
of the developing body of literature on state crimes, which for the purpose of this 
introduction, can be generally understood as acts of commission or omission on the part 
of state actors that result in preventable social injuries, conditions of social inequality, 
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and human rights violations (See: Green & Ward, 2004; Kauzlarich & Friedrichs, 2003; 
Kauzlarich, Matthews & Miller, 2001; Kauzlarich, Mullins & Matthews, 2003; Rothe, 
2009).  My thesis follows in the direction of these scholars and their analytical emphasis 
on state power with the main objective of compensating for the paucity of criminological 
research on natural disasters. 
More specifically, my aim is to determine how we can problematize the notion of 
“natural” disaster to arrive at a criminological understanding of human culpability in the 
production of harm.  This is the essential research question of my thesis.  To this end, I 
argue that the degree of human suffering caused by natural disasters is aggravated by the 
experience of imperialistic state crimes, which predisposes human populations to 
conditions of vulnerability and dependency.  I substantiate this argument with a case 
study analysis of Haiti and demonstrate how its history of imperialistic exploitation by 
the US amounted to a pattern of state crime victimization that marginalized the Haitian 
people and, consequently, shaped the magnitude of their suffering from the January 12, 
2010 earthquake.  Overall, the story of Haiti exemplifies the relationship between the 
contemporary hardships of a natural disaster and the historical injustices of state crime.  
As such, this thesis illuminates the relevance of natural disasters as a subject of 
criminological inquiry. 
Statistical Overview: The Impact of Natural Disasters 
The humanitarian crises generated by natural disasters are easily substantiated by 
numbers.  In presenting the statistics that follow, however, it is necessary that they be 
accompanied by a disclaimer.  Despite experts’ best efforts to measure the precise 
number of casualties, damages, and expenses caused by calamitous events, these figures 
can only ever be accepted as gross undercounts because the chaotic nature of disasters 
make it impossible to account or all persons affected.  Thus, while numbers are not 
enough, they are useful insofar as their shock value forces us to pay attention to the 
seriousness of suffering inflicted during natural disasters.  Following this reasoning, my 
presentation of statistics offers a very base and preliminary consideration of what we 
know about disasters—even though there is so much more that we do not know.  
This insight allows us to mindfully appreciate the following information.  In 2002, 
a severe drought in India victimized 300 million people (Vos, Rodriguez, Below & Guha-
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Sapir, 2010).  In December of 2004, the Indian Ocean Tsunami killed 226,408 people 
across 12 countries (Vos et al., 2010).  In May of 2008, Cyclone Nagris killed 138,366 
people in Myanmar, and less than a week later, the Sichuan Earthquake killed another 
87,476 people in China—with both events amounting to $89 billion in economic 
damages (Rodriguez, Vos, Below & Guha-Sapir, 2009).  Most recently, estimates from 
the Haiti Earthquake on January 12, 2010, suggest that at least 222,570 people died 
(Guha-Sapir, Vos, Below & Ponserre, 2011)–though calculations from the Haitian 
government reach up to 300,000 deaths (Government of the Republic of Haiti, 2010).  
Granted that these examples of “mega-disasters” (Vos et al., 2010, p. 1) are the most 
exceptional cases in terms of casualties, extended victimization, and economic damages, 
they nevertheless underscore the catastrophic capabilities of a single event.  Alarmingly, 
these events only refer to five disasters among the thousands that occurred within the past 
decade and, therefore, severely understate the extent of suffering caused by disasters.  A 
brief digression is warranted here to explain the forthcoming data collected by the 
world’s research center on natural disasters—the World Health Organization 
Collaborating Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). 
As a coordinator of information among United Nations (UN) agencies, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, insurance companies, 
research institutes, and press agencies, the CRED is responsible for the ongoing 
development and maintenance of the International Emergency Events Database (EM-
DAT) with records of disaster events dating back to 1900 (Eshghi & Larson, 2008).  For 
a disaster to be included in the database, it must satisfy at least one of the following four 
criteria: (1) 10 or more persons killed; (2) 100 or more people reported affected; (3) a 
declaration of a state of emergency; and, (4) a call for international assistance (Guha-
Sapir et al., 2011).  The number of people killed is determined by those who are either 
confirmed dead or missing and presumed dead (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011).  The number of 
people affected refers to those requiring immediate assistance during a period of 
emergency through the provision of water, food, shelter, sanitation, and/or medical 
attention, etc. (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011).  With this background information, the following 
statistics are more insightful. 
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In the last decade between 2000 and 2008, the CRED recorded an average of 392 
natural disasters per year along with averages of over 230 million affected victims and 
over $102 billion in economic damages (Rodriguez et al., 2009).  In a more 
comprehensive report encompassing 30 years worth of data from 1974 to 2003, there 
were 6,367 recorded natural disasters, not including epidemics (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt, & 
Hoyois, 2004).  Cumulatively, these disasters killed over 2 million people, affected 5.1 
billion people (including 182 million left homeless), and cost $1.38 trillion in economic 
damages (Guha-Sapir et al., 2004).  Going further back to 1900 until 2005, records 
support the occurrence of 15,644 disasters, with nearly two-thirds of all events happening 
from 1990 onward (Eshghi & Larson, 2008).  Altogether these numbers underscore the 
enduring reality of human suffering as a consequence of natural disasters.  Not only are 
disasters prevalent across time, but they also occur across space.  
On that note, the global scope of natural disasters is supported by recent statistics 
from 2009, which indicate that 111 countries experienced natural disasters across all 
regions of the world (Vos et al., 2010).  While not discounting this global impact, the 
geographic dispersion of disaster events is mitigated by dynamics of vulnerability with 
certain regions more prone to disasters than others.  For example, among the 111 
countries affected in 2009, only 18 of these accounted for 79% of the overall reported 
number of deaths, 95.1% of the victims, and 86.7% of economic damages (Vos et al., 
2010).  As Vos and colleagues (2010, p. 1) rightly point out, “this reflects an unequal 
distribution of the burden that natural disasters bring upon human society.”  In particular, 
a disproportionate share of the human impact of disasters in 2009 fell upon Asia, which 
accounted for 89.1% of victims compared to 6.0% in Africa, 4.8% in the Americas, and 
9.1% in Europe and Oceania (Vos et al., 2010).  These statistics are symptomatic of a 
broader pattern of vulnerability among developing nations.  Findings from the CRED’s 
30-year report in fact highlight an “inextricable link between poverty and disasters,” 
demonstrating that over time disasters have caused more deaths and affected more people 
in the developing world especially Asia and Africa (Guha-Sapir et al., 2004, p. 33).  To 
be clear, the relationship between poverty and disaster is correlative, not causative.  I do 
not mean to suggest that poverty causes disasters but rather that poorer populations lack 
the resources and opportunities to prepare for, respond to, and/or recover from disasters 
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and the various crises that emerge in their aftermath.  In other words, their ability to 
proactively or reactively deal with a major catastrophe is limited because of their 
impoverished life circumstances and associated vulnerabilities and dependencies.  
As an additional point of clarification, my reference to developing nations is not 
intended to homogenize their populations as all poor nor, by implication, to homogenize 
the populations of developed nations as all rich.  I am certainly aware that the developing 
world includes wealthy classes as much as the developed world includes poorer classes 
(and vice versa).  My focus, however, is on poorer populations within particular countries 
or regions and their increased susceptibility to being harmed from disasters relative to 
wealthier populations.  Hurricane Katrina helps put this idea into perspective.  Although 
the hurricane hit the world’s richest country (i.e., the US), the gravity of human suffering 
was so extreme because it specifically affected New Orleans, Louisiana—which, at the 
time, was the country’s twelfth poorest city in its second poorest state (Dreier, 2006).  
The same inferences can be drawn for Haiti and the impact of the 2010 earthquake on its 
population since it is regarded as the only country with a last name—i.e., the poorest 
nation in the Western hemisphere (Bell, 2010)—and is therefore an anomaly among the 
wealthy countries of the West in terms of vulnerabilities to catastrophe. 
In light of my focus poorer populations, the inevitable counterview to my 
argument is that wealthier populations have even more to lose.  However, the point of 
distinction is that the wealthy (or at least those with more social, economic, political 
resources) have alternative options available to them during times of crisis; whereas, the 
poor are confined to the circumstances of their vulnerability.  These points are again 
validated by the example of Hurricane Katrina.  Landphair (2007, p. 126) points out that, 
“geography has always dictated patterns of social settlement,” which meant that the low-
risk, high ground properties of New Orleans were reserved for the wealthy while the less 
privileged found their residences in the high-risk, flood-prone areas below sea level.  
Furthermore, when a mandatory evacuation order was issued for all New Orleanians, 
many were unable to leave because they did not have a car or could not afford 
accommodations outside of the city (Dreier, 2006; Yarnal, 2007).  The main implication 
is that certain groups have alternative options to consider in dealing with disasters while 
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others do not.  This argument will be crystallized in my discussion of Haiti and the 
systematic oppression of its people throughout history. 
Considering the implications of the statistics above, it is again important to insert 
a caveat here: the magnitude of natural disasters is ultimately immeasurable. This is true 
on both methodological and substantive levels.  Methodologically, there is no 
standardized strategy for collecting disaster data and, not surprisingly, this problem is 
compounded by inconsistent terminology with respect to what constitutes a disaster and 
how it should be classified (Guha-Sapir & Below, 2006; Eshghi & Larson, 2008).  
Additional data collection problems arise from georeferencing and the difficulty of 
locating disasters that affect multiple regions (Guha-Sapir & Below, 2006).  Recall, for 
example, that the Indian Ocean Tsunami affected 12 countries.  Temporal aspects also 
inhibit data collection because of the challenges associated with recording the dates of 
occurrence for disaster events (Guha-Sapir & Below, 2006).  Consider Pelling’s (2003) 
claims that the average number of natural disasters recorded on an annual basis has 
doubled since the 1960s.  While this reference alone might support the conclusion that 
disasters are increasing in frequency at an alarming rate, other researchers are careful to 
point out that improvements in information systems and data collection processes have 
likely contributed to an increasing awareness of disasters and, by implication, the 
increase in reported disasters events (Eshghi & Larson, 2008; Guha-Sapir & Below, 
2006; Guha-Sapir et al., 2004).  A final methodological difficulty to consider is sourcing 
because certain countries either do not have sufficient resources (i.e., human, political, 
financial, etc.) to collect information or have an abundance of resources and produce 
inconsistent, conflicting and perhaps even inaccurate information (Guha-Sapir & Below, 
2006).  The overwhelming scholarly attention dedicated to Hurricane Katrina best reflects 
the latter scenario where political will drives the research agenda.  This is nicely 
contrasted with the lack of response to the Sichuan Earthquake in China—i.e., despite 
ongoing speculation that local officials knew about a school building’s weak 
infrastructure, an investigation into its collapse was not launched (Dai & Teskey, 2009).  
Individually and collectively, these methodological issues create serious impediments to 
the establishment and maintenance of an accurate disaster database.  Borrowing, 
therefore, the criminological critique of the validity and reliability of statistics, these 
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issues imply a “dark figure” of natural disasters and their human consequences 
(Ramcharan, de Lint, & Fleming, 2001, p. 20).  
Notwithstanding these practical problems, it is important to point out that efforts 
in disaster data collection operate according to the assumption that disasters are somehow 
calculable—contrary to the aforementioned caveat.  Therefore, on a deeper substantive 
level, I assert that the quality of harm defies quantification.  Any presentation of 
numbers—while perhaps more scientifically tangible—bypasses the unique experience of 
human suffering that continues beyond the disaster event (and perhaps even existed 
before its occurrence).  Research on Hurricane Katrina, for example, overwhelmingly 
supports the disproportionate victimization of low-income, African American women 
(See for example: Cutter et al., 2006; Dreier, 2006; Dyson, 2005; Elliott & Pais; 2006; 
Hartman & Squires, 2006; Logan, 2006; Park & Miller, 2006; Potter, 2007; Ransby, 
2006).  Thus, a simple consideration of the racialized, gendered, and classed dimensions 
of disaster trauma easily renders numerical jargon inadequate, irrelevant and even 
unintelligible.  Acknowledging this reality does not negate the need for quantitative 
research in its entirety, but it does provide a cautionary reminder against uncritical 
subscriptions to statistical data.  Simply put, one cannot consider statistics without also 
attending to the humanity underlying them, and every statistic is ultimately a 
representation of the human condition and broader social realities.  
Definition: The Core Elements of a Natural Disaster 
Adopting the sentiments of Stuart Hall (2009, p. xviii), it is imperative that 
academic inquiry not “be trapped in the empiricist shallows but… test[s] the deeper 
waters where the questions are worth asking.”  Therefore I ask the following questions: 
What is a natural disaster?  Breaking this concept down, what exactly is meant by 
“natural” and what are the constituent components of “disaster”?  Is it possible to suggest 
that natural disasters are actually unnatural?  And if it is, what might be the 
criminological (and/or victimological) implications of this?  This brings us back to the 
research question that introduced this thesis: how can we problematize the notion of 
“natural” in the concept of natural disaster to arrive at a criminological understanding of 
human culpability in the production of social harm and human suffering?  To begin 
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answering these questions, it is necessary to develop a definitional anchor upon which a 
more substantive investigation into the impact of natural disasters can rest. 
As with any phenomenon, the quest of scholarly analysis must begin with a 
definition of the subject of interest.  The CRED defines disaster as a “situation or event 
which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a national or international 
level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great 
damage, destruction and human suffering” (Vos et al., 2010, p. 5).  The CRED further 
delineates disasters according to five subgroups, namely geophysical, meteorogical, 
hydrological, climatological, and biological—all of which are explained according to 
environmental triggers such as atmospheric pressures, water cycles, climate variability, 
toxicity levels, etc. (Vos et al., 2010).  The manifestations of these disaster types are more 
commonly known as earthquakes, volcanoes, tornadoes, hurricanes, tsunamis, floods, 
droughts, and epidemics, among others.  
Given the expertise and credibility of the CRED as the world’s disaster research 
center, its definition of disaster seems most appropriate as the standard for 
operationalizing the term.  While being careful not to suggest that it is inaccurate—
because it is not—it is important to acknowledge two problems with relying only on this 
definition.  First, the CRED’s emphasis on environmental extremities understates the 
interaction of physical phenomena with human populations.  Pelling (2003) explains:  
Whilst physical phenomena are necessary for the production of natural hazard, 
their translation into risk and potential for disaster is contingent upon human 
exposure and a lack of capacity to cope with the negative impacts that exposure 
might bring to individuals or human systems [emphasis added] (p. 4). 
In line with this explanation, Stromberg (2007) specifies three critical factors that must be 
present in order to determine whether or not a particular event constitutes a disaster.  
These include: (1) the triggering natural hazard; (2) the population exposed to the event; 
and, (3) the vulnerability of that population.  The implication, of course, is that “without 
people, there is no disaster” (O’Keefe, 1976, p. 566).  And thus, to the philosophical 
query of whether or not a sound is made if a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to 
hear it, the answer is an unequivocal no.  Translated in a parallel fashion, if a human 
population is not present to experience a disaster, no such disaster can be said to occur.  
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The second definitional matter that warrants critique is the CRED’s regard of 
disasters as unforeseen and sudden events.  Given this overly simplistic description, one 
might easily be misled into believing that natural disasters are incidental occurrences 
isolated in time and space, but this negates the reality that disasters are processual.  In the 
words of Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (2002, p. 3), “a society’s pattern of vulnerability is a 
core element of a disaster.  It conditions the behavior of individuals and organizations 
throughout the full unfolding of a disaster far more profoundly than will the physical 
force of the destructive agent” [emphasis added].  This explanation reinforces the human 
ingredients of disaster—i.e., exposure and vulnerability—in that the consequences of 
human exposure to disaster are largely determined by the processual construction and 
accumulation of vulnerability.  It is important to elaborate upon this recurring notion of 
vulnerability as it is central to the definition of disasters and will also provide a key 
conceptual reference point for later discussions.  
Vulnerability is essentially the quality of being at risk of harm by disasters.  More 
formally defined, Pelling and Uitto (2001, p. 51) state that, “human vulnerability is a 
product of physical exposure to natural hazard and human capacity to prepare for or 
mitigate and to recover from (cope with) any negative impacts of disaster.”  As implied 
by the statistics above, negative impacts typically include death, injury, damaged 
property, disrupted livelihoods and decreased economic activity (Guha-Sapir et al., 
2004).  Guha-Sapir and colleagues (2004) further explain that vulnerability maintains 
four dimensions: physical (e.g. exposure to hazards), social (e.g., population growth, 
ethnic conflicts, limited social security), economic (e.g., dependence on agriculture, 
availability of insurance, basic infrastructure) and environmental (e.g., soil degradation, 
deforestation, availability of water).  Any one of these elements can render a particular 
population vulnerable, but it is when they overlap or accumulate that populations are at 
most risk of harm from certain environmental hazards.  Ultimately then, the impact of 
any natural disaster can only be understood if one accounts for the historical, 
environmental, social, economic, and political contexts in which it is situated and, by 
implication, in which human vulnerability is conditioned.  The need to contextualize 
disasters in this manner provides a helpful segue into a discussion of the disaster-
development relationship. 
	  
	   11	  
The basic idea here is that both underdevelopment and disaster vulnerability are 
branches on the same tree with the same roots—meaning that the causes of 
underdevelopment (typically understood by factors such as a country or region’s 
economic standing and political instability) also produce vulnerability.  This is what 
O’Brien and Leichenko (as cited in Pelling, 2003, p. 5) refer to as “double exposure,” the 
experience of being most at risk of disaster and simultaneously unlikely to benefit from 
the global economy.  In this context, it is not surprising that vulnerability to disaster is 
concentrated among those in developing nations—with “poor populations... living in high 
risk or environmentally degraded areas, hav[ing] the least access to social safety nets or 
infrastructure and hav[ing] few savings or available credit” (Guha-Sapir et al., 2004, p. 
35).  Indeed, these characteristics are typical for small developing island states (SIDS), 
among which Haiti is identified as having the highest vulnerability index to natural 
disasters (Pelling & Uitto, 2001).  The merit of these insights will be evident in later 
chapters of this thesis with a case study of Haiti and the January 12th earthquake.  For 
now, the following statement is particularly illuminating and foreshadows the impetus for 
my case study analysis of Haiti: “Populations are not vulnerable simply because they are 
exposed, but rather their plight is a result of marginality that makes their life a permanent 
emergency” (Cutter et al., 2006, p. 11).  
Overall, having established the importance of the human element and the 
processual character of disasters, the following definition by Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 
(2002) best serves the purpose of this thesis:  
A process or event combining a potentially destructive agent/force from the 
natural, modified, or built environment and a population in a socially and 
economically produced condition of vulnerability, resulting in a perceived 
disruption of the customary relative satisfactions of individual and social needs 
for physical survival, social order and meaning (p. 4).  
Note that my intention is not to dismiss the CRED definition in its entirety but rather to 
compliment it by accounting for and elaborating upon the more nuanced details of 
disasters as they relate to human exposure.  The additional consideration of Oliver-Smith 
and Hoffman’s (2002) definition provides conceptual depth and clarity on the matter.  
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Commenting upon the importance of studying natural disasters, Elliott and Pais 
(2006) suggest that the physical and social devastation caused by hurricanes, earthquakes, 
tornadoes, and typhoons, among other calamities, make natural disasters an ideal setting 
for examining the core dimensions of social life.  Therefore, if we take as our starting 
point the fact that humans interact with the environment to produce natural disasters, we 
can move forward to examine the particular contexts in and processes by which this 
occurs.  In so doing, we can also begin to critically evaluate how humans are not only 
passively affected by natural disasters but also actively affect the magnitude of their 
impact.  Herein lies the need to problematize the notion of “natural” because it falsely 
connotes that disasters are events beyond human control and conceals the ways in which 
disasters are influenced by human populations (Park & Miller, 2006).  This has led some 
scholars to demand re-writing the discourse of so-called natural disasters in order to 
unmask the socio-political forces at play and articulate human rights violations (Green, 
2005; Green & Ward, 2004; Park & Miller, 2006).  Indeed, these collective insights are 
the bases for developing a criminological understanding of natural disasters.  
For a preliminary discussion of the remaining contents of this thesis, allow me to 
make the relationship between natural disasters and state crime more explicit.  My 
essential argument in this thesis (and with specific application to Haitian society) is that 
the experience of a natural disaster is conditioned by imperialistic state crimes.  As the 
foregoing discussion has already established, natural disasters are disastrous precisely 
because of their impact on human populations—the protection of whom is a core 
responsibility of the state.  Ironically, however, the very powers and resources that place 
the state in a position to guarantee the well-being of those populations are the same 
powers and resources that enable them to influence their suffering from calamitous 
events.  This is not to blame states for natural disasters nor to dismiss the real dangers 
posed by environmental hazards, which, in and of themselves, are very serious threats to 
human security.  Instead, the implication is that states have the ability (i.e., through their 
authority over social, economic, and political decisions) to create conditions of 
vulnerability that affect the life chances of human populations.  Examples of these 
conditions include poverty, lack of social security, deficient healthcare systems, poor 
infrastructure, etc.  The dynamic is simple: as vulnerability to disasters increases, the 
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capacity to cope with disasters simultaneously decreases.  Thus, if the real impact of 
natural disasters must be understood according to the accumulation of vulnerabilities over 
time, then the state’s responsibility to protect citizens (and/or their failure to do so) must 
also be examined in a historical context—that is, from the framework of imperialism.  To 
the extent that imperialism has fostered systems of paternalistic subordination and racial 
differentiation to the marginalization of human populations and the underdevelopment of 
entire nations, it can be equated with state crime.  More generally, when a state 
implements policies or engages in practices (i.e., with imperialistic motives) that make 
populations more susceptible to violations of human rights (i.e., before, during, or after a 
natural disaster), its role in shaping those vulnerabilities correspond to the definition of 
state crime and must be understood from a criminological perspective.   
Now, there is certainly a great density to the relationship between natural disasters 
and state crime that risks being oversimplified by this one-paragraph explanation.  This 
acknowledgment should serve as an additional warning regarding the complexity of 
issues discussed throughout this thesis.  Given my reliance on vast and varying bodies of 
literature on disasters, state crime, imperialism, and Haiti, among other sub-topics, the 
effort to synthesize this information into a comprehensive and coherent framework of 
understanding is bound to leave certain issues understated or even neglected.  Thus, as 
much as possible, I attempt to highlight points of contention and counter-arguments to 
account for differing perspectives.  However, my attention to tangential issues should not 
distract from the overall focus of this thesis, which is the impact of state crime on the 
experience natural disasters and the reality of human suffering.  For the purpose of this 
introduction, it should be clear that when the experience of a natural disaster is 
aggravated by imperialistic state crimes, disasters cannot be minimized as natural events.  
It is with this insight that we can begin to problematize the notion of natural disaster.  
 Outline: The Organization of this Thesis 
The overarching purpose of this thesis is to advance the study of natural disasters 
within a criminological framework of understanding.  Having explained the prevalence 
and impact of natural disasters in this introduction, the remainder of this work is 
dedicated to articulating its relevance as a subject of criminological inquiry.   
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Chapter 1 launches this effort with a definition of state crime as self-interested 
actions (or inactions) committed on behalf of the state that produce social harm.  
Particular attention is paid to establishing the role of the state as a criminal actor and the 
nature of crime as violations of human rights.  Two examples of state crime research on 
natural disasters are presented in order to situate my study of Haiti and the 2010 
earthquake within the existing body of criminological literature on natural disasters.  
Chapter 2 illustrates the historical relevance of state crime with a discussion of 
imperialism and its ideological underpinnings.  Based on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony, the project of imperialism is introduced as the extension of power towards the 
achievement of domination in the global order.  This chapter focuses specifically on the 
nature of American imperialism or exceptionalism as espoused in the doctrine of 
Manifest Destiny and its paternalistic and racist tenets of development and white 
supremacy.  Reference to the US’ historical annexation of the Philippines and its more 
recent invasion of Iraq illuminate what some have called the hyperarrogant character of 
American imperialism.  The harms caused by these events are essential for understanding 
the inherent criminality of its imperialistic activities in Haiti.   
Building upon these conceptual and theoretical foundations, a case study analysis 
of Haiti is presented.  Chapter 3 is premised on a re-conceptualization of imperialism as 
state crime.  It examines the history of US-Haiti relations and the policies and practices 
by which the US contributed to the underdevelopment of Haiti.  In particular, Haiti’s 
experiences of colonialism and slavery, a diplomatic quarantine, a military occupation, 
dictatorships, and political subversion are identified as distinct stages in its exploitation 
by the US—thereby amounting to a pattern of state crime victimization.  It is argued that 
this history represents the processes by which Haiti’s vulnerability to natural disasters has 
been constructed.  Grounded in this argument, Chapter 4 examines the state of trauma in 
Haiti in the aftermath of the January 12th earthquake.  This includes the crises of internal 
displacement, a cholera outbreak and electoral fraud.  It is suggested that the Haitian 
state’s ability to respond to such crises and its overall capacity to protect the well-being 
of its citizens have been systematically debilitated by the international community.  
Accordingly, the post-earthquake responses of foreign-based governments and NGOs are 
critiqued as reproductions of imperialism with a humanitarian façade.  Given Haiti’s 
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dependency on the international community, efforts towards a sustainable future are 
suggested via grassroots mobilization and state capacity building.   
Taken altogether, the insights of this thesis provide the foundation for a more 
expansive criminology that accounts for the study of natural disasters and its implications 
for state crime.  Once again, it is my overall argument that the experience of a natural 
disaster is not isolated to the impact of an environmental hazard.  Instead, the true impact 
of a natural disaster must be understood according to the life conditions of the people 
affected—particularly in terms of how their vulnerabilities have been constructed by the 
decisions, policies, and practices of state authorities over time.  Ultimately, this research 
attests to the unnaturalness of natural disasters and lays the groundwork for developing a 
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CHAPTER 1 
Beneath the Rubble: Locating State Criminality in Natural Disasters 
 
When disaster strikes and tragedy abounds, it is the fundamental responsibility of the 
state to ensure that every effort is made to attend to the well-being of affected populations 
in its aftermath.  But when the state fails to uphold this obligation, or, far worse, when the 
state is the cause of suffering in the first place, its actions and corresponding inactions are 
rightly deemed criminal.  To this end, there is a burgeoning body of state crime literature 
in the field of criminology (Chambliss, 1989; Chambliss, Michalowski, & Kramer, 2010; 
Friedrichs, 2009; Green & Ward, 2000; Kauzlarich, & Friedrichs, 2003; Kauzlarich, 
Matthews, & Miller, 2001; Kauzlarich, Mullins, & Matthews, 2003; Michalowski & 
Kramer, 2006; Rothe, 2009; Rothe, Ross, Mullins, Friedrichs, Michalowski, Barak, 
Kauzlarich, & Kramer, 2009).  While studies of the state have been subject to debate 
since the classic philosophical works of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the willingness of 
scholars to criminalize the state is a relatively new endeavour in academia. 
The origins of state crime scholarship are generally credited to the presidential 
address of William Chambliss at the 1988 American Society of Criminology conference 
(Friedrichs, 2010; Kramer & Michalowski, 2005; Matthews & Kauzlarich, 2007; Rothe, 
2009; Rothe et al., 2009).  There Chambliss (1989, p. 204) spoke of state-organized crime 
and underscored the “need to explore different political, economic, and social systems in 
varying historical periods to discover why some forms of social organization are more 
likely to create state-organized crimes than others.”  The core of this address was its call 
to expand the intellectual territories of criminology beyond traditional considerations of 
street crimes and toward a more critical and concentrated focus on abuses of state power.  
This chapter provides a criminological framework for assessing the culpability of states 
in the experience of natural disasters in general and the Haiti earthquake in particular. 
Beginning with a definition of state crime, the term is elaborated upon according 
to its two constituent parts: state power and criminal injury.  First, the identity of the state 
as a criminal actor is established based on its control over resources and its corresponding 
responsibility to protect the well-being of citizens.  Controversies surrounding the 
legitimacy of the state are also considered as they relate to state criminal liability.  Next, 
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the component of crime is addressed with three interpretive approaches (i.e., juridical, 
organizational deviance, and social injury).  The strengths and limitations of each 
approach are discussed in order to advance an understanding of human rights violations 
as the defining element of state criminality.  Following this, two examples of state crime 
research on an earthquake and hurricane are presented, which help intellectualize the 
relationship between state crime and natural disasters.  In its entirety, this chapter 
provides a conceptual foundation for the examination of Haiti’s experience of 
imperialism as a state crime and its connection to the January 12th earthquake. 
Definition: The Five Features of State Crime 
According to Michalowski (2010, p. 16), “the definitional framework that informs 
any study of state crime will influence, and in some cases determine, the suite of harms 
that can be studied.”  Thus, to fully appreciate the criminological implications of natural 
disasters, it is necessary to understand what state crime means in precise terms.  This 
thesis relies on the comprehensive conceptualization offered by Kauzlarich and 
colleagues (2003), which identifies a state crime by the following five features: 
(1) It generates harm to individuals, groups and property; (2) It is a product of 
action or inaction on behalf of the state or state agencies; (3) The action or 
inaction relates directly to an assigned or implied trust/duty; (4) It is committed, 
or omitted, by a governmental agency, organization or representative; (5) It is 
done in the self-interest of (a) the state or (b) elite groups controlling the state (pp.  
244-246). 
Summarizing these points, state crimes can be understood as self-interested acts of 
commission or omission on the part of state actors that result in social injury.  From this 
definition, two questions emerge as queries of ongoing controversy among  
criminologists, including: (1) what is the state and why should it be regarded as a 
criminal actor? and (2) what constitutes crime and how should the scope of harms be 
understood?  These questions are far from being resolved, but it is necessary to address 
them here to contextualize the relevance of state crime to the study of natural disasters. 
The State Component: The State as Criminal Actor 
The first aspect of the state crime definition that requires elaboration is the role of 
the state.  The state generally refers to structures of government that have the authority to 
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affect the collective well-being of a given population (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 1984; 
Brooks, 2004; Inwood, 2004).  To insert a caveat here, it should be noted that the term 
‘state’ reflects a post-colonial reality that accepts the imposition of formal systems of 
governance on indigenous populations.  Therefore, I suggest an understanding of state 
that encompasses those individuals and groups with a monopoly over the powers—i.e., 
political, economic, social, material resources and organization—to control the life 
circumstances of a population.  Rothe’s (2009) definition is appropriate in this respect:  
The institutions, organizations and/or agencies composed of actors representing 
and entrusted with the functions of the political apparatus governing the 
corresponding population via the legitimate and symbolic use of power, contained 
within a historically and culturally defined milieu and bound territory (pp. 11-12). 
This comprehensive definition does not preclude a description of the state that consists of 
formal institutions of government.  At the same time, reference to the symbolic use of 
power allows for consideration of less formal arrangements found historically (e.g., via 
imperialism and colonialism) and perhaps even illegitimate ones (e.g., oppressive regimes 
or foreign interventions).  More will be said about the issue of state legitimacy shortly.  
Having operationalized the concept of state with regard to its monopolistic control of 
resources, one should be able to appreciate how the abuse of state power warrants 
criminal sanction.  However, since this is a major point of contention among academics, 
it also requires further discussion. 
As noted earlier, there was a general disinterest in the topic of state crime before 
Chambliss’ presidential address over two decades ago.  This was largely due to scholars’ 
reluctance to identify the state as a criminal actor.  It was more preferable to think of the 
state as a bureaucratic institution within which individuals made decisions that yielded 
criminal repercussions rather than consider the liability of an entire government in their 
representation of a nation-state.  The effect of this understanding, however, was a denial 
of the state’s capacities to inflict harm as a collective entity.  However, as Kauzlarich and 
Friedrichs (2003, p. 112) point out, “the state continues to have the largest measure of 
resources, the most potent capacity to mobilize, and control over the most formidable 
coercive or destructive forces and weapons, relative to any other entity.”  Indeed, in 
recognizing the limitations of a narrow, individualized approach, critical criminologists 
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have revitalized interest in broad based systems of power with a new determination to 
hold governments accountable to the consequences of their decisions.  The words of 
Michalowski and Kramer (2006) regarding the co-mingling of state power and state 
crime are illustrative of this:  
Great power and great crimes are inseparable.  It is only those with great political 
or economic power who can, with the stroke of a pen, the utterance of an order, or 
even a knowing nod of the head send thousands to their deaths or consign millions 
to lives of unrelenting want and misery (p. 1). 
An understanding of the state as a criminal actor does not negate the agency of 
individual actors.  The idea is not to assign criminal liability to either individuals or 
states, but rather to understand the interrelationship and co-dependency between the two.  
Michalowski and Kramer (2006) establish in their research on state-corporate crimes that 
there are structural and organizational components to the state that mitigate or aggravate 
individual actions.  Thus, while it is the individual who ultimately decides to take a 
specific course of action, they do so within the cultural milieu of an organization that 
endorses or at least condones such behaviour (Rothe, 2009).  Accordingly, it is important 
to underline the defining element of state crime as those actions that are carried out on 
behalf of the state (Kauzlarich & Friedrichs, 2003; Rothe, 2009).  Kauzlarich and 
Friedrichs (2003) make this point clear, stating that: 
If the crimes are carried out to advance state interests, or in the name of the state, 
are only possible through the use of the resources of the state, and reflect norms 
and values that have developed within the state (or some branch of the state), then 
we have state crime (p. 110).  
It follows that when individuals commit crimes in the context of a state’s organizational 
climate, there is a dual responsibility that must be assessed in order to determine both 
individual and state criminal liability (Rothe, 2009).  Rothe (2009, p. 2) suggests that “a 
state will not necessarily be deterred from criminal action if it can merely sacrifice 
individual agents to the court as it can sacrifice individual soldiers and units on a 
battlefield.”  The dual responsibility approach eliminates the possibility of scapegoating 
individual criminal actors while ensuring some measure of collective state accountability. 
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Of course, it is not enough to hold states accountable to their actions after-the-fact 
of some crime-related consequence.  They must be accountable to their responsibilities 
before social harm even occurs.  Chief among these responsibilities is acting in the best 
interests of citizens, which Kauzlarich and colleagues (2003) acknowledge as the basis of 
a state’s legitimacy.  The fact is that when state crimes occur, the resulting social harm 
leads to a violation of trust between a state and its citizens, which, by extension, threatens 
the legitimacy of the offending state.  Following this line of thought, it can be suggested 
that the risk of de-legitimizing the state acts as a deterrent to a concentrated study of state 
crimes.  A number of considerations arise for academics exploring this subject matter.  
For example, if the state is a criminal, in what ways can it realistically be punished? 
Surely, the state cannot be incarcerated and removed from society.  Neither can it be 
dismantled altogether.  Or can it (as some anarchist criminologists suggest)?  And if that 
is the case, what does this mean for the socio-political order of the world?   
Suffice to say that the legitimacy of the state is often an unquestioned assumption 
that is easily taken for granted.  As suggested earlier, use of the term ‘state’ is laden with 
an assumption of legitimate authority.  However, if the veracity of this assumption is 
challenged, then we can more easily ascertain the inherent criminality of state activities.  
In other words, if a state or government acts in a manner that is not within its authority, 
then the root of its criminality is its illegitimacy.  This point foreshadows my discussion 
of US-Haiti relations and the illegitimate involvement of the US in Haitian affairs 
through past and present forms of imperialistic intervention.  I will elaborate upon this in 
greater detail in the next two chapters.  For now, it is important to understand that the 
analysis of state crime need not be confined to considerations of legitimate states or 
governments and should most certainly account for illegitimate exercises of authority 
against citizens and/or other states and their citizens.  This is the crux of state criminality. 
The problem is that state legitimacy is a fluid notion and in different contexts and 
from different perspectives, its meanings can change—which makes the study of state 
crime even more important.  It is beyond the scope of this introductory chapter to address 
these kinds of philosophical matters in any substantive capacity.  However, if we are 
willing to give serious consideration to the question of state legitimacy, it will at least 
force us to understand that the state, by virtue of its monopolistic powers, has 
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fundamental responsibilities to protect the well-being and security of human populations.  
At most, it will force us to acknowledge that the state’s use of powers is never infallible 
and can cause immense suffering.  Thus, the failure of a state to uphold its responsibilities 
in any context warrants serious critique.  This thesis aims to provide exactly that, but to 
accomplish this objective, it is necessary to conceptualize the element of crime.  
The Crime Component: Harm as Human Rights Violations 
Three Approaches to Understanding Crime 
Given the basic concept of crime, three interpretive approaches can be taken to 
further deduce its meanings (Michalowski, 2010). The first is the juridical approach, 
which determines whether a particular action is criminal if it is designated as such in law 
(e.g., criminal codes) (Michalowski, 2010). However, in reviewing the aforementioned 
five features of state crime, reference to the generation of harm alludes to the 
understanding that state crime need not be confined to legalistic definitions.  The fact that 
state actors are vested with lawmaking powers presents a clear conflict of interest since it 
is unlikely that they would implicate themselves (and/or the government they represent) 
in criminal matters.  As Green and Ward (2000) explain, a state can eliminate or excuse 
its crimes by giving its officials unlimited powers over citizens, thereby legitimizing any 
abuse of power.  Other critics such as Molina (cited in Kauzlarich & Friedrichs, 2003, p. 
115) go so far as to dismiss the entire notion of state crime as “an oxymoron, a legal 
absurdity.”  Furthermore, as a practical matter concerning legal jurisdiction, domestic 
laws regarding state crime would fail to address the crimes committed by states beyond 
national borders and against citizens of other states—a scenario which is increasingly 
possible in an era of globalization (and which will be made evident in subsequent 
discussions of Haitian history).  For all of these reasons, Michalowski (2010, p. 19) is 
correct in regarding the juridical approach as a straitjacket in state crime analysis, which 
distracts attention from “structural arrangements that deprive people of a ‘standard of 
living adequate for... health and well-being.’” 
The second approach is based on interpretations of organizational deviance 
(Michalowski, 2010).  Criminal behaviour is that which violates conduct norms 
established among groups with a shared cultural identity (Michalowski, 2010).  Green 
and Ward (2004) develop this model based on Howard Becker’s original 
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conceptualization of deviance, which emphasized the interpretive role of a social 
audience.  Accordingly, organizational deviance refers to those acts which a significant 
social audience interprets to be in violation of behavioural norms and for which they 
would be willing to impose a sanction if it were in their authority to do so (Green & 
Ward, 2004).  The defining element of deviance is thus found at the “matrix of an actor, a 
rule, an audience and a potentially significant sanction” (Green & Ward, 2004, p. 4).  
While attention to deviance would certainly be an improvement upon an unquestioned 
dependence on law, I suggest that it inevitably moves in the same direction as the 
juridical approach with its definitions of crimes governed by culturally-relevant conduct 
norms.  It is not entirely clear, for example, how these norms or rules of behaviour are 
established and why they warrant protection.  To whom the norms belong to is also 
unclear.  Specifically, who represents the social audience being referred to and what 
makes them significant enough to determine which behaviours should or should not be 
sanctioned?  The concern, therefore, is that the deviance approach adopts the same 
limitations of privileging the opinions of select groups and, by extension, neglecting the 
processes by which these groups acquire that privilege. 
The final approach for understanding crime centres on the identification of social 
injury (Michalowski, 2010).  Given its broad scope, the social injury model compensates 
for the limitations of both juridical and deviance models—specifically by attending to 
“the structural and operational harms brought about by state practices that have become 
either normalized routines or have been rendered non-criminal and acceptable” 
(Michalowski, 2010, p. 21).  The key idea is that behaviours which are equally serious as 
those acts defined as crimes are recognized as socially injurious—i.e., as analogous 
harms.  This approach focuses on measuring the consequences of actions/behaviours 
rather than the intentions behind them (Michalowski, 2010).  A problem, however, 
emerges when measuring the equality of harm between consequences of legally 
recognized crimes and those of non-criminal acts.  Although the consequences may be 
the same (e.g., violence or death), this does not mean that the degree of harm suffered is 
also equivalent, particularly if the harms caused by state criminality have endured across 
centuries (i.e., as in the case of Haiti).  Therefore, the severity of social injuries may be 
minimized by using conventional crimes as a basis of comparison.  On a related note, the 
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social injury approach may only function in hindsight.  Consider the system of slavery, 
which existed as a legitimate means of labour for centuries before it was finally 
recognized as a torturous process of dehumanization.  Given this example, at what point 
in processes of oppression might certain cruelties be recognized as such and designated as 
socially injurious before their consequences are analyzed?  The implication is that a strict 
focus on consequences has the potential to de-contextualize criminal processes and 
thereby neglect important antecedents in the emergence of state crime.  This critique is 
especially significant to my criminological assessment of natural disasters and Haiti.  
Having reviewed these three models of crime, we are still left with a conceptual 
conundrum: what constitutes crime? The point of the foregoing discussion is not to 
dismiss the value of each of the juridical, organizational deviance and social injury 
approaches altogether but rather to highlight their inadequacies as stand-alone models for 
understanding crime.  In reality, the nature and dynamics of crime are too complex to 
compartmentalize its meanings.  More appropriate is an integrated model—i.e., one that 
compensates for the weaknesses of each approach by combining their strengths.  In this 
way, the differences among them can be reconciled towards the development of a holistic 
model.  Herein lies the relevance of a human rights framework, which preserves the 
practicality of the juridical approach, the accountability of the organizational deviance 
approach, and the sensitivity of the social injury approach.  
Advancing a Human Rights Framework 
For the specific purpose of understanding state criminality, critical criminologists 
generally agree that definitions of crime and considerations of harm should be framed by 
international standards of human rights (Barak, 1990; Green & Ward, 2000; Kauzlarich et 
al., 2003; Rothe, 2009; Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1975).  Such standards are 
typically found in the Charter of the United Nations (including the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]), the International Bill of Human Rights, and 
other rights-oriented treaties and covenants, including the Convention on the Prevention 
and punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights of 1966, the International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights 
of 1966, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women of 1981, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
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Treatment of Punishment of 1984, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 
1989, among others (Kallen, 2004; Rothe, 2009).  These documents represent the body of 
international human rights law and are premised on the notion that every human being, by 
virtue of his/her membership in the human family, possesses an inherent dignity that must 
be respected for the common realization of freedom, equality and justice (Kallen, 2004). 
Given the ideals embedded in human rights discourse, the assumption of their 
relevance and universal applicability is not without controversy.  When human rights 
were first formulated in the 1940s with the UDHR, Falk (2000, p. 9) states that they were 
advanced as “a common standard of achievement” and notes that the use of “declaration” 
alleviated governments of any obligation to legally enforce human rights—at least not 
until they were willing to do so through their own domestic laws.  Falk (2000, p. 6) 
explains that, “what was set forth and endorsed as constituting the first comprehensive 
formulation of international human rights was treated by world leaders at the time as 
belonging on the most remote back burner of world politics… hardly worthy of notice.”  
Thus, in their very constitution, the relevance of human rights was already undermined.  
Even more problematic than this is the assumed “universality” of human rights.  Because 
human rights were conceived in the West, it is generally argued that Western initiatives 
with Western biases cannot have global application.  Instead, proponents of this view 
assert that, “the promotion of human rights needs to be understood primarily as yet 
another pretext of continued neocolonial intervention” (Falk, 2000, p. 40)—i.e., as 
another form of Western domination or hegemony.  It is for these reasons that Falk (2000, 
p. 9) refers to the endorsement of human rights as “unfinished business.”  Having said 
this, it is not the purpose of this thesis to resolve the question of human rights; however, 
given their utility to the analysis of state crimes and natural disasters, it is necessary to 
address them so that readers can be mindful of these points of contention and the 
complexities surrounding human rights standards. 
Furthermore, the critique of human rights should not be confused as a dismissal of 
their importance altogether.  That would have the effect of ignoring the pivotal role that 
human rights advocacy has played in important social justice movements.  This includes 
the condemnation of the Holocaust, the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa, the 
proliferation of grassroots coalitions oriented around various rights claims, and the 
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creation of multiple treaties to articulate the rights of marginalized groups such as 
religious minorities, women, children, immigrants, and refugees, among many others 
(Falk, 2000).  Indeed, although it is important to acknowledge the criticisms of human 
rights, we must be careful not to throw the proverbial baby out with the bathwater.  
Simply put, criticism must not yield to cynicism or, even worse, fatalism.  Thus, to move 
forward with state crime scholars, it is necessary to explain the rationale for relying on 
violations of human rights in order to define the nature and scope of state criminality. 
To begin generally, Barak (1990) asserts the importance of human rights in a 
context of globalization.  At a time when nation-states are increasingly interdependent in 
their social, economic, and political interactions, human rights standards provide an 
overarching frame of reference for governing the international character of these 
relationships—not only between and among nation-states but also between and among all 
citizens.  In this respect, he asserts that, “human rights obligations can no longer be 
satisfied within the boundaries of individual nations” (Barak, 1990, p. 22) and, therefore, 
the evolving nature of human rights towards international cooperation is most compatible 
with the global order.  More important than context is the content of human rights.  At its 
core, the assertion of human rights entails an articulation of essential “elements of 
freedom and well-being that human beings need to exert and develop their capacities for 
purposive action” (Green & Ward, 2000, p. 110).  As such, human rights speak to the 
necessities of human existence.  The right to food, shelter, clothing, and medical services, 
among other things, are about survival.  They are not simply ideals that states must strive 
to guarantee; they are human needs that are required for people to live in the world.  On 
this note, the benefits of a human rights framework for assessing state criminality can be 
more specifically appreciated according to the three models of crime.  
Particularly relevant to the analysis of state crime is Article 22 of the UDHR, 
which stipulates that:  
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, 
social and cultural rights indispensable for his [sic] dignity and the free 
development of his [sic] personality (UN, 2011).  
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Further to this provision and similarly derived from the aforementioned body of 
international human rights law (including Article 25 of the UDHR), Schwendinger and 
Schwendinger (1975, pp. 133-134) articulate the following foundational human right: 
“All persons must be guaranteed the fundamental prerequisites for well-being including 
food, shelter, clothing, medical services, challenging work and recreation experiences, as 
well as security from predatory individuals or repressive and imperialistic social elites.”  
To appreciate the merits of a human rights framework, it is useful to revisit the three 
models for understanding crime.  
From the onset, it is immediately apparent how the human rights framework 
adheres to the strength of the juridical approach in terms of maintaining the utility of a 
legalistic foundation (Rothe, 2009).  Despite receiving its fair share of criticisms for 
relying on the black letter law, the juridical approach offers the most practicality since 
legal instruments are integral to existing means of governance.  From an academic 
standpoint, international human rights law encourages criminologists to expand the scope 
of state crime analysis beyond the domestic jurisdiction of national laws to standards that 
are globally recognized and agreed upon.  Simultaneously, to the extent that international 
law “challenge[s] states to revise [domestic] laws in ways which offer guaranteed 
protections for the rights of citizens… against abuses of state power” (Kallen, 2004, p. 
13), it sheds light on the evolving nature of law.  Therefore, laws need not only be about 
the rigid and bureaucratic application of codified rules but can also be about the promise 
of adopting standards of human rights within a functional legal framework. 
Although human rights may lack legal enforcement (at least until they are 
formally adopted into the domestic laws of a state), they nevertheless provide a global 
frame of reference for protecting people.  In the words of Kallen (2004, p. 1), “principles 
are advocated by UN authoritative bodies as moral guidelines, the universal human rights 
standards to which all systems of justice should conform.”  The moral (and legal) weight 
of international law rests on the fact that the formulation of human rights-related treaties 
and covenants by globally recognized organizations (e.g., UN) comes closest to achieving 
a universal consensus on what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behaviours 
(Kauzlarich et al., 2003).  On this basis, the human rights framework serves the 
organizational deviance approach well because of its emphasis on measuring criminality 
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by culturally-relevant norms (i.e., human rights) and social audiences (i.e., the 
international community).  Green and Ward (2004, p. 4) make this explicitly clear in 
stating that, “the relevant rules [for determining state crime] are rules of international law, 
domestic law and social morality, as interpreted by audiences that include domestic and 
transnational civil society… international organisations, other states and other agencies 
within the offending state itself.”  Overall, in the context of assessing state criminality, 
the human rights framework corresponds to the organizational deviance approach by 
holding states accountable to standards of social justice while simultaneously 
empowering the international community to develop a critical consciousness regarding 
the universality and inalienability of human rights. 
In addition to serving the criminological analysis of state crime, a human rights 
framework encourages a corresponding victimological analysis.  As such, it is consistent 
with the broad analytical scope of the social injury approach.  By definition, state crime 
victims are understood as “individuals or groups of individuals who have experienced 
economic, cultural, or physical harm, pain, exclusion or exploitation because of tacit or 
explicit state actions or policies which violate law or generally defined human rights” 
(Kauzlarich et al., 2002, p. 176).  Recall that the existence of human rights is grounded in 
the fact that all human beings possess an inherent dignity that must be respected for the 
common realization of freedom, equality and justice (Kallen, 2004).  If the human rights 
framework is founded on the assumption that all people have rights by virtue of their 
essential humanity, it follows that any violation of those rights is first and foremost an 
assessment of victimization, followed then by attributions of criminal guilt on the part of 
the state.  The prioritized focus on victimization and social injury, in this respect, 
represents a restorative model of justice by concentrating on the impact of harms on 
victims, offenders, and the broader community—parties which, in the context of state 
crime, may include citizens, governments, and the international community, respectively.  
Furthermore, the emphasis on human rights in terms of states providing citizens with the 
“fundamental prerequisites for well-being” (Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1975, p. 
133) means that the experience of harm in any capacity must be recognized from the 
onset rather than in hindsight.  Altogether, the human rights framework preserves the 
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value of the social injury model for unveiling the inherent harms caused by normalized 
state practices while underscoring the need for immediate relief. 
In concluding this discussion, it is worth addressing a criticism about the abstract 
formulation of human rights.  In his assessment of social rights, Bakan (1997, p. 136) 
argues that, “rights… whatever their content, are couched in broad and general language, 
providing few constraints on those responsible for their interpretation.”  More 
specifically, Falk (2000) compares the rhetoric of human rights used by politicians to 
dubbed voices on foreign films and explains that,  
A foreign language is superimposed on the soundtrack, but the lips of the actors  
on the screen are out of sync, moving with the rhythms of the film’s original 
spoken language… [T]he superimposed language is that of human rights, but the 
lips of political authority are still moving according to the discordant logic of 
geopolitics (p. 41).  
These criticisms are important insofar as they make us conscious of the fragility of 
human rights, but they need not be taken as a wholesale dismissal of rights.  Thus, while I 
accept the validity of these criticisms, we can also re-frame the controversy to argue that 
it is precisely the abstractions in the formulation of human rights that allows for a 
consideration of seemingly unconventional harms as legitimate criminal matters.  On this 
basis, we can move forward to intellectualize the unique criminological implications of 
natural disasters—that is, the ways in which state activities have contributed to the 
construction and accumulation of vulnerabilities for human populations. 
Research on State Crimes and Natural Disasters 
How we regard states in the context of natural disasters is conditioned by how we 
perceive the natural disasters themselves.  Since natural disasters are confused as isolated 
physical phenomena, the role of the state is typically framed by their obligation to 
provide relief.  The consequence of this perception is that a state’s role in “fashioning 
disaster is underplayed as [its] role in response and relief becomes a more significant 
standard against which a government may be measured” (Green & Ward, 2004, p. 54).  
When a government’s obligations are narrowly constructed by their caregiving duties in 
times of crisis, this has the additional consequence of absolving the state of its 
responsibilities to ensure human security at all times.  In the process, “the precipitating 
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context [of disasters] is lost beneath the rubble, ash, water, mud or lava” (Green & Ward, 
2004, p. 54).  More explicitly, the policies and practices by which the state has created 
conditions of vulnerability (e.g., poverty or lack of social security) that inhibit the ability 
of human populations to prepare for, respond to, or recover from the impact of a disaster 
are ignored.  Meanwhile the repercussions of natural disasters in terms of loss of life and 
human rights violations are attributed solely to physical hazards while the state’s criminal 
contributions to human suffering go unnoticed.  Taking this insight into account, the state 
crime analyses of Turkey’s Marmara Earthquake by Green and Ward (2004) and of New 
Orleans’ Hurricane Katrina by Faust and Kauzlarich (2008) offer prime examples of 
research that properly illuminates the fashioning of disasters by states.  The following 
sections provide a summary of these works rather than my own analysis of the calamities.  
1999 Marmara Earthquake 
The first criminological analysis of a natural disaster was advanced by Green and 
Ward (2004) following a 7.4-magnitude earthquake in the Turkish region of Marmara on 
August 17th, 1999.  In the final count, it was estimated that the earthquake caused 50,000 
deaths, damaged 285,211 houses and 42,902 businesses, and left 200,000 people 
homeless—with total financial losses amounting to $3.5 billion (Green & Ward, 2004).  
Engineering researchers attributed the extent of the destruction to “a lack of adequate 
engineering, a lack of industry inspection and quality assurance, and a lack of discipline 
on the part of the state authorities” (Green & Ward, 2004, p. 62).  Informed by these 
findings, Green and Ward (2004) examined the country’s political climate to show how 
state criminality contributed to the earthquake’s impact.  
Green and Ward’s (2004) analysis of state crime is situated in the 1980s with the 
liberalization of the Turkish economy.  During this time, public lands were privatized, 
which allowed for the removal of rules and standards regulating their proper use.  
Simultaneously, the Marmara region experienced an influx of migrants who were fleeing 
poverty and repression from the war-torn, south-eastern regions of the country.  
Industrialization in Marmara made it an attractive place to live because of the availability 
of jobs.  The problem was that there were no actual places to live.  In the context of this 
housing shortage and unregulated lands, Turkey experienced the proliferation of illegal 
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building and housing developments (Green and Ward, 2004).  This trend became the 
defining weapon in the Turkish government’s commission of state crime.  
As Green and Ward (2004) explain, illegal housing was a characteristic feature of 
Turkey, with the majority of illegal developments occurring on state-owned lands. 
Therefore,  given that the extensive damage caused by the earthquake was connected to 
poor infrastructure, the logical implication is that the state must bear responsibility for 
these consequences (Green & Ward, 2004).  Not only did the Turkish government 
implicitly condone the development of dangerous housing by allowing them on state 
land, but they also explicitly supported them by granting construction amnesties.  
Construction amnesties had the effect of allowing “developers, contractors and owner-
occupiers to build and extend dwellings without regard for building design, soil 
suitability or earthquake regulations” (Green & Ward, 2004, p. 63).  Amnesties were the 
mechanisms by which the government excused and permitted building code violations.   
Thus, although government officials did not create the housing structures that 
collapsed during the earthquake, neither did they make any conscious effort to prevent 
their development.  In this respect, they were complicit in the death and destruction 
caused by the earthquake with their state crime defined by a wilful negligence of the life 
security of the Turkish people (Green & Ward, 2004).  In conclusion, Green and Ward 
(2004, p. 67) contend that “until states are interrogated as specifically criminal agents, the 
disasters arising from floods, cyclones, famines, earthquakes and so on will continue to 
be wrongly attributed to natural causes; and solutions will be sought outside the political 
sphere of state structures” (Green & Ward, 2004, p. 67).  Building upon this lesson, Faust 
and Kauzlarich (2008) analyzed the criminological implications of Hurricane Katrina for 
the administration of former US President George W. Bush.  
2005 Hurricane Katrina  
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast of the US as a category 
3 storm with wind speeds of 145 miles per hour (Elliott & Pais, 2006). The hardest hit 
was Louisiana’s New Orleans where a breech in its levee protection system led to the 
flooding of 80% of the city in 25 feet of water (Elliott & Pais, 2006; Faust & Kauzlarich, 
2008).  Despite the president’s declaration of a state of emergency and a mandatory 
evacuation order, 70,000 residents did not leave the city (U.S. House of Representatives, 
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2006).  In the end, it was estimated that the hurricane damaged 90,000 square miles of 
housing, caused $200 billion worth of damages and left 1,400 people dead (Congleton, 
2006; Faust & Kauzlarich, 2008), making it the “most devastating, costly, and deadly 
storm in the history of the United States” (Brunsma, 2007, p. xv).  
In assigning state culpability, Faust and Kauzlarich (2008) launch their indictment 
of the Bush government on the grounds that it neglected levee systems, disregarded storm 
warnings and failed to adequately respond to the damages and human suffering caused by 
the hurricane—all of which they frame as a state crime of omission.  Specifically, despite 
knowledge of the geographic vulnerability of New Orleans as a city below sea level and 
warnings from the Federal Emergency Management Agency about the risk of a major 
hurricane, the levee protection system was not built to withstand severe hurricanes.  
Anything worse than a category 3 hurricane (i.e., category 4 or 5) would overwhelm the 
levees and flood the city (Faust & Kauzlarich, 2008; U.S. House of Representatives, 
2006).  While officials could not have anticipated the effects of a category 4 or 5 
hurricane, they had every opportunity to prepare for one of category 3 magnitude—which 
is exactly what Hurricane Katrina measured as.   
The most blatant warning of impending disaster was a simulation exercise 
conducted in the summer of 2004.  Based on the design of a hypothetical category 3 
Hurricane Pam, it was predicted that 300,000 people would be unable to evacuate, 
175,000 would be injured, 200,000 would fall ill, and 60,000 would die (Faust & 
Kauzlarich, 2008; US of Representatives, 2006).  It was also estimated that 600,000 
buildings would be destroyed while communications, electricity, and sewage systems 
would fail (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).  Since this study was conducted almost 
a year before Hurricane Katrina, federal, state, and local governments should have had 
ample time to develop an emergency preparedness plan, especially since experts offered 
recommendations for dealing with a disaster of such proportions (Faust & Kauzlarich, 
2008).  However, these early warnings were ignored.  
When Katrina hit New Orleans as a category 3 storm, this was more about luck 
than proper assessment since the National Weather Service predicted its arrival as a 
category 4 or 5 hurricane and recorded it as such magnitudes prior to landfall (Faust & 
Kauzlarich, 2008).  Regardless, a category 3 hurricane was of sufficient strength to 
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overwhelm the city’s unmonitored levee system, the consequence of which was an 
inability to provide warnings of breeches.  In fact, it took 24 hours for officials to confirm 
that levees were even breeched, and it was later revealed that 87% of the flooding in the 
city’s metropolitan area was attributable to such breeches (Faust & Kauzlarich, 2008) 
Aggravating the consequences of a broken levee system was the poor design and 
execution of the city’s evacuation plan by local officials. In terms of design, the 
evacuation plan relied on residents’ personal transportation to leave the city despite the 
known fact that 20% of the city’s population did not own a car (Park & Miller, 2007).  In 
terms of execution, local officials declared a mandatory evacuation order only 19 hours 
before the hurricane struck despite warnings from the director of the National Weather 
Service two days earlier (Faust & Kauzlarich, 2008).  On top of this, the mayor failed to 
take advantage of public transportation resources to facilitate the evacuation, with reports 
suggesting that he rejected an offer by Amtrak train services to remove hundreds of 
people from the city days before the hurricane (Faust & Kauzlarich, 2008).  Far beyond 
poor judgment then, these failures in evacuation represent a complete disregard for the 
threat posed by the hurricane and the security of New Orleans residents. 
Space constraints prevent a comprehensive discussion of all failures during 
Hurricane Katrina.  However, an extensive 364-page government report, appropriately 
titled “A Failure of Initiative,” provides an exhaustive account of the Bush 
administration’s inadequate preparations for the disaster (U.S. House of Representatives, 
2006). For my purpose, it is sufficient to re-assert Faust and Kauzlarich’s (2008) 
argument that the governmental negligence and failures surrounding New Orleans’ flood 
protection system and evacuation plans amount to a state crime of omission. 
Summary 
Research on the Marmara Earthquake and Hurricane Katrina provide important 
examples of the utility of examining natural disasters through the lens of criminology in 
general and state crime in particular.  However, although both research teams frame their 
respective analyses with state crime, important differences can be observed in their 
approaches. For example, while Green and Ward (2004) focus on the historical 
development of vulnerability through the Turkish government’s collusion with the 
construction industry, Faust and Kauzlarich (2008) look more closely at failures in 
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disaster preparedness immediately preceding the hurricane.   In general then, these state 
crime analyses are isolated in specific temporal periods, the limitation of which is a 
narrow understanding of the processual construction of vulnerability.  Thus, while we can 
certainly appreciate how a laissez-faire governmental approach to housing construction 
can increase the vulnerabilities of the Turkish people to the impact of an earthquake, 
absent is any discussion of the government’s policies (if any) for disaster planning.  We 
are left to speculate that the government was indifferent towards the consequences of 
disaster.  Similarly, while we can understand how poor emergency planning affected 
residents during Hurricane Katrina, there is no historical context for understanding 
possible motivations for the government’s lackadaisical efforts in protecting New 
Orleanians.  Was the Bush administration simply incompetent or are there elements of 
racism and classism that warrant investigation?  The point is that there are significant 
gaps in knowledge pertaining to these natural disasters and their state crime contexts.  My 
thesis seeks to address this limitation by tracing the full historical trajectory of Haitians’ 
state crime victimization leading up to (and even following) the January 12th earthquake. 
Conclusion 
A final word on the nature of state crime as both acts of commission and omission  
helps conclude this chapter.  In the examination of natural disasters, the primary role of 
the state in initiating and coordinating relief efforts should never be underestimated.  
However, it is necessary to ensure that an overemphasis on relief does not distract 
attention from any conditions of vulnerability that existed before a calamity ensued.  It is 
important to remember that the experience of natural disasters is not only influenced by 
the immediate impact of an environmental disruption but also by the construction and 
accumulation of vulnerability—i.e., the quality of being at risk of harm by disasters—
over time.  Therefore, any attempt to analyze state crime in the context of natural 
disasters must account for the living conditions and circumstances of disaster victims 
beforehand.  In this way, the role of states in shaping vulnerabilities (and, by extension, 
violating fundamental human rights to well-being) can be better understood as state 
crimes of commission.  To the extent that these crimes of commission reflect the state’s 
failure to uphold its duty to protect human rights, they must also be regarded as part of a 
more significant (and perhaps more injurious) state crime of omission.  Indeed, if wisdom 
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dictates that the absence of something is also a presence, in this context, the reverse is 
also true: the presence of something (i.e., criminal action and harm) also reveals an 
absence (i.e., criminal inaction and negligence). 
The challenge that now lies before critical state crime scholars is to ask not only 
what a state has done at any given point in time but what it has failed to do throughout 
history.  Only then can we begin to adequately appreciate the complexities of the 
relationship between state crime and natural disaster.  The incidence of any natural 
disaster is only the first site of analysis and unless we dedicate appropriate attention to its 
complete historical, environmental, economic, social, and political contexts, we constrain 
our own mental faculties from appreciating the deeper meanings of these phenomena as 
unnatural injustices—and ultimately, as the old adage goes, we dare fail to see the forest 
for only its trees.  Stemming from these thoughts, it is necessary to develop a theoretical 
framework that illuminates our understanding of the state power.  The more knowledge 
we have about state power in general, the more we can understand the particularities of 
its abuse and the criminological implications of this (i.e., as state crime).  Therefore, the 
next chapter is dedicated to an analysis of imperialism as the primary mechanism by 
which states have developed and exercised their powers throughout history to the 
detriment of human populations.  Specific attention is paid to the “hyperarrogan[t]” 
(Boniface, 2000, p. 6) character of American imperialism and its paternalistic and racist 
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CHAPTER 2 
Yes We Can? The Hegemonic Imperative of American Imperialism 
 
Yes we can.  With these three words, Barack Obama captured the imagination of the 
American people during the 2008 presidential elections of the United States (US).  As an 
inspirational mantra of empowerment, this phrase expressed the simple yet profound 
notion that disenfranchised populations are capable of overcoming adversity in order to 
effect progressive change.  Thus, beyond an ingenious campaign sound bite, these three 
words represented a declaration of hope for a better America and a just world.  Though 
certainly uplifting in content and spirit, such a cultural sentiment rests uncomfortably and 
rather awkwardly against a historical backdrop of the country’s expression and 
accumulation of power, which has too often coincided with the degradation of 
neighbouring nation-states and their peoples.  Whether one chooses to see this as a 
contradiction in American identity or outright hypocrisy, the evidence of history attests to 
the fact that the US has consistently acted in ways that are fundamentally out of synch 
with its ideals of justice, liberty and equality.  Indeed, this is the defining feature of 
American imperialism, the contemporary paradox of international relations, and the 
subject of this chapter.  
In the present era of globalization and unlimited points of connectivity, 
relationships between and among nation-states are increasingly fragile.  At the same time 
that peace, freedom, and harmony are promoted as universal ideals, manipulated 
distributions of power threaten to disrupt the delicate balance between sovereignty and 
intervention within the international community.  Such dynamics are at the heart of 
contemporary forms of imperialism, which are necessarily influenced by the hegemonic 
dominance of the US.  Accordingly, this chapter launches a critical investigation into the 
ideological underpinnings of American imperialism. 
Premised on the Gramscian notion of hegemony, I assert that imperialism is a 
mechanism for sustaining the supremacy of the US in the global world order.  In 
particular, I attribute US superiority to two critical factors: (1) physical force via 
imperialistic activities (e.g., annexation, occupation, and invasion) and (2) psychological 
persuasion via the paternalistic and racist doctrine of Manifest Destiny.  To this end, I 
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review the US’ imperialistic pursuits in the Philippines and Iraq.  Reflecting upon these 
historical and contemporary experiences, I suggest that while the mechanisms of 
American imperialism alter across time and space, the essence of Manifest Destiny—in 
terms of the hegemonic imperative to rescue and reform the uncivilized, barbaric 
‘Others’—remains the same.  On this basis, I advance two arguments: first, that 
American imperialism is defined by qualities of hyperarrogance and racist paternalism; 
and, second, that the contemporary expression of these qualities compromises the 
integrity of the humanitarian enterprise and the broader system of international relations. 
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework: Imperialism and Hegemony 
In the interests of world history and global development, imperialism has been 
subjected to intense scrutiny and analysis by varying disciplines, including economics, 
political science, history, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy, among others.  It 
would be natural to assume that such dedicated academic attention would allow for a 
holistic understanding of the phenomenon.  Instead, multiple interpretations have resulted 
in a convoluted narrative of its meanings and implications that is ultimately more 
confusing than illuminating for scholars.  To compensate for the wide array of conceptual 
ambiguities—or what Arendt (as cited in Steinmetz, 2005, p. 340) more eloquently refers 
to as a “wild confusion of historical terminology”—this chapter adopts a broad definition 
of imperialism as: the extension and maintenance of power between and among nation-
states through mechanisms such as the conquest of territories, subjugation of inhabitants 
to a form of alien rule, and various practices of economic and political exploitation 
(Bullock & Trombley, 2000).  This definition accounts for both historical forms of 
imperialism (e.g., annexation and occupation) as well as contemporary forms (e.g. 
invasion) and is therefore most appropriate for the purpose of my analysis. 
From a theoretical standpoint, understanding the nuanced complexities of 
imperialism demands an appreciation of Antonio Gramsci’s insights on hegemony.  
Although Gramsci (1971) developed the term on a micro-scale in reference to the control 
of elite groups over the working class, I maximize the concept’s meanings to apply to 
international relations among nation-states on a macro-scale.  On a semantic level, the 
Greek origins of the word ‘hegemony’ refer to leadership or one state’s exercise of 
control over others (Bullock & Trombley, 2000; Litowitz, 2000).  Not only does this 
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establish the literal application of hegemony to imperialism (and vice versa), but the 
explicit emphasis on control also conveys a deeper meaning of hegemony as domination.  
This helps conceptualize the oppressive nature of imperialism because it implies that the 
exercise of one state’s power against others occurs within a context of inequality.  This 
means that the accumulation of power for some coincides with the loss of power for 
others.  By extension, it also suggests that not all states have equal capacities to exercise 
power, thereby making the opportunities to actually achieve any sense of domination the 
privilege of a select few.  Translated within the international community then, hegemony 
as domination results in the creation of a directive class within a hierarchical arrangement 
of nations—a ruling state whose superior status is founded on the cumulative value of its 
political, economic, and socio-cultural resources (Litowitz, 2000).  
Building upon this understanding, Gramsci argued that the nature of domination is 
more sophisticated than the sum total of a state’s tangible assets (i.e., economic wealth, 
military control, political leadership) and must be sustained on a socio-cultural level with 
a dominant worldview (Litowitz, 2000).  As Litowitz (2000) explains, Gramsci likened 
the development of hegemony to a Centaur: just as the Centaur has two composite parts 
in being half human and half animal, hegemony emerges through a dialectic of force and 
consent.  The element of consent is achieved once the ruling class is able to project its 
own interests on the subordinated class as a mutually beneficial worldview (Bullock & 
Trombley, 2000; LItowitz, 2000).  It is this dimension of hegemony that is perhaps most 
insidious as the unquestioned legitimacy of ruling class interests provides the impetus for 
exploitative undertakings—most notably, imperialism.   
In summary, hegemony is composed of mutually reinforcing aspects of (1) 
imperialistic activities (i.e., in the form of political strategies to annex, occupy, and 
invade territories and their populations) and (2) an imperialistic ideology (i.e., as a 
cultural justification that induces submission and acquiescence to predatory forms of 
imperialism).  It is important to note that while both of these factors are necessary for 
achieving domination or hegemony, the execution of imperialistic activities depends upon 
their consistent reinforcement by the dominant worldview.  Given this paper’s focus on 
the hegemonic status of the US, it is necessary to provide an elaborated discussion of the 
doctrine of Manifest Destiny as the ideological worldview driving American imperialism.  
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This discussion offers an important starting point for understanding the quality of 
“hyperarrogance” (Boniface, 2000, p. 6) that is unique to the US and exemplified in the 
racist paternalism of its imperialistic activities.  It also provides a basis for critically 
assessing the implications of American imperialism for disrupting the harmonious 
coexistence of nation-states within the international community.  
Ideological Framework: Manifest Destiny and Racist Paternalism 
In 1845, John Lee O’Sullivan described the fate of the US in terms of: “our 
Manifest Destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free 
development of our yearly multiplying millions” (as cited in Boniface, 2000, pp. 6-7).  
Although the phrase was originally coined in reference to the annexation of Texas 
(McCarthy, 2009), its profound implications transcend this one imperialistic feat.  More 
broadly, Manifest Destiny captures the idea of Americans as “messianic and morally 
exceptional” (Boniface, 2000, p. 6); as “innately endowed to shape the destiny of the 
world and other, innately inferior, races as biologically destined to be subjugated or 
annihilated” (McCarthy, 2009, p. 73).  This sense of exceptionality is the ideological 
basis of American imperialism—or what is more commonly known as American 
exceptionalism.  To elaborate, American exceptionalism expresses the idea that “the US 
is unlike other greater powers, past and present, because it has a ‘transcendent purpose’ in 
‘the establishment of equality in freedom in America,’ and indeed throughout the world” 
(Chomsky, 2010a, p. 39).  Thus, the Manifest Destiny of the US is driven by its assumed 
exceptionality.  It is impossible to appreciate the depths of these sentiments without 
understanding its origins in the concepts of human development and white supremacy. 
Beginning with the first concept, the quest for human development was 
historically measured by a normative ideal of government.  Populations without formal 
governmental institutions to regulate human behaviours and interactions were deemed 
uncivilized.  The ideal of government was grounded in the following rationale:  
The dominant people seek to advance the development of the subject people, so 
that the arrangement is temporary; once the immature people is capable of self-
rule and self-improvement, it can be treated as an equal member of the 
community of civilized nations (McCarthy, 2009, p. 177).  
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Inherent in the seemingly noble objective of helping certain subject people improve was 
an assumption that the dominant people’s standard of improvement (i.e., government) 
was an accurate measure of progress and civilization in the first place.  The reality, 
however, was that measures of progress were articulated according to Western ideals of 
nationalism and capitalistic enterprise in order to justify oppressive patterns of 
colonialism (against Indigenous populations) and slavery (against African populations) 
(McCarthy, 2009; Nicholson, 2000).  In this respect, the notion of human development 
was reinforced by that of white supremacy. 
As development’s complementary concept, white supremacy historically 
expressed the belief that non-European populations were innately inferior to their 
European counterparts and amounted to a racialization and essentialization of all non-
Europeans as incompetent and barbaric savages. This generalization was further 
supported by scientific assertions that the inferiorities of non-European ‘races’ were 
biologically pre-determined and that their survival in the world was contingent upon 
being disciplined by the superior white ‘race’ (Curtin, 1974; McCarthy, 2009).  The 
overall effect of white supremacy was that:  
Non-European peoples were characterized as barbarous or uncivilized, as not 
possessed of fully developed rational capacities and incapable of fully rational 
agency, and hence were declared to be in need of tutelage, not only for the good 
of those who commanded them, but also for their own good, for the development 
of their capacities (McCarthy, 2009, p. 27). 
To reiterate this point, Steinmetz (2005, p. 345) quotes Hannah Arendt in confirming that 
“no nation state could with a clear conscience ever try to conquer foreign peoples” 
without them being deemed inferior.  As the passage above suggests, the Europeans’ low 
regard of non-Europeans as biologically inferior was used to legitimize their oppression 
in the course of development.  Taken altogether, Ottaway and Lacina (2003, p. 75) best 
explain the influence of notions of development and white supremacy on the pursuit of 
hegemony by describing imperialism as, “prolonged domination over subject states and 
peoples and their use of colonial bureaucracies to rule conquered populations and exploit 
natural resources in the pursuit of their own economic, security and national goals.” 
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Moving forward, it is critical to understand that the concepts of human 
development and white supremacy operate in a coordinated fashion to inform the doctrine 
of Manifest Destiny and validate American imperialism.  It is worth repeating the earlier 
explanation of Manifest Destiny in terms of Americans being “endowed to shape the 
destiny of the world and other, innately inferior, races as biologically destined to be 
subjugated or annihilated” (McCarthy, 2009, p. 73).  Thus, at its core, Manifest Destiny 
reflects the project in civilization adopted by the US—a project that is, at once, both 
paternalistic and racist.  Recall also Gramsci’s explanation that hegemony entails force 
and consent (Litowitz, 2000).  That both human development and white supremacy were 
presented as matters of benevolence rather than exploitation illuminates the manipulative 
nature of achieving consent from exploited subjects.  This is precisely why the dangers of 
American imperialism must be understood through the lens of Manifest Destiny and “the 
[hegemonic] imperative of America’s mission as the vanguard of history; transforming 
the global world order and… perpetuating its own dominance.” (Bacevich, as cited in 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 43).  In other words, the doctrine of Manifest Destiny nurtures the 
nationalistic rhetoric of a civilizing mission for the US while concealing—perhaps 
deliberately—its oppressive requirements and hegemonic ambitions.   
In advancing these ideas, it should be clear that the critical issue is not so much 
that the US accepts its role in shaping the world order because, in and of itself, any 
nation’s desire to contribute to the betterment of the world (however ambitious this 
mission may seem) is a fair reflection of noble intent.  Rather, the problem arises when 
the US internalizes the belief that its role in shaping the world is superior to all others, 
tantamount to what Boniface (2000, p. 6) describes as “hyperarrogance.”  The problem is 
further exacerbated when the methods that the US adopts to achieve this end are 
exploitative and self-serving.  Thus, to the extent that the doctrine of Manifest Destiny 
fosters the expression of racist paternalism through imperialistic activities, its 
simultaneous evolution into a type of “hyperarrogance" (Boniface, 2000, p. 6) on behalf 
of the American hegemon presents a grave threat to peaceful international relations.  
Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter is concentrated on the ways in which Manifest 
Destiny has inspired historical and contemporary forms of American imperialism.   
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The United States of America: Dimensions of Imperialism 
To fully appreciate the threat that American imperialism poses to the stability of 
international relations and humanitarian projects, it is necessary to understand the 
enormity of the US’ influence in the world.  As once described by former US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright, the US is “one indispensable nation” (Braziel, 2006, p. 129).  
Indeed, few can dispute the fact that the US is the most powerful nation in the world 
today with the magnitude of its influence best reflected in its economic prosperity, 
military strength and cultural domination (Boniface, 2000; Dumélin & Lévy, 2004; 
Knauft, 2007; Lake, 2006; Steinmetz, 2005).   
Economically, Slater (1976) explains the incredible power of the US in terms of: 
The billions of dollars invested in the Third World by American-controlled 
multinational corporations; US government control of economic assistance to 
underdeveloped countries, either directly in its bilateral programs or indirectly 
through its domination of the major international financial institutions; the 
dependence of Third World countries on American markets for their exports of 
raw materials and commodities and imports of manufacturing goods and modern 
technology; the centrality of the dollar in the world monetary system, etc. (p. 64). 
To qualify this dated reference, Steinmetz (2005) acknowledges that while the American 
economy may not be as strong as it once was in the immediate decades following 1945, 
its supremacy in the world is no less remarkable with such indicators as employment and 
production levels surpassing those of the European Union.  Furthermore, the US 
continues to hold tremendous clout in the international arena because of its control of 
over half of the world’s major banks and corporations (Cockcroft, 2006).  As Steinmetz 
(2005) elaborates, this places the US in a position to set the terms and conditions of 
economic interactions between nation-states with respect to loans, investments, and 
trading sanctions.  Based on this information, it is clear that the US is the key player in 
today’s world economy.  While it can be said that countries like China, India, and Brazil 
are bound to overpower the US in economic supremacy (Zakaria, 2008), at present, the 
US has the supporting infrastructure and ideology to bolster its global dominance. 
 Supporting the US’ dominant economic position is the scope of its military 
prowess, which Knauft (2007) asserts is unprecedented in world history.  What Steinmetz 
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(2005, p. 362) refers to as the expansive “web of US military installations” stretches 
across 132 countries with more than 700 bases (Cockroft, 2006).  The vitality of these 
bases is sustained by the deployment of over two million military and civilian 
Department of Defense personnel across the world (Steinmetz, 2005).   Furthermore, not 
only does the US have the largest armed force, but they are also equipped with the most 
technologically advanced weaponry and equipment and receive the most sophisticated 
training (Knauft, 2007).  Given the scope of this military enterprise, it is not surprising 
that the US spends more on its military than all other countries combined (Steinmetz, 
2005)—which ultimately reinforces the fact of its enormous wealth.  
Balancing these dimensions of domination is the proliferation of American 
cultural values—otherwise known as the “Americanization’ of the globe (Aas, 2007; 
Kroes, 2000; van Elteren, 2003).  This process refers to the concrete ways in which 
American attitudes, values, beliefs, customs, and practices permeate throughout the 
world, thereby expanding the influence of the US on a socio-cultural level.  Kroes (1999) 
speaks of this reality in the following sense:  
America has assumed a centrality that one might rightly call imperial… It has 
become the center of webs of control and communication that span the world.  Its 
cultural products reach the far corners of the world, communicating American 
ways and views to people elsewhere, while America itself remains relatively 
unaware of cultural products originating outside its national borders (p. 465). 
Cultural products are most evident in media outlets, which are predominantly owned by 
American corporations (Kendall, Nygaard & Thompson, 2011).  Film, television, 
publishing, radio and music industries serve as global carriers of American ideals, 
collectively constructing fairytale notions of the American Dream whereby consumers 
are promised success and prosperity through hard work.  The “pursuit of Happiness”, so 
stated in the US Declaration of Independence, is both presented and received as a 
universal endeavour along with all of the media imagery that depicts what this should 
look like.  This translates more concretely into business management and labour practices 
and political ‘development’ policies (van Elteren, 2003), which are all validated by the 
US’ supreme status in the global economy.  In the process, the US is heralded as the 
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world’s shepherd of progress and development and the “yardstick” (Kroes, 2000, p. 464) 
of global excellence.  
Premised on these collective facts, Boniface (2000, p. 6) is absolutely correct in 
his characterization of the US as a “nation without rivals,” which further substantiates its 
status as the global hegemon of the international community.  In this respect, the 
economic, military, and cultural strengths of the US enhance its capacity to dominate the 
world.  The capacity to act in any particular manner, however, does not automatically 
warrant taking that action.  The arrogance with which the US has neglected this truism as 
evidenced by its engagement in predatory forms of imperialism is the subject of the 
following sections of this chapter.  
Historical Context: Origins of American Imperialism  
In a historical context, the clearest expression of Manifest Destiny is found in the 
origins of American imperialism with the annexation of the Philippines.  As a defining 
moment in American history, this event best exemplifies the infiltration of racist 
paternalism through imperialistic activities.  In this particular case, the US adopted an 
overtly paternalistic approach to their imperial rule over Filipinos while the racist 
motivations—though no less pervasive or harmful—were more covertly applied.  
1898 Philippines Annexation 
The annexation of the Philippines in December of 1898 occurred as result of the 
Spanish-American War, with the US’ defeat of Spain resulting in the Treaty of Paris and 
the Americans’ purchase of the archipelago (along with Guam and Puerto Rico) for $20 
million (Balce, 2006; Williams, 1980).  Goh (2005, p. 7) frames this imperialistic act as a 
historical embarrassment and “accidental conquest.”  Since the US was originally 
considered an ally of the Philippines in the war against Spain, the expectation of the 
Filipinos was to proclaim their country’s sovereignty following Spain’s defeat.  Because 
of the Treaty of Paris, however, their Spanish colonial oppressors were merely replaced 
by their American friends—thereby thwarting their pursuit of political independence 
while simultaneously subjecting them to the treacherous wrath of American imperialism.  
Reflecting upon the arrogance of the US, Philippine President Emilio Aguinaldo (1987) 
expressed the following in an 1899 statement to the Filipino people:  
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All my efforts have been useless against the measureless pride of the American 
Government and of its representatives in these islands, who have treated me as a 
rebel because I defend the sacred interests of my country and do not make myself 
an instrument of their dastardly intentions  (p. 20).  
Such dastardly intentions referred to the imperialistic interests of the US in their 
imposition of colonial rule over Filipinos.  Americans’ betrayal resulted in the aggressive 
introduction of American-style educational institutions to displace church officials, the 
insertion of American military figures in key positions of political authority, and the 
creation of an American-controlled Philippine Commission to take over governmental 
functions in the country—all in a paternalistic effort to “Americanize the Filipinos” (Goh, 
2005, p. 217).  It was not until 1935 that the Philippines was granted self-rule as a 
commonwealth and not until 1946 that it received independence after nearly five decades 
of colonial rule under the US (Boot, 2003; Goh, 2005). 
In view of this history, it is necessary to acknowledge the subtleties of racism that 
also operated during this time.  Although the annexation of the Philippines immediately 
followed the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, the benefits and limitations of 
acquiring the Philippines were heavily debated between imperialists and anti-imperialists 
long before any treaty was signed.  At the time, Rudyard Kipling famously encouraged 
the annexation of the Philippines in a poem that dared Americans to, “Take up the White 
Man’s burden!/ Send forth the best ye breed/ Go bind your sons to exile/ To serve your 
captives’ need” (Steinmetz, 2005, p. 339).  Consistent with this sentiment, US Vice 
President Theodore Roosevelt justified the annexation with the need to civilize Filipinos 
(Williams, 1980).  The implication was that Filipinos were uncivilized, and Roosevelt 
certainly made this clear when describing Aguinaldo as “the typical representative of 
savagery, the typical foe of civilization of the American people” (Balce, 2006, p. 53).  In 
the end, Roosevelt concluded that, “one more fair spot of the world’s surface shall have 
been snatched from the forces of darkness,” (Williams, 1980, p. 826) and it was obvious 
that he was speaking both metaphorically, in the sense of America’s civilizing mission, 
and literally, with reference to the colour of Americans’ “little brown brother[s]”—the 
Filipinos (Nicholson, 2001, p. xi).  In this respect, the paternalistic approach of conquest 
was undoubtedly anchored in racism.  That the decision to adopt Filipinos as colonial 
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wards was not by impulse but by intense deliberation ultimately demonstrates how deeply 
entrenched racist paternalism was in the character of American imperialism.  
Overall, the Philippines annexation illustrates the ways in which the doctrine of 
Manifest Destiny inspired imperialistic pursuits—both paternalistic and racist—to the 
harm of subject populations.  Given my focus on the ideological underpinnings of 
imperialism, this chapter is less concerned with the specific imperialistic activities of the 
US than with the fact that they were premised on the categorization of particular 
populations as inferior.  In other words, the historical significance of imperialism in the 
Philippines is that the US found a way to legitimize exploitation under the guise of its 
Manifest Destiny.  Ultimately, the fulfillment of Americans’ Manifest Destiny in this 
country served to validate the arrogance with which the US sought hegemonic 
dominance.  Perhaps of greatest concern then is the implication of this historical account 
for contemporary experiences of American imperialism, especially as they compromise 
humanitarian initiatives.  To this end, a focused discussion on the invasion of Iraq is most 
illustrative of Americans’ continued efforts to achieve their Manifest Destiny without 
regard for the well-being of their subjects.  In this case, imperialism continues to function 
as an expression of racism and paternalism in the pursuit of hegemony; however, it is 
conveniently muted by professions of humanitarian intent. 
Contemporary Context: Current Directions of American Imperialism 
To contextualize contemporary experiences of American imperialism, it is 
necessary to appreciate the global importance of peace and human rights.  In the 
aftermath of two major World Wars, the millions of casualties caused by widespread 
violence offered a sobering lesson for the world—i.e., when countries are in conflict with 
one another, human suffering abounds.  This realization triggered a new awareness of the 
extent to which nation-states can endanger the welfare of human populations.  Most 
importantly, it spawned the birth of a rights-conscious humanitarian culture in which the 
maintenance of peaceful relations between nation-states and the preservation of human 
security emerged as universal ideals. 
The most significant development in this regard was the founding of the United 
Nations (UN) in 1945, with 51 countries affirming their commitment to “maintaining 
international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and 
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promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights” (UN, 2010b, ¶1).  
Today, the UN’s mission manifests in solidified efforts in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, 
conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance in addition to promoting democracy and 
human rights amongst 192 Member States (UN, 2010b, ¶2).  At the core of the UN’s 
system of governance is the Charter of the United Nations, which serves as a written 
constitution to codify norms of behaviour in the international community (Kallen, 2004).  
Two key principles have emerged from the UN Charter to foster international 
cooperation and are thus most relevant to the analysis of imperialism.  These are: (1) the 
principle of sovereignty and (2) the principle of the responsibility to protect—both of 
which coexist in contradiction to one another.  
Sovereignty versus the Responsibility to Protect 
The principle of sovereignty essentially recognizes the independence of all 
states—that is, “the authority of a state to control its territory and the structure of its 
internal and international affairs free from outside interference” (Conlon, 2004, p. 86).  
This is considered a foundational principle of international relations and is articulated 
from the outset of the UN Charter in the provisions of Article 2.  Specifically, Article 
2(1) states that, “[t]he [UN] is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all of its 
Members” (UN, 2010a).  Article 2(4) goes further to specify that, “[a]ll members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state” (UN, 2010a).  Article 2(7) continues to 
assert that, “[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the [UN] to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” 
(UN, 2010a).  Collectively, these provisions signify a general prohibition against state 
interference (Conlon, 2004).  As with any rule, however, there are always exceptions.  
Herein lies the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the “inviolability of state 
sovereignty [and] the responsibility to protect” (Ayub & Kouvo, 2008, p. 641).  
The responsibility to protect is a developing principle in international law that has 
largely grown from contemporary concerns over the need for humanitarian intervention 
(Ayub & Kouvo, 2008; Oman, 2009; Pattison, 2008).  Conlon (2004, p. 77) explains 
humanitarian intervention in terms of “the use of force by one or more states in another 
state for the declared purpose of protecting indigenous people there from human rights 
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violations.”  In this respect, the responsibility to protect—i.e., the fundamental need for 
states to protect the human security of their citizens—is intricately tied to a defence of 
human rights.  In the UN Charter, Article 1(3) establishes “promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and… fundamental freedoms for all” as one of the overarching 
purposes of the UN (UN, 2010a).  This is reinforced by Article 55, which states that, “the 
[UN] shall promote… universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all” (UN, 2010a).  In accordance with the emphasis on human 
rights, the principle of the responsibility to protect serves as the foundation upon which 
humanitarian efforts are launched and actively pursued.  As alluded to earlier, this 
principle conflicts with sovereignty in that intervention necessarily entails interference.  
Oman’s (2009) elaboration upon this principle thus offers some clarity on the matter:  
States bear primary responsibility for the protection of the people under their care.  
When states fail to make good-faith attempts to fulfill this responsibility, it 
devolves upon the international community of states to protect populations at risk 
from domestic threats such as severe state repression and collapse, insurgencies, 
and civil strife (p. 2). 
According to Oman’s (2009) explanation, intervention for the sake of protecting human 
rights is justified even if it requires a violation of sovereignty.  By extension, this 
suggests that the principle of the responsibility to protect overrides that of state 
sovereignty.  Assuming that this is true and, in Conlon’s (2004, p. 81) words, that  
“sovereignty must yield to human rights,” the inevitable question that must be addressed 
is what happens when violations of sovereignty also lead to violations of human rights; 
when humanitarian interventions do more harm than good?   
It is in the context of this contradiction between state sovereignty and state 
protection that contemporary manifestations of American imperialism must be 
considered.  While it can be assumed that the primacy of human rights offers protection 
against predatory actions of any kind, the reality is that humanitarian agendas are being 
manipulated by the imperialistic impulses of states—as evidenced by the American 
presence in Iraq and the so-called war on terror.  Indeed, Ottaway and Lacina (2003, p. 
74) recall how colonial conquests in the past were pursued as humanitarian interventions 
“to bring civilization and higher standards of morality to heathen populations, and to 
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improve the world,” and they conclude that present-day “international interventions 
revive memories of the imperial past.”  Based on this insight, the ongoing conflict in Iraq 
warrants closer examination as it demonstrates how American imperialism (with its 
attendant qualities of hyperarrogance and racist paternalism) persists today with the 
extended consequence of compromising the humanitarian enterprise.  
2003 Iraq Invasion 
Of all contemporary examples of American imperialism, the most disconcerting is 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  The invasion—alternatively known as Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Dale, 2009)—was launched in the aftermath of the events of September 11th in 
New York and Washington and in the context of a war on terror.  At issue here is not so 
much what the US did but how it went about doing this—i.e., invading a sovereign state 
without support from the UN or any other international body.  The invasion was 
foreshadowed in September of 2002, with  the US National Security Strategy introducing 
its doctrine of pre-emptive intervention (Ottawa & Lacina 2003).  Pre-emptive 
intervention expressed the idea that, “the US has the right to intervene unilaterally in 
order to eliminate threats to its security such as the harboring of terrorists or the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” (Ottaway & Lacina, 2003, p. 74).  Thus, 
when the US informed the UN Security Council of its plans to invade Iraq, it employed 
the rationale of this doctrine and claimed that the government of Saddam Hussein 
possessed weapons of mass destruction and was associated with terrorist networks (Roth, 
2006).  The American invasion would purportedly eliminate these threats to international 
peace and bring stability to the Iraqi people.  Failing to see the need for such a hostile 
measure, however, the UN refused to authorize Americans’ use of military force against 
Iraq.  In March of 2003, in perhaps the most controversial and blatant display of 
American hyperarrogance, the US proceeded with its war anyway (Dale, 2009). 
Such public defiance of the UN has significant implications for the evolving 
character of American imperialism.  According to Lake (2006, p. 23), “the US turned to 
the UN not for assistance but to support its claim that it had the authority to wage a 
preventive war on a sovereign state that it deemed a threat to its security.”  Thus, the Iraq 
invasion is best understood as an assertion of America’s hegemonic power in the global 
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order—which one should recall as the defining element of imperialism.  Commenting 
upon the imperialistic undertones of the US’ invasion, Ottaway and Lacina (2003) state:  
The [US] is seeking to shift final authority for authorizing internal interventions 
away from the UN and toward itself, relegating the UN to a position of secondary 
importance, to be called upon when convenient as a marginal contributor to 
essentially American undertakings (p. 86).  
On this basis, it is possible to suggest that the US never had any intention of acquiring the 
UN’s approval and was resolute in its decision to invade Iraq before 2003.  Indeed, as 
President George W. Bush infamously declared after September 11th, “Either you are 
with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Acharya, 2007, p. 278).  
Beyond arrogance, this statement illuminates the racialized element of the 
invasion in Iraq—a country in which 97% of the population are Muslims (CIA, 2011).  
Critical analysis of Bush’s words suggest that he had a particular group in mind when he 
identified “the terrorists.”  For example, Bush was also quoted as saying, “We’re facing a 
new kind of enemy, somebody so barbaric that they would fly airplanes into buildings 
full of innocent people” (Graham, Keenan, & Dowd, 2004, p. 23).  In yet another public 
denouncement of terrorism, Bush stated:  
There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and 
the guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil 
by its name.  By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a 
problem, we reveal a problem.  And we will lead the world in opposing it 
(Graham et al., 2004, p. 24). 
When such statements are contextualized by a climate of Islamophobia and anti-terrorism 
legislation, the target of Bush’s words is confirmed.  Specifically, the carefully crafted 
USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act contains several provisions under 
Section 102 that profess the importance of civil liberties and explicitly condemns 
violence against Muslim Americans (Gaskew, 2009).  On the surface, while this law 
appears to protect the rights of Muslims, it has the effect of harming them.  Gaskew’s 
(2009, p. 349) research, for example, reveals that Muslim Americans are largely 
dismissive of Section 102 as a “political tool to demonize Muslims,” offering a 
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superficial disclaimer to excuse the inevitable anti-Muslim discrimination resulting from 
the law in its entirety (e.g., including provisions which encourage the racial profiling of 
suspected terrorists).  The Act’s explicit reference to Muslim Americans is not only a 
clear indication that legislators anticipate their discriminatory targeting by the police and 
the community at large, but it is also a means of cementing the association of these 
groups with terrorism.  Overall, the enactment of such laws for the suppression of 
terrorism has led to the development of a culture of racial and Islamophobic hostility 
rooted in the social construction of ‘9/11 brown-skinned terrorists.’  And in the 
imperialist’s formula of racism and paternalism, the former requirement is duly satisfied, 
thus supplying a worldview to reinforce imperialistic activities.  
Since the war was launched, no weapons of mass destruction or links to terrorist 
groups have been discovered, leaving the US to retrospectively cite the tyranny of the 
Hussein regime as the sole humanitarian rationale for its otherwise baseless invasion 
(Roth, 2006).  Of course, to refute the validity of a humanitarian cause is not to dismiss 
the past atrocities of the Hussein regime because it certainly contributed to the deaths of 
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis during the course of its reign (Roth, 2006).  However, at 
the time of the invasion, the Iraqi government did not pose any imminent threat to justify 
US claims of a humanitarian intervention (Roth, 2006).  Thus, as Bellamy (cited in 
Heinze, 2006, p. 20) explains, “the 2003 war in Iraq is important because it represents the 
first time a group of intervening states have justified their actions by referring to the 
humanitarian outcomes that were produced by acts primarily motivated by non-
humanitarian [military] concerns.”  In other words, a humanitarian agenda was falsely 
presented to serve what were ultimately imperialistic objectives. 
To say that this discussion is less concerned with what the US did in Iraq than 
with how it went about the invasion is not the same as ignoring this information 
altogether for, to be sure, the consequences of the invasion were severe and certainly 
illuminate the dangers of American imperialism.  Accordingly, Conlon (2004) offers a 
comprehensive summary of the invasion’s impact on Iraq and its people, stating:  
Although the horrible crimes of the Hussein regime have been eliminated, they 
have been replaced by widespread power outages, shortages of food and shortages 
of basic supplies.  The infrastructure of the nation, which had already been 
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enormously damaged by the first Gulf war and more than a decade of economic 
sanctions, was further devastated by the invasion.  General lawlessness, access to 
weaponry and the widespread existence of unsecured, undetonated explosives has 
caused serious harm to people across Iraq (p. 95). 
Aggravating these conditions were US efforts to manipulate the composition of the new 
Iraqi government so that anti-American dissidents were kept from positions of political 
leadership and influence (Conlon, 2004).  Given all of this information, it is clear that the 
human rights of the Iraqi people and the stability of their country were never really a 
priority for the US.  Therefore, the invasion of Iraq can be stripped of its humanitarian 
cloak to reveal its true nature as an imperialistic project of regime change in the 
American pursuit of hegemony. 
Ultimately, the invasion of Iraq represents “a disingenuous conflation of a 
military intervention with a humanitarian one” (Ayub & Kouvo, 2008, p. 648).  This 
point should be obvious.  Less obvious, however, are the consequences of this conflation 
for the humanitarian enterprise.  In the context of international relations, this means that 
the principles of sovereignty have been violated for the sake of humanitarian 
interventions that fail to serve any humanitarian objectives.  To say the very least, the 
spirit of humanitarianism has been seriously compromised and rendered ineffective by 
imperialistic assertions of power.  To the say the most, it has been manipulated to foster 
oppressive systems of racism and paternalism.  Thus, while the invasion of Iraq was 
framed as a necessary humanitarian intervention in a war on terror, it also became a 
mechanism for the social construction of “terrorist Others” as those “brown-skinned, 
‘Arab or Muslim looking’” persons who use predatory violence and intimidation to incite 
widespread fear for ethno-religious purposes (Jaggar; 2005, p. 204; Rosenfeld, 2004).  
Furthermore, since the intervention was premised on the need to correct the error of the 
“terrorists’” misguided ways, they also inspired the paternalistic approach of democratic 
regime change and nation-building on behalf of the US and its allies.  In this respect, the 
danger of such false humanitarianism is not simply that it allows for imperialism—but 
that the nature of the imperialism that it allows for is one that legitimizes the denigration 
of an entire population on the fraudulent premise that they are being helped.  Oman’s 
(2009) comments summarize the implications of false humanitarianism: 
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While human rights and democracy may be good things, to use them as sufficient 
warrant to interfere in the affairs of other states would be not only to risk peace, 
concentrate power and authority in a few states, it would also be to arrogate to a 
group of states the moral authority that could not possibly be justified to 
participants in the international community (p. 12). 
Indeed, this is the objective of imperialism—i.e., the accumulation of power towards the 
achievement of domination.  To the extent that the humanitarian enterprise can be 
manipulated to serve this end, American imperialism will continue to violate sovereignty 
and undermine peaceful international relations in fulfillment of the US’ Manifest Destiny. 
Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, the subject of imperialism is undoubtedly complex and 
controversial.  Given the depth and breadth of American history, I certainly make no 
claims that this chapter provides a definitive discussion of American imperialism.  For 
the most part, academic analyses of American imperialism tend to focus on the tangible 
manifestations of imperialistic activities rather than their motivations.  However, if we 
understand imperialism’s function in the pursuit of hegemony (i.e., in the Gramscian 
sense), we can also appreciate that imperialism operates through the duality of force and 
consent; that is, through both action and motivation.  Accordingly, this chapter has 
attempted to remedy a gap in imperialism scholarship by intellectualizing the character of 
American imperialism according to its ideological premises. 
While the nature of American imperialistic activities change over time and 
space—from the annexations of days past to the invasions of days present—the constant 
variable at play is the racist and paternalistic ideology of Manifest Destiny.  This 
chapter’s discussions of the Philippines and Iraq illuminates this ideological consistency.  
In the historical case of the Philippines, American imperialism resulted in paternalistic 
policies of nation-building that were grounded in determinations of the racial inferiority 
of subject populations.  In the contemporary case of Iraq, the paternalistic and racist 
underpinnings of regime change in the war on terror were also evident and compromised 
the humanitarian enterprise.  Both examples underscore the “hyperarrogance” (Boniface, 
2000, p. 6) of American imperialism in fulfillment of the US’ Manifest Destiny and 
achievement of global hegemony.  Perhaps most importantly, they illustrate the harms 
	  
	   53	  
that are caused to both states (e.g., violations of sovereignty) and human populations 
(e.g., failures to protect well-being) as a result of imperialistic pursuits and, therefore, the 
inherent nature of imperialism as state crime.   
Reflecting upon these experiences, Barack Obama’s inspirational mantra of 'Yes 
We Can’ becomes less of an assertion and more of a question. Can the US really resolve 
the fundamental inconsistencies between its past actions and its present aspirations?  Can 
ordinary Americans really achieve the ideals of justice, liberty and equality in spite of the 
power dynamics between and among states in the global arena of politics?  The audacity 
of hope (Obama, 2006) ingrained in the spirit of ‘Yes We Can’ need not be dismissed by 
the cynicism of doubt; however, the fervour with which it is proclaimed must be 
informed by a conscientious understanding that a better world for some cannot be 
realized in the face of an unjust world for others.  
In the broad context of this thesis, this chapter serves the purpose of connecting 
imperialism with state crime.  The two defining aspects of state crime are that they are 
committed in the self-interest of the state and result in social harm.  These are the same 
qualities that define imperialism in terms of the paternalistic project of achieving social, 
economic, and political power over racial subordinates.  Accordingly, the harms caused 
by imperialism with respect to the systematic undermining of nation-states and their 
peoples must be re-framed as state crimes.  Thus, the bigger implication of this chapter is 
that state crime is not a new phenomenon but a contemporary conceptualization of state 
abuses that have endured throughout history (e.g., as revealed through the mechanisms of 
imperialism discussed above).  The articulation of state crime, therefore, reflects a 
criminological awakening to the unquestioned legitimacy of state power and a renewed 
effort to hold states and state actors accountable to the enormity of such power.  
Stemming from this understanding, the following chapters present a reconceptualization 
of imperialism as state crime through a case study analysis of Haiti.  Haiti’s relationship 
with the international community (especially the US) make it the quintessential example 
of how past and present forms of imperialistic state crimes construct and condition the 
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CHAPTER 3 
Haiti in Hindsight: A Pattern of State Crime Victimization  
 
“Beyond these mountains, more mountains” is a popular phrase among Haitians, 
reflecting the seemingly perpetual state of despair that has defined their country 
throughout history (Buss & Gardner, 2008, p. xii).  Thus, on January 12, 2010, when a 
massive 7.3-magnitude earthquake hit the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince (Government 
of the Republic of Haiti, 2010), the resulting devastation amounted to yet another tragedy 
for a nation all too familiar with human suffering.  Within hours after the earthquake, the 
death toll was estimated at 100,000 people (Elliott, 2010).  More recently, the Center for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters reports a death toll of 222,570 people (Guha-
Sapir et al., 2011). Meanwhile, estimates from Haitian authorities suggest that up to 
300,000 people were killed by the immediate impact of the earthquake or buried under its 
rubble (Government of the Republic of Haiti, 2010). Despite all figures, the true 
magnitude of suffering can never be adequately quantified.  Thus, to appreciate the 
degree and intensity of that suffering, it is necessary to understand its roots in the 
country’s history of imperialistic exploitation and its reinforcing forms of oppression—all 
of which I argue constitute a pattern of state crime victimization.  
This chapter calls for an intellectual re-conceptualization of imperialism as state 
crimes.  Using a case study approach, particular emphasis is placed on the interference of 
the United States (US) in Haitian affairs.  The historical trajectory of Haiti’s oppression is 
traced through what I call “critical moments of crisis” in terms of (1) colonialism and 
slavery; (2) diplomatic quarantine; (3) military occupation; (4) governmental 
dictatorships; and (5) political subversion.  Within each of these periods, I illustrate the 
policies and practices by which the US imposed its political and economic interests on 
Haiti at the expense of its development and stability.  Following this discussion, Haiti’s 
experiences of exploitation are summarized to reflect a broader pattern of state crime 
victimization.  I ultimately suggest that Haiti’s underdevelopment can be attributed in 
part to the commission of state crimes by the US.  This chapter provides the foundation 
for connecting Haiti’s historical oppression to its present-day state of trauma following 
the January 12th earthquake (to be discussed in Chapter 5). 
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Statistical Overview: The Hallmarks of Haitian Underdevelopment 
The Republic of Haiti has been variously labelled as “a nightmare, predator, 
collapsed, failed, failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, virtual, pariah state, or orphan 
democracy” (Buss & Gardner, 2008, p. 2).  Given that contemporary interests in Haiti can 
be credited to the earthquake, it is troubling to consider the possibility that were it not for 
such a devastating event, the gradual demise of Haiti may have gone unnoticed.  Indeed, 
the social realities of Haitians before the earthquake speak to the humanitarian disaster 
that the country had already become.   
According to a World Development Report from 2000/2001, Haiti was the 170th 
poorest country among 206 countries (James, 2010).  This was a telling status 
considering its public health indicators.  With a population of between nine to ten million 
people (CIA, 2011), 63% lacked safe water, 55% lacked healthcare, and 75% lacked 
access to sanitation (James, 2010).  Furthermore, 38% of children under the age of five 
were below normal weight and the infant mortality rate was 64 per 1000 live births 
(James, 2010, p. 108).  Recent statistics from a World Factbook of 2008 revealed that the 
life expectancy of Haitians was 58 years for women and 55 years for men (James, 2010).  
This was perhaps related to the prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS, which affected 6% of the 
population with some regions having significantly higher rates (James, 2010). 
With regard to poverty, a report commissioned by the United Nations (UN) 
Development Programme revealed that 76% (6,200,000) of Haitians were poor and 56% 
(4,450,000) were extremely poor (Sletten & Egset, 2004).  The difference between these 
two conditions is one of living on $2 per day and $1 per day (Sletten & Egset, 2004).  
These poverty measures were consistent with those reported in the 2008 World Factbook, 
which also revealed that Haiti had a 70% unemployment rate and a debt of $1.3 billion 
(James, 2010).  Altogether, these figures reinforced Haiti’s widely cited status as the 
poorest nation in the western hemisphere (Bell, 2010; Buss & Gardner, 2008; Coyne, 
2008; Loescher & Scanlan, 1984; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Sletten & Egset, 2004). 
Taking these statistics into account, Buss and Gardner (2008, pp. 1-2) provide an 
apt description of the average Haitian as someone who “survives on $1 a day; is 
unemployed and has no prospects of a job; is unable to read, access potable water, or turn 
on the lights; and will die prematurely.”  It must again be emphasized, however, that 
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human suffering defies quantification.  These numbers provide a snapshot of Haiti, but 
the bigger picture lies in the nuanced details of its history.  In the aftermath of the 
earthquake, while there is much to celebrate from the outpouring of public sympathies, it 
is important to understand that the tragedy of the country is not isolated to one event and 
instead spans an entire history of oppression and underdevelopment.  Again, my 
argument is that the cumulative exploitation of Haiti—organized around imperialism—is 
best understood as a pattern of recurring state crimes. 
Conceptual Framework: An International Context for State Crime 
Although Chapter 2 provided a general framework, the analysis of any state crime 
is contextually sensitive.  The types of state crimes experienced by Haiti, therefore, 
requires further elaboration.  Recall that the basic definition of state crime is a self-
interested act of commission or omission on the part of legitimate state actors that result 
in social harm (Kauzlarich et al., 2003).  Existing state crime literature generally focuses 
on the commission of state crime by governments against their citizens.  However, as the 
previous chapter established, states have a responsibility to all people by virtue of their 
common possession of human dignity.  Therefore, when a state acts in a manner that 
undermines the rights of citizens in another country, this engenders a form a international 
conflict between states in that the offending state impedes the ability of the victimized 
state to ensure the collective well-being of its citizens.  Kauzlarich and colleagues (2002) 
refer to this type of state crime as an international-international governmental crime that 
involves subverting state sovereignty and political processes.  Examples include imposing 
economic sanctions as political coercion against the government of another state or even 
supporting dictatorships that facilitate the repression of citizens’ rights (Kauzlarich et al., 
2002).  As these examples suggest, such state crimes are typically committed in the 
pursuit of political and economic self-interests.  These insights provide a conceptual 
foundation for understanding the historical oppression of Haiti by the US.  In the sections 
that follow, the US-Haiti relationship is scrutinized according to five critical moments of 
crisis in Haitian history, namely: (1) colonialism and slavery; (2) diplomatic quarantine; 
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I. 1492-1791: Colonialism and Slavery 
Haiti’s history of state crime begins with a story of colonialism.  Colonialism 
describes a power imbalance where “one side relates to another on terms unilaterally 
defined by the other” (McCaskill, as cited in Curtis, Grabb & Guppy, 2004, p. 296).  This 
power imbalance is further expressed as the perceived superiority of ways, values and 
beliefs of one group of people and their imposition upon another group (Monture-Angus, 
1999).  In the specific context of political history, colonialism is often associated with 
imperialism, which, as Chapter 3 discussed, is the “extension of power of a state through 
the acquisition, usually by conquest, of other territories; the subjugation of their 
inhabitants to an alien rule imposed on them by force, and their economic and financial 
exploitation by the imperial power” (Bullock & Trombley, 2000, p. 418).  To the extent 
that the objective of colonialism is to maintain unequal relations between a ruling state 
and its subordinate counterpart, Bullock and Trombley (2000, p. 418) confirm that, 
“colonialism is a form of imperialism.”  Accordingly, the project of colonialism is to 
preserve the consequences of imperialism through processes of political, social, and 
economic differentiation (Bullock & Trombley, 2000).  
For Haiti, these processes were first triggered in 1492, when Christopher 
Columbus conquered Hispaniola (present-day Haiti and the Dominican Republic) for 
Spain (Buss & Gardner, 2008).  Not only did Europeans impose their presence upon the 
indigenous Arawak-speaking Taino population by settling on their land, but they also 
introduced infectious diseases, violent massacres, and a system of slavery, which 
contributed to their extinction (Farmer, 2006; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Schuller, 2007a).  
There were eight million Tainos when Columbus arrived in Haiti, and this number was 
dramatically reduced to 50,000 in 1510 and zero by the 17th century (Farmer, 2006).   
Although the indigenous population was obliterated, they left behind a legacy in 
terms of the value of slave labour for economic expansion.  This manifested in the 
transatlantic slave trade and the importation of 30,000 West Africans into Haiti (Farmer, 
2006).  In 1697, the Spanish Crown ceded control over the western third of Hispaniola to 
France with the Treaty of Ryswick, thus splitting the island of Hispaniola and creating the 
French colony of Saint-Domingue (present-day Haiti) (Farmer, 2006).  Indeed, slavery 
became a staple feature of France’s expansion to the extent that by the late 1700s, nearly 
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30,000 slaves were being imported to the colony on an annual basis (Farmer, 2006).  By 
1788, there were a total of 405,564 slaves (Schuller, 2007a) and it is estimated that this 
number reached 500,000 (Buss & Gardner, 2008).  It is also estimated that slaves 
represented 90% of the colony’s population (Shah, 2009).  Fatton (2006) provides a 
description of the dehumanizing practice of slavery, where Africans:  
labour[ed] to death under the brutal surveillance of commandeurs… [who] 
crack[ed] the whip to force acquiescence to an infernal regime of domination… If 
the whip did not suffice, [they] were always ready to unleash a sadistic arsenal of 
bodily mutilation, public hangings and torture against slaves who dared to 
trespass on the boundaries that incarcerated them into the confining despair of 
living as ‘socially dead’ beings (p. 118).  
While slavery rewarded French colonists with tremendous prosperity—i.e., making Haiti 
the world’s richest colony during this period (Schuller, 2007a)—the gravity of 
exploitation inspired slaves to revolt against their oppressors in 1791 (Farmer, 2006).  
Herein lies the first appearance of the US in Haitian discourse.  
By the time of the 1791 insurrection, the US was well entrenched in economic 
relations with Haiti, sending 500 American ships to Haitian ports annually (Farmer, 
2006).  Thus, in an effort to protect their economic relations with the colonists, US 
President Washington sent $750,000 in military aid to suppress the slave rebellion 
(Farmer, 2006).  Despite this intervention, the African slaves succeeded against their 
European colonizers, and on January 1, 1804, Haiti became the first independent nation 
in Latin America and the second independent nation in the western hemisphere after the 
US (Farmer, 2006; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Schuller, 2007a).  This also marked the first time 
that a slave population defeated their colonial oppressors.  However, as Farmer (2006) 
explains, “the Haitians would never heal the wounds of colonialism, racism, and 
inequality.”  The subordinate status of the Haitian people established through colonialism 
was to remain a fixed identity, and the very notion of freedom among black slaves was 
abhorrent to the international community, especially the US.  
Given this history, it is important to recognize colonialism and its supporting 
system of slavery as state crimes.  While codified human rights may not have been in 
place during Haiti’s colonization, the imposition of European settlers on the indigenous 
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Tainos followed by the kidnapping of Africans undoubtedly violated the human rights of 
both groups.  While exploitation of the former group amounted to the demise of their 
entire population, exploitation of the latter took the form of prolonged enslavement under 
dehumanizing conditions.  Thus, if the European settlers are understood as state actors—
since they imposed their political and economic authority on Haiti—colonialism and 
slavery offer clear examples of state crimes.  At this point, it is perhaps not immediately 
apparent why the US should be singled out as oppressors of Haitians, but let it suffice 
that colonialism and slavery placed Haitians in a precarious position of vulnerability that 
allowed the US to interfere in their political and economic affairs.  The diplomatic 
quarantine of Haiti, in this respect, sheds further insight on the US and its state crimes. 
Before going any further to discuss the US reaction to the newfound 
independence of Haitians, it is necessary to take pause here and reflect upon the racist 
underpinnings of this period for these are integral to Haiti’s experience of imperialism as 
state crime.  As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, colonial conquest was justified on the 
grounds that non-European subject populations were innately inferior and, therefore, 
incapable of self-governance and civilization without the tutelage of Europeans.  Thus, in 
the context of Haiti’s historical development, the initial conquest of the Tainos, the 
kidnapping of West Africans, and the enslavement of Haitians were all manifestations of 
white supremacy and mechanisms for racial differentiation.  In this respect, it can be 
suggested that Haiti’s relationship with the international community has always been 
shaped by perceived and projected racial inequalities.  Because the 1804 slave revolution 
disrupted the dogma of Haitian inferiority, this event became the “original sin” (Doucet, 
2011, ¶ 12) for which Haitians would be forever punished—i.e., through foreign-based 
efforts to undermine their sovereignty.  For this reason, every act of paternalistic 
imperialism throughout Haitian history must be understood in relation to this period of 
colonialism.  As the remainder of this chapter demonstrates, US involvement in Haiti can 
be seen as part of a long-standing effort to suppress the agency of racial subordinates.  
II. 1804-1862: Diplomatic Quarantine 
In the words of Mintz (as cited in Farmer, 2006, p. 64), “the birth of Haiti was a 
nightmare for every country in which slavery endured.”  This included the US and 
because Americans continued to profit off the backs of slaves in its southern territories, it 
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fiercely rejected the legitimacy of Haitian independence (Buss & Gardner, 2008).  The 
general fear was that the slave rebellion in Haiti would inspire similar actions by slaves 
across the world (Hallward, 2004; Shah, 2009).  Therefore, in 1825, the US excluded 
Haiti from the Western Hemisphere Panama Conference in order to communicate their 
intolerance of slave freedom (Farmer, 2006).  Since the conference was a gathering of 
independent states in the west, Haiti’s political exclusion amounted to a “diplomatic 
quarantine of the ‘Black Republic’” (Farmer, 2006, p. 66; Schuller, 2007a).   
Interestingly, at the same time that the US denounced Haiti’s sovereignty, it also 
strengthened economic ties with the country.  In 1821, for example, the US was 
responsible for 45% of Haiti’s imports and by 1851, North Americans sold more to Haiti 
than all of Latin America (Farmer, 2006).  To say the least, the US-Haiti trading 
relationship was crucial to the former state’s growth into an imperial power.  Therefore, it 
was not surprising that Americans’ recognition of Haitian sovereignty in 1862 (Mintz, 
1995), nearly six decades after the revolution,  coincided with their monopolization of the 
Haitian economy.  Gaffney (1994, p. 4) explains that the change in attitude toward Haiti 
was not a “conversion to benevolence [but a] broadened awareness of Haiti’s economic 
importance.”  Between 1870 and 1913, the US doubled its share of the Haitian market 
from 30% to 60% (Farmer, 2006), which solidified the American influence in Haiti’s 
development or, more appropriately, its underdevelopment. 
Amato (2006, p. 37) clarifies that the trading relationship between the US and 
Haiti was not reciprocal but coercive: “Haiti was forced into an economy in which they 
were entirely dependent upon foreign goods [from the US], but… unable to export 
anything and make a profit.”  As a result, Haiti was unable to build its economy and this 
had dire consequences for the impoverishment of its citizens.  Add to this the fact that 
Haiti was simultaneously struggling to pay off an indemnity of 150 million francs to 
France—supposedly to compensate slave owners for their losses from the rebellion—and 
the destitute conditions of its economy are clear (Farmer, 2006; Oliver-Smith, 2010).  
Hallward (2004) states that the indemnity was equal to ten years’ worth of Haiti’s total 
revenue at the time and Edmonds (2011) equates this with $21 billion today.  Although 
the indemnity was eventually reduced to 90 million, this did little to help Haiti’s debt 
situation (Oliver-Smith, 2010).  By 1904, Haiti’s total foreign debt was $40,891,394, an 
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amount which vastly exceeded its capacity to pay (Farmer, 2006).  As these 
circumstances demonstrate, therefore, the diplomatic quarantine of Haiti had the ultimate 
effect of “systematically indebting the country” (Hallward, 2004, p. 27), debilitating its 
economy and halting its overall development.  
Farmer (2006, p. 74) offers an insightful explanation of this time and states that, 
“what was visionary about the Haitian revolution—the struggle against slavery and 
racism in a monolithically racist world—was not accompanied by a new economic 
vision.”  In the context of state crime, the international community’s racial ostracism of 
Haiti left it vulnerable to the intersecting forces of political and economic exploitation.  In 
the process of disempowering Haiti with a diplomatic quarantine and then overtaking its 
economy, the US simultaneously permitted the Haitian people to suffer from poverty, the 
conditions of which violated their essential human rights to free development and 
protection from social harm.  Overall then, given that Haiti’s exploitation and resulting 
underdevelopment can be attributed to the self-interested, imperialistic pursuits of 
American (and European) elite powers, these circumstances can be reframed as state 
crimes.  In reference to the project of imperialism, the cumulative impact of this historical 
period signified Haiti’s ultimate failure to escape its colonizers’ oppression and realize 
freedom.  A new barrier to achieving this freedom was the American occupation of Haiti.  
III. 1915-1934: Military Occupation 
The domineering presence of the US in Haiti’s economy can perhaps be thought 
of as foreshadowing the more intrusive military occupation launched on July 28, 1915 
(Farmer, 2006).  Farmer (2006, pp. 77-78) notes that US Navy warships were repeatedly 
sent into Haiti during the following years: 1849, 1851, 1857, 1858, 1865, 1866, 1887, 
1888, 1891, 1892, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1911, 1912, 1913, 
1914, and 1915.  The US occupation of Haiti was therefore a logical extension of this 
incessant presence (Amato, 2006).  That the occupation was not a surprise, however, does 
not mean that it was warranted.  Indeed, for almost two decades, the US enacted policies 
and engaged in practices that continued the tradition of undermining Haitian 
sovereignty—this time, under the guise of democracy.  
Beginning in 1916, the ratification of the Convention Hatiano-Americaine gave 
the US political, economic, and administrative authority over Haitian affairs (Farmer, 
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2006).  This included the power to appoint Haiti’s presidents and administrators in lieu of 
any election, thereby dictating the make-up of the country’s system of governance (Buss 
& Gardner, 2008).  Reinforcing the practice of economic interference from earlier years, 
the US also took control over the Haitian National Bank and prohibited Haiti from 
undertaking foreign debt without its permission (Buss & Gardner, 2008; Hallward, 2004).  
The US had no problem, however, with Haiti taking out a $40,000,000-loan from its own 
banks (Farmer, 2006).  And if one recalls that Haiti accumulated $40,891,394 worth of 
debt in 1904, this new loan represents a shifting of foreign domination; the replacement 
of Haiti’s indebtedness to France with its indebtedness to the US.  Altogether, these 
changes contributed to a culture of paternalism that subverted Haiti’s sovereignty and 
treated Haitians like children in the process.  As Shah (2009) explains:  
Haitians were characterized as ‘children’ and ‘savages’, and ‘devoid of any 
capacity for political organization’, all the necessary orientalist tropes required to 
satisfy the USA that it was fulfilling a moral obligation and only took up this 
responsibility in the name of humanity and international security (p. 27).  
Recalling earlier discussions from Chapter 2, such paternalistic treatment is consistent 
with the regard of Haitians as racially inferior subjects.  In this respect, the political 
construction of their incompetence reinforces the racialization of their inferiority. 
Aligned with these developments was the drafting of a new constitution in 1918, 
authored by Franklin D. Roosevelt in his capacity as secretary of the US Navy (Buss & 
Gardner, 2008).  The constitution was most controversial for abolishing the law that 
prohibited foreign ownership of Haitian property, which left the country vulnerable to 
further exploitation (Schuller, 2007a).  Negative reaction to the proposed constitution 
eventually triggered a plebiscite or public vote.  While this gave the illusory appearance 
of democratic governance, in reality, the voting public was manipulated into giving its 
approval.  Gaffney (1994) explains how voters were given slips marked “Oui” (Yes) in 
support of the constitution while the “Non” (No) slips and, by extension, the option to 
vote against the constitution, were concealed.  Ultimately, the constitution was ratified 
with 99.9% support from a voting public that represented only 5% of the population 
(Chomsky, 2006).  The plebiscite thus exemplified a strategic silencing of dissent. 
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The most notable consequence of the occupation was the creation of an army, 
which was trained and controlled by the US Marine Corps (Farmer, 2006).  According to 
the criticisms of Hallward (2004, p. 27), the US essentially “trained a brutal military force 
whose only victories [were] against the Haitian people.”  Indeed, General George Barnett, 
a former Commandant General of the Marines, later admitted that the military engaged in 
the “indiscriminate killing of natives,” which amounted to 3,250 deaths  (Farmer, 2006, 
p. 84; Gaffney, 1994).  These were the deaths of native Haitians who resisted foreign 
domination and the Marines’ policy of conscripting labour crews (Farmer, 2006).  
Hallward (2004) suggests that 5,000 to 15,000 Haitians were killed during the entire 
period of occupation.  Thus, complementing their policies and practices of exploitation, 
the US also engaged in a murder spree that violated all Haitians’ sense of security. 
After a series of small rebellions, Americans inevitably lost public favour and left 
Haiti in 1934—ironically, or perhaps strategically, at the same time that President 
Roosevelt promoted the US Good Neighbor Policy and the idea that “no state has the 
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another country” (Barry, as cited in 
Buss & Gardner, 2008, p. 24).  As evidenced by the conditions of the occupation, such a 
sentiment only reflected the hypocrisy of Americans in their dealings with Haiti.  As per 
Kauzlarich and colleagues’ (2002) definition of international-international governmental 
crime, this period offers the clearest examples of a state violating human rights through 
its subversion of another state’s sovereignty and political processes.  Thus, not only did 
the combination of political repression, economic exploitation, and violence replicate 
historical patterns of imperialism, but the resulting social harms and rights violations (i.e., 
poverty, death, fear, and subordination) also qualify these experiences as state crimes on 
the part of the US against Haiti.  
IV. 1957-1986: Governmental Dictatorships 
While the occupation officially ended, the following decades ensured that the US 
still maintained a political presence in Haiti through the tyrannical reign of the Duvaliers.  
In 1957, Francois Duvalier rose to power as president with the financial backing of the 
US (Buss & Gardner, 2008).  As a reflection of favourable American attitudes, Time 
magazine reported that, “the Negro republic of Haiti went to the polls for their freest and 
most peaceful elections in decades” (Buss & Gardner, 2008, p. 25).  Interestingly, reports 
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of election fraud also surfaced, for instance, with 7,500 votes for Duvalier in a region of 
900 registered voters (Farmer, 2006).   The implication was that the US’ endorsement of 
Duvalier paved the way for a corrupt and repressive system of governance, and this is 
exactly what transpired.  
Within the first four years of his presidency, Duvalier received a total of $40.4 
million from the US government (Farmer, 2006).  During these formative years of his 
political office, he established the foundations of tyranny.  As his first order of business, 
Duvalier created the Tontons Macoutes as a paramilitary force to control civil unrest and 
political opposition.  Numbering over 10,000 men—compared to country’s national army 
of 7,000 (Buss & Gardner, 2008)—the Tontons Macoutes wielded tremendous 
“discretionary power to arrest, imprison, torture, and put to death any Haitian citizen 
without even an order in writing.  Opponents of the regime or those merely under 
suspicion disappeared without a trace” (Loescher & Scanlan; 1984, pp. 317-318).  
Indeed, the Tontons Macoutes posed a formidable threat to ordinary Haitians, 
representing “instruments of state terror” that guarded Duvalier’s power with violent 
dedication (Loescher & Scanlan, 1984, p. 317).  It was through their support that 
Duvalier was able to dismantle or “Duvalierize” (Lundahl, 1992, p. 12) all major sources 
of opposition including the National Union of Haitian Workers (i.e., the largest 
association of labour unions), Catholic and Protestant clergy, mass media, the business 
sector and the educational system  (Loescher & Scanlan, 1984; Lundahl, 1992).  Duvalier 
also took control over the legislative and judicial functions of government, thus 
solidifying his position as Haiti’s dictator (Loescher & Scalan, 1984; Lundahl, 1992). 
Despite the wide-ranging abuses of power, the US embraced Duvalier as a 
political ally against communism.  For example, Duvalier’s control over the legislature 
allowed him to enact laws that made it a capital offence to engage in communist 
activities, and this was consistent with the anti-communist agenda of the US (Buss & 
Gardner, 2008, Farmer, 2006).  Furthermore, in a 1962 meeting of the Organization of 
American States (OAS), Haiti cast a decisive vote that effectively expelled Cuba from the 
OAS and further allowed the US to embargo the country (Loeschler & Scanlan, 1984).  It 
was not by coincidence that after this meeting the US constructed a $2.8 million airport in 
Port-au-Prince, provided military assistance, and pledged $10 million in additional aid 
	  
	   65	  
(Buss & Gardner, 2008; Loeschler & Scanlan, 1984).  The strength of the US-Haiti 
alliance was abundantly clear; thus, a challenge to the corruption of Duvalier was 
politically unfeasible for the US. 
Generally, this meant that Americans were willing to turn a blind eye towards the 
Duvalier’s repressive regime if it meant protecting their political interests.  This was 
proven in 1963.  In perhaps the most astonishing display of power, Duvalier amended 
Haiti’s constitution to declare himself President for Life and went a step further to lower 
the minimum age for a president from 40- to 18-years old, conveniently qualifying his 
son, Jean-Claude, to succeed him as president  (Farmer, 2006).  In that same year, 
Haitians who were fearful of the regime fled the country by boat as political refugees, but 
upon their arrival in Florida, American officials denied them political asylum (Farmer, 
2006).  In fact, between 1972 to 1980, Loescler and Scalan (1984) observe that the US 
rejected all Haitian claims for refugee status and anyone who arrived on American 
territory was either detained or deported.  This policy of exclusion only reinforced 
Americans’ support of Duvalier and, by extension, his continued abuse of power. 
When Jean-Claude replaced his father in 1971, the political influence of the US 
re-surfaced. Apparently, the presidential transition from father to son was previously 
arranged with the US Nixon administration (Lawless, as cited in Farmer, 2006).  Lawless 
(as cited in Farmer, 2006) explains that the US would continue to support the Duvalier 
dynasty as long as Jean-Claude, 
would support a new economic program guided by the [US], a program featuring 
private investments from the [US] that would be drawn to Haiti by such 
incentives as no customs taxes, a minimum wage kept very low, the suppression 
of labor unions, and the right of [US] companies to repatriate their profits (p. 97).  
Not only did the US continue to support the dictatorship, but they used it to their 
advantage to vicariously exploit Haitian citizens in the interests of corporate profit.  
According to Schuller (2007a), the economic program had the effect of exacerbating 
conditions of poverty and starving Haitians.  For example, wages declined by 56% with 
workers earning $0.14 per hour while the country’s resources were depleted (Chomsky, 
2006).  During that same time, Haiti’s debt increased sevenfold from $53 million in 1973 
to $366 million in 1980, plummeting the nation into an insurmountable deficit (Farmer, 
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2006).  Ultimately, civil unrest concerning human rights violations forced Jean-Claude 
into exile in 1986 (Buss & Gardner, 2008; Farmer, 2006).  However, by then, the damage 
of the tyrannical Duvalier’s—and their American associates—was already done. 
Overall, this period offers even more examples of state crimes.  While the US 
may not have directly imposed harm upon Haitians—with the notable exception of the 
refugee claimants—its support of the Duvaliers made it complicit in both administrations’ 
abuses of power.  Recall Kauzlarich and colleagues’ (2002) explanation that 
international-international governmental crimes can occur when a state supports a 
dictatorial regime that fosters the repression of citizens’ rights.  This is precisely what the 
US government did by providing financial and military support throughout the Duvaliers’ 
almost 30-year reign.  In the words of Amato (2006, p. 39), “behind the appalling 
suffering of the Haitian peasantry stood US policies, both advertent and inadvertent, that 
contributed to and instigated Haiti’s troubles.”  Therefore, the complicity of the US 
during this period qualifies their involvement with the Duvaliers as a form of state crime. 
V. 1990-2004: Political Subversion 
Given the degree of suffering that Haitians were forced to endure during the 
oppressive rule of the Duvaliers, the common sentiment was that things could not 
possibly get worse, and for a brief moment, a sense of hope actually dawned on the 
country.  In particular, the year 1990 saw the rise of a new leader in Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide who won two-thirds (or 67.5%) of the popular vote in what was considered 
Haiti’s first truly free and legitimate democratic election (Chomsky, 2006; Girard, 2006; 
Lundhal, 1992).  According to Chomsky (2006, p. 26), Aristide represented “a textbook 
example of participatory, ‘bottom-up’ and democratic political development.”  Aristide 
maintained a populist orientation to governance and sought to empower ordinary citizens 
through political participation and a redistribution of wealth.  As Farmer (2006, p. 165) 
reports, he even declined a $10,000 monthly salary because he perceived it as 
“scandalous in a country where most people go to bed hungry.”  Such populist-based 
changes, however, threatened the economic and political order of the day and caused 
serious apprehension among foreign investors (Amato, 2006; Chomsky, 2006).  So, to the 
great, yet seemingly typical, misfortune of Haiti, things got worse.  
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Although Aristide’s victory could be attributed to support from the majority of 
Haitians, spearheaded by a coalition of grassroots organizations called the Fanmi Lavalas, 
he was not favoured by the US’ Bush administration, which endorsed the presidential 
candidacy of former World Bank official Marc Bazin (Hallward, 2004).  Given this 
political tension, Chomsky (2006) asserts that the US’ sudden interest in upholding 
human rights and rule of law—as evidenced by its Democracy Enhancement project in 
Haiti—warranted doubt and suspicion.  For nearly three decades, the US ignored 
Francois Duvalier’s systematic removal of opposition with the Tontons Macoutes and 
refused to grant political asylum to Haitian refugees fleeing human rights abuses.  To 
then suddenly focus on human rights and the rule of law was fundamentally out of synch 
with its previous approach to dealings with Haiti.  As Chomsky (2006, p. 31) explains, 
the Democracy Enhancement project was designed to “fund sectors of the Haitian 
political spectrum where opposition to the Aristide government could be encouraged.”   
In light of active political resistance from the US, it was perhaps not surprising 
that the Aristide government was overthrown by a military coup on September 30, 1991, 
only seven months after he took office, and forced into exile (Buss & Gardner, 2008; 
Lundahl, 1992).  The coup was led by General Raoul Cedras and any resistance 
encountered in the aftermath of the takeover was met with mass killings and torture 
(Hallward, 2004).  This response was primarily directed at peasant groups, student 
organizations, and the press, and resulted in the deaths of at least 5,000 Lavalas 
supporters (Amato, 2006; Hallward, 2004).  
As for the US response to the coup, Amato (2006, p. 41) states that there was an 
“awkward silence” on the issue in the months that followed its occurrence and argues 
that, “when Haiti’s biggest and most influential neighbor fails to weigh in on an illegal 
government, silence can be construed as a passive approval of sorts.”  Allegedly, the US 
indirectly sponsored the military coup through the Central Intelligence Agency’s training 
of high-ranking Haitian army officers including the coup’s leader, Cedras (Farmer, 2006).  
Putting an end to his silence on the matter, President George H. W. Bush eventually 
condemned the illegal regime by imposing an economic embargo.  However, as Amato 
(2006) points out, the US conveniently exempted 800 American firms from the embargo 
and simultaneously increased its trade with Haiti by 50%.  Consequently, while Haitians 
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suffered from widespread malnutrition, Americans reaped the benefits of increased 
profit—yet another instance of politics and economics trumping human rights. 
In 1994, the Clinton administration launched Operation Restore Democracy in an 
effort to restore Aristide to power (Shah, 2009).  Again, while this gave the impression 
that Americans were acting in the spirit of democratic governance, their assistance was 
contingent upon Aristide making a number of concessions.  This included an amnesty for 
those responsible for the coup, shared power with opponents, and, most notably, the 
implementation of a structural adjustment program (Dupuy, 2010; Hallward, 2004).  
Echoing the economic reforms of earlier times, the structural adjustment program, framed 
as the Emergency Economic Recovery Plan, involved a reduction in wages, privatization 
of public assets, a reorientation of domestic production to focus on crops most profitable 
in North American markets, and the elimination of import tariffs (Hallward, 2004).  The 
elimination of import tariffs was especially damaging for Haiti’s agricultural industry, 
which resulted in the depletion of Haiti’s rice, poultry and pig sectors.  Ultimately, 
agricultural production accounted for only 25% of the country’s GDP, down from the 
50% it represented in 1970s (Hallward, 2004).   
Aristide eventually returned to power but only with the military aid of 20,000 US 
troops (Farmer, 2006).  For obvious reasons, this was likened to a second American 
occupation of the country (Gaffney, 1994).  Gaffney (1994, p. 4) reports the comments of 
one Haitian when asked about the return of the Americans to Haiti: “A victim of repeated 
rape, seeing her assailant returning, heavily armed, has certain expectations.  They do not 
usually include apology, consolation or assistance, do they?”  This statement captures the 
sense of intrusion experienced by Haitians and, by extension, the nature of the social 
harms caused that qualify this period as another state crime.  By 2004, during Aristide’s 
second term as president, he was once again removed from power by soldiers and 
paramilitary members and forced into exile in South Africa (Dupuy, 2010).  At this time, 
the US refused to support Aristide and instead led a UN Multinational Interim Force 
compromised of American, Canadian, French and Chilean military to install an 
illegitimate proxy government (Dupuy, 2010).  In the end, public sentiments suggested 
that Aristide compromised the integrity of the Haitian people.  It was said that “[Aristide] 
should have stayed outside and let us continue the struggle for democracy; instead, he 
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agreed to deliver the country on a platter so that he could get back into office” (Hallward, 
2004, p. 34).  That the US was in a position to devour everything on that platter—i.e., 
through political manipulation and economic exploitation—represents its continued 
commission of state crimes against the Haitian people.  
Conclusion 
Reflecting upon these five critical moments of crisis, the compilation of evidence 
provided above makes it undoubtedly clear that Haiti and its people were consistently 
victimized by the state crimes of the US.  Referring back to the original definition (see 
Chapter 2), a state crime is generally understood as a self-interested act of commission or 
omission on the part of state actors that results in social harm (Kauzlarich et al., 2003).  
The two defining elements of this concept include: (1) the experience of social harm as 
human rights violations, most notably the violation of one’s security from predatory 
individuals and/or imperialistic elites; and, (2) the state’s role in perpetuating rights 
violations, typically in the pursuit of political and economic interests (Green & Ward, 
2000; Kauzlarich et al., 2002; Scwhendinger & Schwendinger, 1975).  
In revisiting these conceptual foundations, it is not difficult to see how the 
exploitation of Haiti and its people throughout history follows a pattern of state crime 
victimization.  To review this in brief:  first, as a result of colonialism, Haitians were 
kidnapped from their African homelands and enslaved.  When Haitians defeated their 
colonial masters, their freedom was de-legitimized as they were quarantined from the 
world community.  Their sovereignty was further undermined by the military intrusion of 
a foreign state, which assumed control over the country’s political and economic affairs.  
Haitians were only left alone to be subjected to tyrannical regimes, the leaders of which 
permitted the use of terror to silence political opposition.  When Haitians finally started to 
actualize their agency through the democratic election of a new leader, foreign 
interference once again interjected.  Scattered throughout all of these experiences were 
multiple forms of political manipulation, violence, and economic exploitation, ultimately 
amounting to the underdevelopment of Haiti as a state and the corresponding 
impoverishment of its people.  Perhaps most importantly, with every successive 
experience of victimization, the source of Haitians’ suffering was the US—through both 
direct and indirect intrusions into Haitian affairs.  
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That US intrusions were motivated by assertions of power highlights the 
imperialistic nature of their state crimes.  That these same intrusions were carried out 
through exclusionary, manipulative, and exploitative practices underscores the predatory 
nature of their state crimes.  Thus, aligned with the notion of social harm and the 
Schwendingers’ (1975) human rights framework, the US acted in a way that repeatedly 
denied Haitians their fundamental rights to security from predatory individuals and 
imperialistic state actors.  It is easy to be overwhelmed by the details within each critical 
moment of crisis in Haitian history, but one thing should is clear: the interests of a nation 
and its people—Haiti—have consistently been sacrificed for the political development 
and economic prosperity of another—the US.  Therefore, Haiti’s experience of state 
crime goes beyond the individual instances of abuse and exploitation and must be 
understood as a long-standing pattern of victimization. 
To extend this argument further, this pattern of state crime victimization has been 
conditioned by Haitians’ experience of imperialism and its translation into colonialism.  
Monture-Angus (p. 83) states, “colonialism is the theory of power, [and] oppression is the 
result of lived experiences of colonialism.”  Sure enough, the US’ abuses of Haiti were 
not isolated to the period of colonialism, but instead emanated directly from that period 
and manifested in the multiple forms of oppression noted above—slavery, quarantine, 
occupation, dictatorships, and subversion.  Thus, if one recalls that the objective of 
colonialism is to maintain unequal relations between a ruling state and its subordinate 
counterpart (i.e., through processes of political, social, and economic differentiation, 
etc.), the incidents of state crime within every historical period can be regarded as serving 
project of imperialism—that is, asserting the superiority of the US at the expense of Haiti.   
Given the historic and international relevance of my arguments, it is worth 
acknowledging an alternative viewpoint on Haiti’s underdevelopment.  Girard (2006, p. 
9) states, “Haitians’ tendency to blame foreigners for Haiti’s troubles is a primary reason 
for their country’s poverty, for it makes it impossible to foster a spirit of enterprise.” 
Girard (2006, p. 11) also adds that, “past ills too often serve as a scapegoat for Haiti’s 
present shortcomings… [and] Haitians would be better served setting aside their history 
and focusing on current problems.”  To sufficiently respond to these criticisms, it is 
necessary to deconstruct their deeper meanings.   
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The underlying message of Girard’s (2006) first criticism is that Haitians are fully 
capable of overcoming their hardships but are unwilling to take ownership of their 
responsibility to do so.   This, however, amounts to a rhetoric of responsibilization that 
blames Haitians for their own suffering while simultaneously excusing the harms caused 
by foreign states.  In the context of this paper, it is impossible to understand the suffering 
of Haitians apart from the influence of Americans.  Thus, while I can at least appreciate 
Girard’s (2006) comments as an appeal to Haitian agency, it is critical to understand how 
foreign interferences have debilitated that agency, thereby forcing Haitians into a state of 
created dependency (Kallen, 2004).  
Girard’s (2006) second criticism attempts to remove Haiti from its historical 
context.  This suggestion defies basic logic.  It is impossible to understand current 
problems without attending to their root causes—i.e., those “past ills” that Girard (2006) 
suggests be ignored.   Indeed, to ignore history is to render it invisible.  For Haitians, this 
would require a complete dismissal of the social harms and human rights violations 
discussed above from the first historical period of colonialism and slavery straight 
through to the political subversion of the Aristide government and all the violence and 
exploitation in between.  Again, this would neglect the cumulative impact of Haiti’s state 
crime victimization on Haitians’ collective disadvantage and created dependency (Kallen, 
2004).  That is, in the historical process of being exploited and deprived of political and 
economic opportunities, Haitians have been alienated, marginalized and invalidated to the 
extent that all aspects of their existence are now contingent upon foreign aid from the 
international community.  Thus, any account of Haiti’s under/development that fails to 
acknowledge its historical troubles and the role of foreign states in those troubles is, at 
best, incomplete and, at worst, inaccurate.  
Overall, this chapter has not provided an exhaustive account of the US-Haiti 
relationship, let alone the history of Haiti.  My purpose, however, was to draw attention 
to critical moments of crisis within that history to illuminate how Haitians have 
consistently suffered at the hands of Americans.  Specifically, I argued that the 
exploitation of Haiti by the US amounted to a pattern of state crime victimization.  With 
roots in colonial exploitation, the subordination of Haiti was reinforced through various 
encounters with slavery, a diplomatic quarantine, a military occupation, governmental 
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dictatorships, and political subversion.  Individually and collectively, these periods and 
the incidents of state crime throughout them underscore how the human rights of Haitians 
were blatantly ignored and violated by the economic and political pursuits of Americans.  
These critical moments of crisis represent the mountains beyond mountains of tragedy 
that Haitians have been forced to endure.  Ultimately, therefore, this chapter encapsulates 
the Haitian journey of climbing those mountains in the face of great obstacles.   
Amato (2006, p. 42) concludes her analysis on the tragic history of Haiti and its 
exploitation by the US with the following reflection:  “Haiti seems closer to total collapse 
than it ever has been in its precarious history of independence, with the world largely 
unaware and unconcerned” [emphasis added].  Little did she know how eerily prophetic 
this phrase would become by January 12, 2010.  Herein lies the connection between 
Haiti’s historical experiences of state crime victimization and its present-day realities of 
disaster, vulnerability, and dependency.   In the aftermath of the devastating January 12th 
earthquake, the people of Haiti are at a critical juncture in their climb.  Understanding the 
history of their state crime victimization by the US (and other colonial oppressors) is 
necessary to determine whether Haitians will be pushed off the edge once and for all or 
lifted towards humanitarian justice.   
On this note, it is important to link the implications of Haiti’s history to the 
earthquake’s impact.  As discussed in the introduction and reinforced throughout this 
thesis, natural disasters are not incidental occurrences but are processual events 
encompassing the construction and accumulation of vulnerability.  For this reason, there 
is a distinct relationship between disasters and development.  Unless we are able to 
intellectualize the complexities of Haiti’s underdevelopment (with respect to imperialism 
as state crime), we limit our capacities to move forward with a humanitarian agenda.  
Today, given the emerging crises in Haiti, it appears that imperialistic interests are once 
again infiltrating the mission of rebuilding the nation, ultimately marking the next period 
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CHAPTER 4 
Another Haiti is Possible: Reconciling Foreign Interference and Humanitarian Need 
 
“Another Haiti is possible” (Bell, 2010, p. 31).  This phrase is as heartening as it is 
daunting.  At the same time that it espouses an eager sense of hope for the future progress 
of the country, it also carries the formidable weight of a history of systemic exploitation.  
Thus, we are left with the challenge of deciding how to treat this seemingly bipolar 
assertion.  How we choose to engage in this issue is not simply a matter of attitudinal 
adjustments between optimism and pessimism.  It requires far more than a reconciliation 
of confidence with insecurity.  Fundamentally, it is about a principled commitment to 
social justice in the face of perpetual injustice.  Given the choice between justice and 
injustice, one must always choose the former.  The unfortunate reality is that Haitians 
have never had this choice.  In the context of Haiti’s present circumstances, I argue that 
responses to the earthquake have been conditioned by the international community’s 
legacy of imperialism in the country.  Current efforts to rebuild Haiti suggest that the 
humanitarian agenda has been compromised to serve an imperialistic one—ultimately 
amounting to the debilitation of the Haitian government and reflecting a continuation in 
the international community’s commission of state crime against Haiti and its people. 
 To support this argument, the discussion in this chapter is organized in two main 
sections.  The first section articulates the transformation of Haiti’s 35-second earthquake 
into a major humanitarian catastrophe and highlights three pressing crises in the country 
today: (1) internal displacement; (2) a cholera epidemic; and, (3) election fraud.  
Although the consequences of these crises are largely attributed to the failures of the 
Haitian government, I suggest that its capacity to help citizens has been jeopardized by 
foreign interference.  Accordingly, the second section of this chapter focuses on the 
responses of the international community as manifested in the work of non-governmental 
(NGOs) organizations and the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC).  An 
investigation into the composition and functions of these two groups illustrates how the 
Haitian government and its people have been systematically deprived of autonomy and 
rendered dependent on the international community.  To the extent that this has resulted 
in violations of fundamental human rights—i.e., preventing the Haitian state from 
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protecting the well-being and human security of its people—I frame this practice of 
humanitarian intervention as a reproduction of imperialistic state crime.  Concluding 
discussions are informed by the insights of Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed to 
emphasize grassroots mobilization and state capacity building toward the construction of 
a new Haiti rather than the reconstruction of the old one with its concomitant 
vulnerabilities to state crime victimization. 
From Natural Disaster to Humanitarian Catastrophe 
Within 35 seconds, the 7.3 magnitude earthquake of January 12th literally caused 
the total collapse of Haiti (Government of the Republic of Haiti, 2010).  Following the 
earthquake, a Post Disaster Needs Assessment was conducted by a team of national and 
international experts in collaboration with NGOs and civilians.  The assessment identified 
three areas of impact, including human life, infrastructure, and  environment.  With 
respect to human life, the earthquake affected 1.5 million people representing 15% of the 
national population.  Not only were 300,000 killed but 1.3 million people were 
immediately rendered homeless and forced to live in temporary shelters (Government of 
the Republic of Haiti, 2010).  The earthquake’s impact on the country’s infrastructure 
was equally devastating.  A total of 105,000 homes were destroyed while 208,000 
sustained damages (Government of the Republic of Haiti, 2010).  Major institutions 
representing public services were also affected with the collapse of 1,300 educational 
institutions, 50 hospitals and health centres, law courts, public administration buildings, 
and the presidential palace (Government of Haiti, 2010).  Environmental damage caused 
by the earthquake also devastated the country’s already depleted natural resources 
(Government of the Republic of  Haiti, 2010).  
In the aftermath of the earthquake, the world has witnessed the transformation of 
a natural disaster into a humanitarian catastrophe involving political, civil and public 
health crises.  Three of the most pressing issues challenging the survival of Haitians today 
are internal displacement, cholera, and political instability.  Individually and collectively, 
these crises illustrate how a natural disaster lasting less than a minute can have dire 
consequences for years to come.  Perhaps most importantly, they illustrate the extent of 
damages that can be caused by state criminality.  
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A Civil Crisis: Internal Displacement and Tent Cities 
In the wake of extensive property damage, an immediate consequence of the 
earthquake was the internal displacement of Haitians and the emergence of widespread 
homelessness.  There are currently 1.5 million people living in approximately 1,300 
makeshift tents across the country (Annis & Ives, 2011; Kaussen, 2011).  Tents and 
tarpaulins vary in size and overall quality with some easily tearing apart to make them 
virtually useless as shades for the sun let alone a means of shelter.  Camp conditions are 
characterized by overcrowding and a scarcity of essentials such as water, food, and basic 
sanitation.  Schuller (2010), for example, reports that the Solino camp does not have any 
latrines available for its 6,000 residents—meaning they must find a latrine outside of the 
camp, use a bag, or just dig a hole.  At other camps, the use of latrines comes at a price.  
This is the case at Champs-de-Mars, where its 35,000 residents are required to pay five 
gourdes (the equivalent of 13 cents) per person to relieve themselves (Schuller, 2010).  
These schemes, however, are the least of the abuses that residents must worry about.  
According to Schuller (2010, p. 23). “NGOs’ top-down method of aid distribution 
has made possible all manner of abuse and coercion in the camps, given the wide 
difference in power between those who distribute aid and those who are meant to 
passively receive it.”  Schuller (2010) elaborates upon this statement by describing the 
food distribution system in the camps.  Residents—typically women—are given ration 
cards by NGOs and must then line up as early as 2:00 a.m., wait for up to eight hours and 
pass through several checkpoints before finally arriving at a distribution site to receive 
food.  For those fortunate enough to receive food (because not all people get ration 
cards), making sure it is edible presents a new challenge if they do not have the necessary 
cooking resources.  For others, even getting a ration card can be difficult as women are 
often propositioned for sex in exchange for them (Schuller, 2010).  In an interview with 
leaders from the Commission of Women Victims for Victims (an organization for 
survivors of rape and violence), the gravity of the situation is described as follows:  
Even a young girl in need is forced to sleep with the person for a little card. What 
does she get with this card? A little rice... So now [the man who distributes ration 
cards] has a monopoly... That is, he will just give out the cards to whomever he 
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wants... The woman doesn’t like it. In order to get a card you need to sleep with 
them (Schuller, 2010, p. 25). 
Given this scenario, it is not surprising that sexual assault has become a major security 
concern for women and their families, with some camps such as the one at Martissant 
reporting the occurrence of up to 80 rapes since the earthquake (Schuller, 2010).  The fear 
of sexual assault is aggravated by the close proximity of tents to one another, the lack of 
electricity, and the absence of formal surveillance by police since men are easily able to 
sneak into tents and kidnap girls.  In one extreme case, such conditions gave rise to 
vigilante justice when camp residents stoned a man to death after he raped a 12-year old 
girl (Schuller, 2010).  Anecdotal reports suggest that girls as young as 2-years old are 
even being raped (McClelland, 2011). 
In one of the more controversial incidents at a campground surrounding St. Louis 
de Gonzague Catholic School, a priest refused aid to residents in an effort to discourage 
their stay (Schuller, 2010).  Since St. Louis de Gonzague was a school for the children of 
Haitian elites, it was alleged that the education of a privileged few was being prioritized 
before the survival of 12,000 camp residents (Kaussen, 2011; Schuller, 2010).  When 
advocacy organizations refused to have the residents re-located, the priest worked with 
public administrators including the police commissioner and mayor to issue a government 
order for the mandatory re-opening of schools.  This resulted in the coerced removal of 
all residents to a new campsite that was only suitable for 3,000 people (Schuller, 2010).  
Altogether, these anecdotes depict the quality of human suffering that Haitians 
have been forced to endure as a consequence of the earthquake.  The reality is that the 
tents were only supposed to provide temporary shelter; yet, now they are being treated as 
the main solution for internal displacement.  Consider the fact that although international 
aid agencies committed to the construction of 130,000 units of housing, only 10% were 
actually built by September of 2010 (Beaubien, 2010).  In the final assessment then, the 
conditions of the tent cities offer a rude awakening to the failures of the Haitian state and 
the international community in protecting the well-being of the Haitian people—and, by 
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A Health Crisis: The Cholera Epidemic 
Tent cities present ripe conditions for health problems.  As Schuller (2010, p. 23) 
describes the problem: “The closeness of the tents to one another, the flies and 
mosquitoes buzzing around the mud puddles, and the human waste have joined forces to 
create yet another disaster [in] public health.”  While symptoms of malaria and dengue 
were expected and observed, the sudden appearance of cholera was perhaps the most 
unanticipated aftershock.  Cholera is described as “an acute diarrheal infection caused by 
the ingestion of food or water contaminated with the bacterium Vibrio cholera 0:1” 
(Chelala, 2011).  The first case of the disease was reported in October of 2010, allegedly 
transferred to Haiti via UN personnel from the Nepalese contingent (Annis & Ives, 2011; 
Fraser, 2010).  Prior to this, Haiti was not known to be a country that encountered cholera 
and, in fact, had not been exposed to the disease in half a century (Fraser, 2010).  Thus, 
according to an assessment from the Center for Disease Control, Haitians must be 
understood as “an immunologically naïve population” (Fraser, 2010, p. 1813). 
For these same reasons, Haiti’s healthcare providers are unfamiliar with the 
disease and were ill-equipped to deal with the outbreak when it emerged.  Furthermore, 
with a ratio of only two doctors per 10,000 inhabitants, the country was (and continues to 
be) inadequately resourced to provide the necessary medical attention that the disease 
requires (Fraser, 2010).  It certainly does not help that only 10% of the $164 million-
worth of medical supplies called for by the UN has been provided as of November 2010 
(Fraser, 2010).  Thus, if we can appreciate health as a prerequisite to well-being—as per 
the Schwendingers’ (1975) human rights framework—then we should also be able to 
appreciate how the cholera outbreak factors into the commission of state crime.  That is, 
by failing to provide appropriate healthcare through the most basic of sanitation services, 
the state has inadvertently exacerbated the impact of the cholera disease and jeopardized 
the health of the Haitian people.  At present, it is estimated that 3,600 Haitians have died 
and 122,000 have been infected by cholera (Annis & Ives, 2011; Leeder, 2011).  If left 
untreated, it is expected that 50% of those affected will die (Chelala, 2011).  
Beyond the particular details of the disease, if one fact is to be known, it is this: 
the spread of cholera can be contained and prevented with clean water, sanitation and 
proper hygiene (Chelala, 2011; Fraser, 2010).  However, given Haiti’s perpetual poverty, 
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poor infrastructure, lack of safe water, and overcrowded tent camps, it is unlikely that the 
impact of cholera will be alleviated in the near future.  More probable is that Haitian 
doctors will have the unfortunate opportunity to familiarize themselves with the disease 
as Haiti’s present conditions make “a perfect storm for a massive epidemic of cholera” 
(Fraser, 2010, p. 1813). 
A Political Crisis: Electoral Fraud and Corruption 
In the midst of these humanitarian emergencies and the inability of the Haitian 
government to address them, the incompetency of the Préval administration and the need 
for new leadership in the country has become blatantly obvious.  In this context, the 2010 
presidential election was regarded as an opportunity to seek the type of political 
leadership that could adequately address the consequences of the disaster (Brake, 2011).  
The degree to which an election would become problematic, however, was well known 
before the election process even started.  In the first place, Haiti did not have the 
infrastructure or facilities to support a fair election.  As Annis and Ives (2011, p. 23) 
clarify, the post-earthquake circumstances of the country meant that it was impossible to 
develop an “accurate voters’ list, adequate mechanisms for voter registration, facilities for 
casting votes, [or] security at polling stations.”  Simply put, the country did not have the 
capacity to hold a legitimate and fair election.  However ill-advised it was to proceed 
with an election on the basis of these conditions, the UN Security Council went ahead 
with it anyway on November 28th, 2010. 
Instead of producing new Haitian leadership, election results revealed the 
undemocratic character of Haiti’s political landscape.  To begin, the choice of 
presidential candidates was limited to the Provincial Electoral Council, the members of 
which were appointed by President Préval.  Not only did this represent a form of political 
patronage, but it also meant the exclusion of 14 other political parties, including Haiti’s 
most representative party, the Fanmi Lavalas (Annis & Ives, 2011).  Given the limited 
and undemocratic selection of candidates, it is not surprising that citizens boycotted the 
election with 4.7 million eligible voters opting not to cast a ballot in what they perceived 
to be a corrupt election (Annis & Ives, 2011).  This sentiment was heightened by 
incidences of intimidation and violence.  In the end, an independent review of 11,181 
tally sheets collected during the electoral process revealed “massive irregularities, errors, 
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and missing vote totals” (Doucet, 2011, ¶ 5).  The co-director of the Center for Economic 
and Policy Research sums up the elections by concluding that it is impossible to: 
Salvage an election that was fundamentally illegitimate, where nearly three-
quarters of the electorate didn’t vote, where the most popular political party was 
excluded from the ballot and the vote count of the minority that did vote was 
severely compromised (Doucet, 2011, ¶ 5). 
To say the least, the election process was a needless burden on the Haitian people. In the 
words of former Canadian Governor General and native Haitian, Michaelle Jean, “it’s 
like you have a patient that is undergoing surgery with a body that is suffering, that needs 
recovery, and you’re asking that person to run for a marathon” (Leeder, 2011, ¶ 18).  At a 
time when the country was mourning one of its greatest tragedies, the election only 
triggered conflict and division among citizens instead of the unity needed to support one 
another.  Furthermore, it re-affirmed existing perceptions of the Haitian government as a 
corrupt, untrustworthy, and incapable entity.  All of this does not discount the importance 
of and need for national leadership.  However, when an election is illegitimate and faith 
in a country’s system of governance is diminished, there is no means by which national 
solidarity can realistically be achieved.  This does more to demoralize an already 
hopeless population than inspire meaningful change.  At the time of this writing, Michel 
Joseph Martelly is set to become Haiti’s newest president and assume the enormous task 
of rebuilding the country (Daniel, 2011).  However, as Fatton (2011, p. 170) ominously 
expresses, “this presidential political season is unlikely to heal [the] severe fracture 
[caused by the earthquake]; it is prone to signal continuity with, rather than a major 
departure from, past and failed policies.” 
Summary 
In the midst of the chaos created by these crises, efforts to help Haitian people 
have been scattered, ineffective and ultimately dysfunctional.  The issues of internal 
displacement, cholera, and election fraud collectively signal the failure of the Haitian 
state to address the immediate needs of the Haitian people after the earthquake.  These 
failures rightly constitute a violation of fundamental human rights in alignment with the 
Schwendingers’ (1975) framework of the prerequisites for well-being and Kauzlarich and 
colleagues’ (2003) conception of state crime.  However, beyond simply blaming the 
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Haitian government, more important questions must be asked: Why is the Haitian state 
incapable of meeting the needs of its citizens?  Is the government merely incompetent or 
are there deeper systemic issues that have incapacitated its proper functioning?  In 
response to these questions, I suggest that the Haitian government (and its people) have 
been systematically debilitated by the state crimes of the international community.  Thus, 
it is necessary to scrutinize the international response to the earthquake. 
International Assistance as Imperialistic Interference 
While the previous chapter discussed the realities of this process of incapacitation 
throughout Haitian history, this chapter focuses on the continuation of state crime in the 
aftermath of the earthquake.  This section in particular discusses the scope and nature of 
international humanitarian aid by foreign governments and related NGOs.  A review of 
the composition and functions of both groups demonstrates how humanitarian relief 
provided by the international community amounts to an ill-disguised mechanism for 
imperialism and state crime against Haitians.  
Non-Governmental Organizations 
Immediately after the earthquake struck Haiti, a horde of NGOs paraded into Port-
au-Prince to provide aid to disaster victims in the form of medication, water, food, and 
shelter, among other miscellaneous services and items.  By definition, an NGO is: 
Any non-profit voluntary citizens’ group which is organized on a local, national 
or international level.  Task-oriented and driven by people with a common 
interest, NGOs perform a variety of services and humanitarian functions, bring 
citizens’ concerns to Governments, monitor policies and encourage political 
participation at the community level (Schuller, 2007a, p. 97).  
With the literal crippling of the Haitian government—i.e., 17 of 18 ministries were 
destroyed by the earthquake (Pierre-Louis, 2011)—the assistance of NGOs was not only 
welcome by Haitians but it was also crucial to their survival.  Of course, the presence of 
NGOs is nothing new for this country.  In the 1980s, there were approximately 300 
NGOs in Haiti; by the 1990s, this number reached 800; and, as recently as 2010, 
estimates were as high as 11,000 NGOs (Bellegarde, 2011; Pierre-Louis, 2011).  For 
obvious reasons, Haiti has earned the moniker of “Republic of NGOs” (Farmer, 2011, p. 
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4).  In the grand scheme of things, this “NGO-ification of aid” (Fraser, 2010, p. 1814) is 
symptomatic of the type of dependency that has consistently limited Haitian agency. 
To elaborate upon the nature of this problem, it is necessary to contextualize the 
emergence of NGOs in the country.  Accordingly, the decade of the 1970s offers an 
important reference point.  It was during this time that the international community—
especially the US—made a conscious effort to undermine the Haitian government by 
channelling aid through NGOs as opposed to state agencies (Buss & Gardner, 2008; 
Gros, 2011).  The underlying rationale of this policy was to guarantee that foreign 
donors’ funds were “properly” used for their intended development and humanitarian 
purposes and not mismanaged in any way by corrupt government officials (Pierre-Louis, 
2011).  This practice communicated the international community’s lack of faith in the 
integrity of Haitian authorities and had the effect of delegitimizing their collective 
functioning as a system of national governance. 
Pierre-Louis (2011, p. 193) explains that this policy set a precedent for Haiti’s 
international relations that no administration has been able to overcome—to the extent 
that “for every ministry, there is [now] a parallel NGO that executes programs.”  Recent 
statistics from 2007, for example, reveal that Haiti’s largest donor, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), invested a total of $245 million in the 
country, all of which was given to NGOs in the form of grant monies (Pierre-Louis 
2011).  Consequently, programs that normally fall under the mandates of agricultural or 
educational ministries were implemented by international NGOs such as Save the 
Children, World Vision International, and the Cooperative for American Relief 
Everywhere (Pierre-Louis, 2011).  This created a situation in which the Haitian 
government was essentially sidelined and bypassed in favour of foreign-based 
organizations.  The international community’s reliance on this method of aid delivery is 
evidenced by the rapid proliferation of NGOs in Haiti over the past few decades as noted 
above.  In fact, Haiti’s 11,000 NGOs represents the highest concentration of NGOs in any 
country in the world (Pierre-Louis, 2011).  It is only reasonable to expect that this number 
has increased today following the devastating earthquake.  
In light of this figure, it is imperative to understand that quantity does not dictate 
quality.  This idea makes most sense when NGOs’ responses to the earthquake are 
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critically examined.  As Schuller (2010, p. 20) explains, relief efforts have primarily been 
controlled by foreign NGOs in a “top-down privatized manner” absent any consultation 
with the local leadership of Haitian communities.  Because of the lack of coordination, 
NGOs have failed to address the needs of disaster victims.  This includes everything from 
not providing tampons for women for the first three months after the earthquake; to 
charging camp residents for the use of latrines; to exacerbating women’s vulnerabilities 
to sexual assault with bureaucratic food distribution systems (Schuller, 2010).  The 
delivery of healthcare by NGOs has also been riddled with difficulty.   
The most pressing issue is that of volunteers not having sufficient credentials to 
be useful aid providers (Jobe, 2011; Van Hoving, Wallis, Docrat & De Vries, 2010).  
Thus, although levels of altruism are high, when they are unmatched by professional 
competencies, the presence of such volunteers is more of a burden than a benefit.  In 
other cases, medical care has been exploitative.  Van Hoving and colleagues (2010) 
explain the phenomenon of medical disaster tourism whereby opportunistic NGO 
volunteers pose as medical experts for the sake of gaining field experience. This is 
despite the fact that they have little to no actual training in dealing with disaster-related 
injuries and illnesses.  For this reason, Haiti has been compared to a “huge laboratory” 
(Leeder, 2011, ¶12).  Wilentz (2011, p. 8) comments that Haiti is regarded as “a training 
ground for young people getting their first taste of development and foreign aid work, as 
if the plight of the Haitian people were just an interesting test case—a neat, accessible 
database for some cool experimentation.”  To illustrate, one volunteer took the liberty of 
performing surgery on an injured man despite his limited qualifications as a general 
practitioner whose most recent surgical experience was 20 years ago (Van Hoving et al., 
2010).  His companions even had the audacity to film the surgery to capture the drama of 
their humanitarian endeavour up until the moment of the patient’s death (Van Hoving et 
al., 2010).  To say that the human dignity of this victim was ignored is a gross 
trivialization of his abuse.  Further, to congratulate NGOs for all of their heroic efforts is 
to be oblivious to the existence and gravity of these abuses. 
Of course, it would be irresponsible and unfair to suggest that such anecdotes 
represent the entire picture of NGO work in Haiti.  Simply put, they do not.  However, 
while not wanting to discount the role of NGOs in the provision of humanitarian relief, it 
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is necessary to acknowledge that the means by which NGOs try to accomplish their 
objectives can have unintended consequences—chief among these being the failure to 
provide anything beyond temporary hand-outs.  The ultimate reality of NGO work is that 
once the sense of emergency wanes along with funding, NGOs leave.  Their work is 
done, they did what they could, and the time comes to move on to the next rescue 
mission.  Left behind is the collective neediness of an impoverished and victimized 
population.  The situation is best described as follows: 
The NGOs believe that the government is corrupt so they go out on their own, and 
the end effect is that the government becomes less relevant, and the project ends 
when the funding dries up. We have a lot of money but no continuity, and 
therefore no results (Patriquin, 2010, ¶ 10).  
In defence of NGOs, the responsibilization argument is often brought forward, suggesting 
that Haitians need to take ownership of their own well-being and that NGOs can only 
ever be expected to offer temporary assistance.  Indeed, there is no dispute that Haitians 
have a responsibility towards each other’s care.  However, when the help provided by 
NGOs aggravates the capacity of Haitians to assume that responsibility, their short-term 
assistance can easily translate into long-term repercussions—namely in terms of created 
dependencies.  Again, this is the problem of the NGO-ification of aid (Fraser, 2010)—
one that inevitably cripples the Haitian people from leading their own development. 
This discussion lends itself to the infusion-versus-invasion debate over the impact 
of NGOs in Haiti, which Schuller (2007b) frames with the following questions:  
Are NGOs “good” or “bad” for [Haiti]? Are they closer to Haiti’s people and less 
corrupt than the government, or are they tools of foreign imperialism? ... Are 
NGOs the solution to Haiti’s poverty, exclusion, and centralization, or are they 
part of the problem? (p. 96) 
On the one hand, NGOs are praised for humanitarian contributions—representing an 
“infusion” of good-faith volunteerism; on the other hand, NGOs are seen as an extension 
of foreign governments—representing an “invasion” of neoliberal practice and policy 
into developing nations (Schuller, 2007b).  Rather than attempting to reconcile the 
differences between these perspectives, it is better to approach the debate with neutrality.  
That is, the infusion-invasion dichotomy is false; the presence of NGOs in Haiti is neither 
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one nor the other, but both—with the former realities of infusion creating the conditions 
that permit the impact of invasion.   
As noted earlier, the predicament of the NGO-ification of aid is rooted in the fact 
that the existence of NGOs in Haiti is borne from a climate of mistrust.  Thus, while 
NGOs deliver many necessary services, their presence in the country perpetuates the idea 
that the Haitian state cannot be trusted to care for the well-being of its citizens.  The 
operations of NGOs in Haiti do nothing to disprove this belief.  The fact that only 1,200 
of the 11,000 NGOs in Haiti today are officially registered with the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Patriquin, 2010) is a clear indication that they 
have no desire to be held accountable to the government or its people.  Perhaps this is 
because their projects depend upon the funding of foreign governments (e.g., USAID), so 
there is no incentive to coordinate with Haitian authorities with whom they have no 
affiliation.  Whatever the reasoning, the concentration of foreign-based NGOs ultimately 
“impedes the proper development of state structures and the healthy evolution of national 
institutions… render[ing] the Haitian government ineffectual and always at the mercy of 
its foreign benefactors” (Bellegarde, 2011, p. 266).   
Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 
To say that Haiti is at the mercy of foreign benefactors could not be more of an 
understatement if one considers the country’s current state of dependency.  In response to 
the earthquake, the Haitian government drafted a strategic action plan in a 55-page 
document entitled, “Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti: 
Immediate Key Initiatives for the Future” (Government of the Republic of Haiti, 2010).  
One of the main recommendations of this plan was the development of a temporary 
governing body to oversee the deployment of resources toward the recovery of the 
country (Government of the Republic of Haiti, 2010).  On April 15th, 2010, this idea 
came to fruition through the formation of an unelected 26-member body known as the 
Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC).  The IHRC would operate under a State of 
Emergency Law for 18 months with a mandate to “conduct strategic planning and 
coordination and implement resources from bilateral and multilateral donors, [NGOs], 
and the business sector, with all necessary transparency and accountability” (Fatton, 
2011; IHRC, 2010a, ¶ 5).  Upon ceding its powers over the reconstruction of Haiti to the 
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foreign-led IHRC, Haitian Prime Minister Bellerive offered the following sombre remark 
before members of the Haitian Senate: 
I hope you sense the dependency in this document. If you don’t sense it, you 
should tear it up.  I am optimistic that in 18 months, we will be autonomous in our 
decisions.  But right now, I have to assume, as prime minister, that we are not 
(Dupuy, 2010, p. 15). 
Based on this statement alone, the surrendering of Haiti’s sovereignty to the international 
community is clear and does not require further elaboration.  Nevertheless, it is worth 
examining the new dynamics of power fostered by the IHRC to illuminate Haiti’s 
prospects (if any) for a sustainable future.  To this end, two issues surrounding the 
Commission’s composition, structure and functioning deserve discussion, including: (1) 
American domination versus Haitian subordination; and (2) an economic orientation 
towards disaster capitalism.  These issues represent the key ingredients in the 
incapacitation and created dependency of the Haitian government and, ultimately, its 
contemporary victimization by state crime. 
Structure: American domination and Haitian subordination. 
When examining the organization of the IHRC, American dominance is 
immediately obvious.  As an initial consideration, it must be noted that the IHRC was 
originally conceived by the US State Department (Dupuy, 2010).  It is therefore no 
surprise that the US shares power with Haiti in chairing the Commission.  However, the 
fact that former US President Bill Clinton was selected as Bellerive’s co-chair is a 
fascinating irony given his own admission of guilt in ruining the country’s agricultural 
industry.  Clinton admits that his trade liberalization policies in the 1990s were a 
“mistake,” adding that, “I had to live every day with the consequences of the lost capacity 
to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people because of what I did, nobody else” 
(Dupuy, 2010, p. 14; Goodman, 2011).  Remorseful sentimentality aside, to any Haitian 
the choice of Clinton’s leadership is a mean-spirited way of adding insult to their injury.  
Add to this the controversies surrounding the US’ response to the earthquake—which 
included military forces taking over the Port-au-Prince international airport and diverting 
relief aid to accommodate military equipment (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011; Hallward, 2010; 
Pinto, 2010)—and American involvement at any level in the country is disconcerting.  
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Overall, the prominent position of an American on the Commission amounts to a 
territorial declaration of US authority in Haitian affairs.  Given the tumultuous nature of 
US-Haiti relations, if the past is any indication of the types of projects that will be 
prioritized in Haiti’s reconstruction, then its future is certainly worrisome. 
If the binary opposite of domination is subordination, then the IHRC’s 
empowerment of the US is best juxtaposed with its disempowerment of Haiti.  On the 
surface, it would appear that Haiti has equal footing with the US since Bellerive and 
Clinton share leadership responsibilities as the Commission’s co-chairs.  However, 
despite the political aesthetics of this arrangement, there are no illusions as to what co-
chairing really means—i.e., a custodianship for the US over Haiti on the grounds that 
Haitians cannot be trusted to lead their own development.  Indeed, this is a classic 
imperialistic sentiment that has haunted Haiti since the 1804 slave revolution; one that is 
undoubtedly borne from the resentment and wounded egos of its colonial slave masters.  
The need for co-chairs conveys the idea that Haitians are too incompetent to care for 
themselves and cannot improve their circumstances without the guidance of more 
superior nations—i.e., a scenario in which “the black child needs his white father” 
(Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, p. 269).  In fact, this was evident when the Commission 
proceeded with a December board meeting in the Dominican Republic without Bellerive 
(Doucet, 2011).  Although the IHRC’s board meeting minutes state that Bellerive was 
technically in attendance via videoconferencing, the limited nature of his participation 
was a clear indication of his value (or lack thereof) on the Commission (IHRC, 2010c).  
To borrow Bellegarde-Smith’s (2011) metaphor, the black child was reduced to a 
requisite body to achieve quorum while his white father seized control over more 
important matters.  Thus, fast forward from 1804 to 2010, and the IHRC represents yet 
another exercise in the paternalistic degradation of Haitian sovereignty. 
The dynamics of paternalism between Bellerive and Clinton are mirrored in the 
relationship between other Haitian and foreign representatives on the Commission.  
Article 5 of the Decree of the IHRC requires that “the number of voting Haitian 
representatives must at all times be equal to the number of voting representatives on the 
international community” (IHRC, 2010b, p. 4).  Thus, for each of the 13 international 
representatives on the IHRC, there is a Haitian counterpart.  Similar to the Bellerive-
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Clinton association, the idea is to guarantee that Haitians are leading the rehabilitation of 
their country.  In practice, however, this simply reproduces the paternalistic pattern of 
having foreign governments oversee the activities of Haitians.  Indeed, the very inclusion 
of this provision means that the tendency for members of the international community to 
control Haitian affairs is well understood.  Sure enough, in a letter addressed to the co-
chairs at the December board meeting, 12 of the 13 Haitian members of the IHRC (i.e., 
all but Bellerive) submitted an official complaint about being “completely disconnected 
from the activities of the IHRC” (Caricom News Network, 2010; See Appendix for 
English translation of the letter).  Among other things, these Haitian representatives 
expressed their dissatisfaction with receiving last-minute notifications about project 
proposals, not having time to review materials, and not having any input on the hiring of 
staff or consultants (Caricom News Network, 2010).  As a result of their marginalization, 
their only function, according to Doucet (2011, p. 2) “is to rubber stamp, as Haitian-
approved, decisions already made by the executive committee.”  In this respect, the 
presence of Haitians on the IHRC can be regarded as a façade of Haitian representation 
that conceals the magnitude of foreign interference (Doucet, 2011; Fatton, 2011). 
Some might refute this argument on the grounds that Haiti’s president, then Rene 
Préval, holds a veto power over all decisions made by the Commission (Bell; 2010; 
Dupuy, 2011).  However, as Bell (2010) points out, not only does Préval have a history of 
appeasing his international colleagues, but the devastated state of Haiti makes it 
politically unfeasible to challenge any sort of help offered to the country.  In this sense, 
the notion that beggars cannot be choosers holds truth, rendering Haiti’s submission to 
the demands of the international community a function of its dependency.  This will 
likely continue as President Martelly assumes his responsibilities in Haiti’s 
reconstruction.  As Fatton (2011, p. 160) puts it: “the danger of imperial domination has 
been the permanent specter haunting Haitian rulers whose statecraft has oscillated among 
accommodation, resistance, or compliance to the diktats of foreign powers.”  Evidently, 
the composition and structure of the IHRC cultivate this dependency further. 
 Functions: An economic orientation towards disaster capitalism. 
Beyond composition and structure, the IHRC’s actual functions are also indicative 
of Haiti’s loss of autonomy and created dependency.  It is generally fair to suggest that 
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Haiti is trapped within the webs of influence of the world’s wealthiest nations (e.g., the 
US, France, Spain, the European Union, Canada, Venezuela, Brazil, and Norway, etc.) as 
well as international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank) since each of these 
international actors holds voting privileges on the Commission (IHRC, 2011).  Of less 
concern is the fact that Haiti is subject to their influence and control than the likelihood 
that the decisions surrounding its future will be dictated by their economic agendas.  One 
cannot easily forget the historical fact of how the Spanish, French and Americans 
conspired to enslave Haitians in order to generate profit for their domestic economies 
(See: Farmer, 2006; Oliver-Smith, 2010).  Given these countries’ apparent inclination to 
mistreat Haitians in the pursuit of economic development, the voting privileges of foreign 
governments and financial institutions are most unsettling. 
To elaborate upon this issue, consider the fact that Article 4.10 of the Decree of 
the IHRC (2010b) states that the Commission will be comprised of: 
One representative of each of the bilateral and multilateral donors having offered 
to sit on the Commission and having pledged to contribute at least 
US$100,000,000… for the reconstruction of Haiti as a gift over a period of two 
consecutive years or at least US$200,000,000… in debt relief (p. 3). 
This provision illuminates the auctioneering of IHRC membership with decision-making 
powers in Haiti’s reconstruction being awarded to the highest bidders.  Whether one 
refers to the monetary contributions of foreign governments as gifts, donations or 
pledges, the effect is all the same—the commodification of Haiti’s future.  Indeed, a rose 
by any other name would certainly smell as sweet; yet, it seems that Shakespeare 
neglected to consider if everyone has the same capacity to smell.  In the garden of global 
politics surrounding Haiti’s future, that sense appears to be the exclusive privilege of the 
wealthy.  In concrete terms, Article 4.10 encourages the inclusion of those with 
purchasing power in the IHRC to the simultaneous exclusion of those without it.  This 
reflects the economic orientation and preoccupation of the Commission, which can be 
extrapolated as a guiding principle of its operations.  The questions that logically present 
themselves are: what do foreign members have to gain from investing in Haiti and what 
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might be the effects of this for Haiti’s development?  This point provides the necessary 
segue into a discussion of disaster capitalism. 
The concept of disaster capitalism comes from Naomi Klein’s (2007, p. 6) work 
in The Shock Doctrine and describes the “treatment of disasters as… marketing 
opportunities.”  During times of disaster, the desperation of victims places them in a state 
of shock that makes them susceptible to the false humanitarian promises of predatory 
state officials.  The predatory nature of promises for recovery and redevelopment is such 
that they are coated in humanitarian jargon while ultimately serving capitalistic, profit-
oriented objectives.  Accordingly, Klein (2007, p. 9) speaks of disaster capitalism as the 
exploitation of catastrophe and the use of “collective trauma to engage in radical social 
and economic engineering.”  In criminological terms, when a state’s exploitation of 
catastrophe in pursuit of profit leads to violations of fundamental human rights, disaster 
capitalism is synonymous with state crime.  This appears to be happening in Haiti today. 
On this note, the issue of donations is a relevant first consideration.  According to 
the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti (2011), out of a total of $5.6 billion dollars 
pledged at the international donors’ conference in March 2010, only $1.7 billion has been 
disbursed to date.  Disbursements refer to funding that has been transferred by donors for 
implementation via the Haitian government, an NGO or non-state provider (UN Office of 
the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2011).  Among the top donors, the US pledged $1.16 billion, 
but has only disbursed $240 million thus far; Canada pledged $360 million and has only 
disbursed $182 million; Spain committed $299 million and disbursed $187 million; and, 
France committed $284 million and disbursed $53 million (UN Office of the Special 
Envoy for Haiti, 2011).  Taken altogether, these figures reveal a general reluctance on the 
part of the international community to uphold their financial commitments to Haiti.  
Considering the degree of control that they have over Haiti’s reconstruction as IHRC 
members, the methods by which they might continue to stall the disbursement of pledges 
is a legitimate concern.  This consideration is particularly worrisome given the little 
known fact that donors are allowed to change their pledges (Macdonald, 2011).  Granted, 
there are logistical limitations to the disbursement of funds and no one can realistically 
expect the reconstruction of Haiti to happen within a year.  However, upon closer 
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examination of the ways in which pledged dollars are being allocated, the international 
community’s unwillingness to contribute to the recovery of Haiti is apparent. 
Consistent with the concept of disaster capitalism, the only way for international 
members to reconcile their aversion to financial loss with Haiti’s need for financial 
support is to ensure that their humanitarian efforts somehow benefit their own social and 
economic development.  Consider the financial offerings of the US—one of Haiti’s top 
donors.  When the US is acknowledged for pledging $1.16 billion, it is critical to 
understand that this figure includes debt relief of $245.4 million—therefore reducing the 
US’ actual commitment to Haiti to only $914.4 million in programmable cash (UN Office 
of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2011).  This means that the US is being celebrated as a 
champion of humanitarian relief for financial commitments that it is partially making to 
itself.  Furthermore, if one considers historical incidents whereby the US occupied Haiti, 
took over its national bank, and forced the country to take a $40 million loan (Farmer, 
2006), it is easy to recognize the potential illegitimacies in Haitians’ accrued debt to 
Americans.  Thus, what the US may be portraying as acts of benevolence in terms of debt 
forgiveness may have no honourable basis if the debts are invalid in the first place. 
Debt considerations aside, it is more insightful to examine the actual breakdown 
of US funding to Haiti, which Bellegarde-Smith (2011) establishes as follows:  
Of each American dollar spent by the US, 33% went to sustain the 30,000 or so 
military troops that came to Haiti uninvited, and a mere 3%... to sustain the 
democratically elected government of Haiti.  The balance, about 64%, was given 
to 11,000 [NGOs]… (p. 266). 
Scrutinizing these funds more closely, Doucet (2011) states that approximately $98.04 of 
every $100 in reconstruction contracts awarded by the US are returned to American 
companies.  Assuming that these contracts factor into the 64% spent on NGOs, then the 
charitable contribution of the US can be unmasked for its true nature as an opportunistic 
means of economic development pursued under the false pretence of humanitarian aid.  
Thus, one of the main economic benefits of IHRC membership for foreign governments 
is revealed.  The logic is simple: the more authority they have on the Commission; the 
more they can direct how resources are used; and, the more they can ensure that financial 
contributions find their way back to their own economies.  As a reflection of disaster 
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capitalism, this ultimately amounts to a perversion of the humanitarian system for the 
repatriation of relief dollars.  When this boomerang effect has the extended impact of 
impeding the Haitian government’s ability to protect the fundamental human rights of its 
citizens, it also translates into a state crime on the part of the international community.  
As a final way to evaluate the IHRC’s (in)effectiveness, it is important to 
investigate the types of projects it has approved for funding.  For this purpose, Dupuy 
(2011, p. 15) frames the dilemma in rebuilding Haiti as one of determining “whether to 
respond primarily to the interests of foreign capital and the Haitian business class, or to 
prioritize the interests of the impoverished majority articulated by grassroots and popular 
organizations.”  As evidenced by the projects currently funded by the IHRC, Dupuy 
(2011) suggests that the former group is more likely to be appeased and further critiques 
the international community’s response to the earthquake as a strategic undertaking in 
disaster capitalism.  He makes this claim on the basis that “the dual strategy of urban 
sweatshops and laissez-faire agriculture, which subordinated Haiti in the 1980s, is now its 
‘reconstruction’ plan’’ (Dupuy, 2011, p. 16).  Indeed, the prioritization of these areas of 
development is unmistakable in the IHRC’s list of funded projects with the most 
expensive ones involving the development of an industrial park to expand the garment 
industry and increased crop productions to stimulate the agricultural sector.  Reinforcing 
Dupuy’s (2011) argument, to continually endorse policies and practices known to be 
ineffective and harmful reflects the international community’s callous disregard for 
Haiti’s security.  To appreciate the implications of this for state criminality, these areas of 
development warrant closer attention. 
Dupuy’s (2011) reference to sweatshops coincides with the development of the 
Northern Industrial Park.  This project has received the most funding to date on a per 
annum basis with $174 million allotted over two years for the first phase of 
implementation (IHRC, 2011).  Described as a “globally competitive 150-hectare 
industrial park in the northern region of the country that will host export-oriented garment 
manufacturers”, this project is jointly funded by the Inter-American Development Bank 
and the US Government as a means of job creation (IHRC, 2011).  It is expected that the 
park will generate work for up to 18,000 Haitians in the initial phase of development, and 
then create up to 65,000 jobs upon completion of the second phase—thereby “increasing 
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Haitian garment industry jobs by more than 200%” (IHRC, 2011).  Given the country’s 
abysmal poverty and unemployment rates—measured at 76% and 70%, respectively 
(James, 2010; Sletten & Egset, 2004)—the idea of generating employment is appealing, 
especially since these figures are worse today.  However, absent from the celebratory 
pronouncements of economic growth is any serious discussion about the quality of the 
jobs that will be created.  According to Dupuy (2011), the minimum wage for Haitian 
workers in the garment industry amounted to a mere $3.75 per day in 2009—making this 
type of labour comparable to exploitative urban sweatshops.  Wilson (cited in Dupuy, 
2011, p. 29) makes the nature of exploitation clearer by arguing that the plan to 
resuscitate the garment industry “isn’t really about creating jobs, it’s about relocating 
them… what they really mean is that they plan to take jobs away from Dominican, 
Mexican, and Central American workers—and pay the Haitians even less for doing the 
same work” [emphasis added].  To the extent then that the export-oriented garment 
manufacturing companies aim to profit from the cheap and intensive labour of ordinary 
Haitians, it is fair to discredit the Northern Industrial Park project as a practice in disaster 
capitalism, and, by extension, state crime. 
The second aspect of Dupuy’s (2011) critique concerns the agricultural sector. 
The IHRC’s highest funded agricultural-based project is worth $200 million over five 
years and aims “to induce a sustainable growth of the agricultural sector” (IHRC, 2011).  
Funded by the Inter-American Development Bank, the objectives of this project are 
specified as the improvement of agricultural value chains, agricultural intensification, 
technology adoption, and land tenure regularization (IHRC, 2011).  Upon first glance, 
such an ambiguous description makes it difficult to decipher the implications of this 
project in any critical sense; however, close attention to the loaded terminology reveals 
the potential repercussions for Haiti’s continued underdevelopment.  For example, 
improving “agricultural value chains” is best understood in terms of increasing the 
efficiency with which crops are produced.  Dupuy (2011) explains this more concretely 
as the expansion of production zones for export crops such as mangoes.  Although the 
increased exportation of Haitian crops would do much to stimulate the economy in 
theory, there is no corresponding challenge to pre-existing trade liberalization policies 
and practices that have systematically reduced their competitiveness and value in the 
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global market (Dupuy, 2011).  Consider also that the help of multinational corporations 
such as Coca-Cola has been solicited to foster mango production, which signals another 
dimension of foreign intrusion in Haiti’s economy (Interlandi, Yarett, Cornblatt, Barry & 
Tuttle, 2010).  Thus, however well-intentioned this project may be, if its development is 
decontextualized from the political climate that stifled its effectiveness in the first place, 
then it is unlikely that it will have any utility for Haiti in the long-term.  Meanwhile, the 
emphasis on certain practices (e.g. agricultural intensification) and the adoption of 
technologies has the effect of conditioning industrializing nations’ dependence on their 
advanced counterparts who develop these technologies (Balasubramaniam, 1998)—
therefore adding to the subordination of Haitians by the international community. 
To be fair, these are only two projects in a longer list of 73 projects covering 18 
areas of development including, but not limited to, debris removal, disaster preparedness, 
education, environment, health, housing, and infrastructure, etc. (IHRC, 2011).  However, 
as two of the top funded projects to date, they offer important insight into the quality of 
decision-making that is informing Haiti’s recovery.  Apparently, it is one that wholly 
disregards the histories of failed policies and willingly subverts the well-being of Haitians 
to serve the profit interests of foreign governments and associated corporations. 
Summary 
Having reviewed the details of the international community’s response to the 
earthquake, it is necessary to consider its implications for state criminality.  Overall, the 
presence and involvement of NGOs and the IHRC in Haiti underscores the depth of 
Haiti’s dependency on international aid.  Given Haiti’s historical trajectory toward social, 
political, and economic underdevelopment, this dependency is not unexpected.  It is, 
however, extremely problematic in that foreign intervention is premised on a belief in 
Haitian incompetence.  This belief is used to legitimize intervention and has the extended 
consequence of fostering imperialistic agendas, the exploitative means for achieving 
these, and corresponding violations of human rights.  In this respect, the issue is not 
simply a matter of Haiti being dependent, but of the international community thriving on 
that dependency to elevate their respective social, political, and economic statuses.  This 
idea is reminiscent of Gramsci’s discussion of hegemony (See Chapter 2).  Thus, the 
defining dilemma of Haiti’s future is this: How can Haiti reconcile its dependency on the 
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international community with its need for humanitarian assistance without compromising 
the well-being of its people to imperialistic state crimes?  To begin answering this 
question, Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed offers an inspiring reference point. 
Future Directions 
Freire’s (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed revolves around the relationship 
between oppressors and the oppressed.  Both the oppressors and the oppressed exist 
within a system of exploitation whereby the former subjugates and dehumanizes the 
latter.  While this inequality describes existing inequalities in the world, Freire (1970, p. 
44) asserts that it need not be a “given destiny” and calls upon the oppressed to launch a 
liberation movement.  Liberation, he explains, is about “the struggle for humanization… 
the emancipation of labor… the overcoming of alienation… [and] the affirmation of men 
and women as persons” (Freire, 1970, p. 44).  The catalyst in this movement is self-
actualization.  Liberation must be the project of the oppressed through the development 
of a critical consciousness that allows them to recognize the injustice of their 
marginalization and then strive to overcome it in defence of their dignity and self-worth.  
In liberating themselves, they also liberate their oppressors from the unjust order of their 
co-existence.  It is this challenge of achieving liberation that now lies before Haitians.  
To argue that Haitians must liberate themselves might be perplexing given that 
the 1804 slave revolution served this very purpose.  However, despite the apparent 
success of that revolution, Haitians never actually achieved freedom.  Recall the period of 
diplomatic quarantine when members of the international community deprived Haitians 
of all opportunities for social, economic, and political advancement.  Even the formal 
recognition of Haitian sovereignty required that they make various concessions to 
imperial powers (e.g., paying an indemnity to France or adopting economic policies that 
favoured the US), which not only stifled their development but further compromised the 
integrity of their efforts in freedom.  Indeed, none of this can be equated with liberation.  
Liberation is more than the status of political independence among nation-states; it is 
about a fundamental respect for human agency.  The fact is that Haitians were never 
accorded this respect at any point in their history.  Given the current workings of 
international NGOs and the IHRC, they are certainly not being respected today. 
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In the absence of liberation, therefore, Haitians have only known dependency, and 
it is this dependency that has continually reinforced the myth of their incompetence.  
Meanwhile, the unjust order between the international community, as oppressors, and the 
Haitian people, as the oppressed, remains unchallenged.  Thus, if we can appreciate that 
the essence of liberation is self-empowerment and self-determination, then we can 
advance a principle of respect for Haitian agency in the construction of another Haiti.  
Two strategies for doing this are grassroots mobilization and state capacity building.  
Grassroots Mobilization 
As discussed throughout this thesis, the context of Haitian society (especially 
post-earthquake) is defined by its dependency on humanitarian aid from the international 
community.  Humanitarianism, in its purest form, is about compassion for human 
suffering and the provision of assistance to alleviate the manifestations of this suffering.  
Problems emerge, however, when the cause of humanitarianism disguises imperialism 
and the needs of suffering populations are subordinated by the selfish wants of elite 
groups and state powers.  In Freire’s (1970) words, when this happens, humanitarianism 
loses its true generosity and becomes a false charity: 
True generosity [is] fighting to destroy the causes which nourish false charity. 
False charity constrains the fearful and subdued, the “rejects of life,” to extend 
their trembling hands.  True generosity lies in striving so that these hands—
whether of individuals or entire peoples—need be extended less and less in 
supplication, so that more and more they become human hands which work, and 
working, transform the world (p. 45). 
Thus, humanitarianism has no value when its end result is dependency.  Not to belabour 
the point, but transformation (i.e., toward liberation and away from dependency) can only 
occur when Haitians take ownership of their agency without concession; when the critical 
insight of oppression inspires conscious, self-empowered, and unapologetic activism. 
Fortunately, and in spite of the many problems surrounding the intrusion of 
foreign-based NGOs and the IHRC, evidence of this kind of activism can already be 
found.  For example, in response to the crisis of internal displacement, over 30 local 
associations in Port-au-Prince mobilized together to campaign for shelter from the 
Haitian government (Schuller, 2010).  Other grassroots organizations challenged the 
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neoliberal policies related to garment factories and mango production and advocated 
alternative priorities such as agrarian reform, subsidized production for local markets, and 
the protection of workers’ rights (Dupuy, 2011).  As recently as April 2011, a collection 
of 40 Haitian organizations, including the Platform of Advocacy for an Alternative 
Development, the Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations, the Support Group 
for Refugees and Returnees, the Popular Organization of Small Peasants, and the Sanmi 
Timoun Foundation, demanded the removal of the IHRC on the basis that “its existence 
is an affront to [Haitians’] collective dignity” (Canada Haiti Action Network, 2011).  
Additionally, an even bigger coalition of 50 NGOs and grassroots groups launched a 
broad-based social movement around six priorities, including: (1) creating participatory 
democracy; (2) rebuilding under a new economic paradigm; (3) protecting the 
environment; (4) putting social needs at the center; (5) prioritizing agriculture; and (6) 
ensuring women’s and children’s rights (Bell, 2010).  In a public declaration of their 
mandate, this coalition stated the following (Bell, 2010):  
[We have] decided to launch a national and international campaign to bring forth 
another vision of how to redevelop this country, a vision based on people-to-
people solidarity to develop the opportunity now facing this country to raise up 
another Haiti.  We [want] to build a social force which can establish a 
reconstruction plan where the fundamental problems of the people take first 
priority.  These include: housing, environment, food, education, literacy, work, 
and health for all; a plan to wipe out exploitation, poverty, and social and 
economic inequality; and a plan to construct a society which is based on social 
justice [emphasis added] (p. 30).  
Clearly, there is no shortage of critical insight among Haitians regarding their oppressive 
circumstances and the appropriate solutions for moving forward.  Note the opportunity 
for NGOs to join in these efforts, which would resolve the problem of NGO-ification in a 
way that increases their cooperation with and accountability to the Haitian people.  Thus, 
the importance of grassroots efforts is consistent with Freire’s (1970, p. 45) wisdom in 
asking: “who are better prepared than the oppressed to understand the terrible 
significance of an oppressive society?  Who suffer the effects of oppression more than the 
oppressed?  Who can better understand the necessity of liberation?”  Given the foregoing 
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discussion, the only answer to these questions is the Haitian people.  Simply put, Haitians 
must be the agents of change in overcoming their oppression.  In summary, Bell (2010) 
captures the importance of grassroots mobilization in the Haitian context:  
Grassroots approaches offer a different vision and practice of what humanitarian 
can mean when it is embedded in aid given with respect, dignity, and a 
commitment to equity… The approaches serve as a guide to what a society that 
privileges mutual aid over profit, and democratic participation over domination, 
could look like in Haiti (p. 29).  
State Capacity Building 
Although grassroots mobilization is critical to the cause of liberation, it cannot 
occur in isolation and must operate within the existing system of international relations if 
it is to have any sustainable influence.  To this end, the liberation of the Haitian people 
also requires the liberation of the Haitian state from the imperial trappings of global 
politics.  Thus, the extended component of grassroots mobilization is the “building of 
state capacity” (Fatton, 2011, p. 173) for the establishment of a “working state” (Gros, 
2011, p. 155).  At the forefront of this effort must be an assertion of Haitian 
independence.  Chomsky (2010b) explains the importance of sovereignty as follows:  
In the case of Haiti, unless we can compel the imperial powers—the powerful 
states—to permit the kind of sovereignty that could develop out of their lively 
functioning society, they won’t have the chance… If they don’t have the chance, 
they’re obviously doomed.  
Concretely, the assertion of independence must translate into a dismantling the IHRC, 
which encompasses the removal of Haitian representatives from the subordinate positions 
they occupy on the Commission as well as the removal of foreign governments from their 
positions of power in Haitian society.   No Haitian is oblivious to the dependency 
cultivated by the IHRC.  The Haitian Prime Minister acknowledged it from the moment 
of the IHRC’s inception; the Commission’s Haitian representatives experienced it when 
they were excluded from decisions; and, the Haitian people suffered because of it as their 
human rights were sacrificed for neoliberal projects.  Given the overall ineffectiveness of 
the IHRC, the only logical action is to permanently disassemble this body in respect of 
Hatians’ capacity to lead their own development.  It is only when the Haitian state 
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achieves this independence that it can concentrate on becoming a functioning state that 
serves the needs of its people.   
This is not to suggest that the international community has no role in Haiti’s 
rehabilitation.  The goal is not to alienate Haiti from the global community, but rather to 
reduce the authority that other nations (such as the US, France, Canada, etc.) presume to 
have in Haitian affairs.  Furthermore, the failures of current interventions do not absolve 
countries of their ongoing responsibility to respect the human rights of the Haitian 
population.  If anything, those failures should increase the urgency with which they offer 
support.  For example, much has been said about the need for the international 
community to rectify past injustices that have aggravated Haiti’s underdevelopment and 
its vulnerabilities to disaster.  Klein (2010) makes this case on the matter of debt 
repayment.  For all the talk of Haiti’s debt to different countries, Klein (2010) stresses the 
fact that Haiti is a “creditor, not a debtor” and identifies three debts that are owed to 
Haitians.  These include a slavery debt, which stems from the French indemnity; a 
dictatorship debt for all monies that the kleptocratic Duvaliers stole from Haitian banks 
while simultaneously indebting the country to financial institutions; and, a climate debt 
for the excessive carbon dioxide emissions of industrial nations that increase Haiti’s 
vulnerability to the impact of climate change (Klein 2010).  To the extent that these debts 
have paralyzed Haiti’s development, Klein (2010, ¶ 10) argues that the country deserves 
compensation and explains that, “each payment to a foreign creditor was money not spent 
on a road, a school, [or] an electrical line.”  In other words, the more that Haiti’s 
resources were used to pay off illegitimate debts, the less they were used to protect the 
rights and well-being of citizens.  At present, the authenticity of the international 
community’s commitment to helping Haiti recover from the earthquake can rightly be 
measured by its willingness to compensate the country without the expectation of a 
reciprocal benefit.  If foreign governments and international financial institutions can be 
held accountable to their contribution to Haitian underdevelopment, then this will go a 
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Summary 
Reflecting upon these broad-based strategies of grassroots mobilization and state 
capacity building, the overarching lesson to be learned is that Haitians have the power to 
change the trajectory of their present circumstances of dependency.  What I am 
presenting here is a cooperative approach for liberation; one that is consistent with 
Schuller’s (2007a) tripartite framework for considering the participation of Haitian 
people, the nation-state, and the international community in Haiti’s development.  It is an 
approach that thrives on the notion of people-to-people solidarity as the defining strength 
of the Haitian people and recognizes the necessity of Haitian leadership.  The efforts 
discussed above are obviously only a few among a myriad of strategies that can be 
pursued to facilitate Haiti’s recovery from the earthquake (in the short-term) and its 
social, economic, and political redevelopment as a nation (in the long-term).  The 
common thread that must bind together their utility is a respect for Haitian agency.  This 
is the fundamental principle that must guide all efforts to liberate the oppressed and truly 
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
Natural disasters have the potential to wreak havoc in unimaginable ways.  Beyond 
physical destruction, they expose people to the rawness of human suffering and, in so 
doing, alter their sense of security in the world.  For those directly affected, all things 
once familiar drift into an abyss of uncertainty as the struggle for survival becomes their 
sole priority in existing.  And in the midst of the chaos and trauma, fundamental issues 
arise concerning the collective well-being of humankind and the responsibility to 
preserve it.  In the words of disaster scholars, Hoffman & Oliver-Smith (2010, p. 11), “in 
their turmoil, disassembly, and reorganization, [disasters] expose essential rules of action, 
bare bones of behavior, the roots of institutions, and the basic framework of 
organization.”  Despite public sympathies and international relief efforts, the emerging 
realities of widespread human misery (manifested in such things as poverty, disease, and 
social conflict), become a shocking revelation of the failure of entrusted state institutions 
to protect human populations.  Thus, at a time when the environmental circumstances of 
the world are most volatile and the disparities between the powerful and the powerless 
most intense, it has never been more urgent to evaluate the relationship between natural 
disasters and state crime.   
Accordingly, this thesis was guided by one question: How do we problematize the 
concept of natural disaster to arrive at a criminological understanding of human 
culpability in the production of social harm?  The inherent assumption in this question is 
that the notion of natural disaster is somehow false or misleading.  This is grounded in 
the idea that natural disasters are processual occurrences that result from the development 
of vulnerability over time.  For example, García-Acosta (2002, p. 50) states that disasters 
emanate from pre-existing critical conditions and further explains that, “the magnitude 
and severity of accumulated social and economic vulnerabilities, associated with the 
presence of a severe natural hazard, result in real disasters, which are processes, and, as 
such, inescapable subjects to be studied from a historical perspective.”  Indeed, this 
allows us to appreciate why humans are not only passive recipients of the consequences 
of calamity (i.e., through exposure to disaster) but are also active contributors to the 
magnitude of their impact (i.e., through the construction of vulnerability).  On this basis, 
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human culpability in the production of harm during disasters can be assessed.  This 
insight provided the impetus for my investigation into the 2010 Haiti earthquake and its 
relationship to the country’s experience of imperialism as state crime.  
The Haiti earthquake of January 12th was one of the most devastating natural 
disasters in world history—to the extent that its estimated casualties made 2010 the 
deadliest disaster year in the past two decades (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011).  Although the 
damage caused by the earthquake was undoubtedly great, the tragedy of its consequences 
in injury, illness, and death had much deeper roots than ruptured geological fault systems 
and tectonic plates.  An examination of Haiti’s history revealed the depths to which 
American imperialism infiltrated the country and halted its social, economic, and political 
development, thereby rendering it completely dependent on the US and other foreign-
based governments and institutions.  The prevalence of imperialistic activities was 
evident in Haitians’ subjection to slavery, a diplomatic quarantine, a military occupation, 
two successive dictatorial regimes, and political subversion—all of which amounted to a 
pattern of state crime victimization and the inevitable construction of Haiti’s disaster 
vulnerability.  The consistency in this victimization resulted in the country’s overall 
regression from the “Pearl of the Caribbean” to a “Paradise lost” (Girard, 2005).  Today, 
post-earthquake efforts to rebuild Haiti signal continuity with these historical patterns of 
state crime, with the exception that the imperialistic motives of foreign governments and 
international financial institutions are now carefully disguised by humanitarian 
commitments.  Thus, in the final analysis, the paradox of Haiti’s plight is clear: those 
entrusted to care for the well-being of Haitians have simultaneously been the source of 
their instability, impoverishment, and insecurity.  The case study of Haiti, therefore, 
substantiates the understanding that natural disasters are unnatural.  
In considering the expanding scope of state crime scholarship, David Friedrichs 
(2010, p. 75) asks an important question: “Will those of us who have been addressing 
crimes of states for some time now be seen by some future generation of critical 
criminologists as blind to other important manifestations of crime?”  The contents of this 
thesis represent my long-winded response to this question in the affirmative.  The 
overarching purpose of my research has been to advance the study of natural disasters in 
criminology in a manner that broadens the intellectual horizons of the discipline.  And 
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while I am under no illusion that my thesis will revolutionize the field, my analysis of 
Haiti’s earthquake and its experiences of imperialistic state crimes reinforces the efforts 
of critical criminologists to legitimize the study of state power.  When the body of 
literature on any topic is in its infancy, scholars are inclined to demand more research.  
Given that the subject matter of natural disasters has virtually gone unnoticed in 
criminology, the call for more research is certainly warranted.  However, in line with the 
subtext of Friedrichs’ (2010) question, perhaps more important than how much research 
we do is how we do research.  That is, the ways in which we approach research need to be 
reconfigured altogether—beginning with a transformation in how we think about the 
criminological underpinnings of phenomena.   
This discussion is compatible with the agenda brought forth by current experts for 
developing a prospective criminology of state crime, which Friedrichs (2010) describes in 
the following way:  
Such a criminology would have as its primary focus the identification of potential 
sites of prospective crimes of states, and the analysis of the most feasible 
strategies for preventing, subverting or containing future crimes of states.  A 
prospective criminology of state not only has to be rooted in a retrospective 
criminology of state crime, but also must adopt a coherent framework of a rapidly 
evolving world, including the present character of globalization and post-
modernity in the world, and the significance of a post-9/11 world (p. 79). 
A prospective criminology of state crime, therefore, represents a proactive approach—
one that anticipates the scope of crimes that can be committed in the future based on 
reflections of the past.  It fosters an intellectual synthesis of contemporary realities with 
their historical precedents.  As such, it allows for a critical consideration of patterns of 
exploitation and social stratification that have contributed to the systemic oppression of 
certain groups and their present-day marginalization.  In essence, a prospective 
criminology of state crime invites scholars to utilize a more expansive criminological 
imagination that accounts for the multi-faceted complexities of state power and 
corresponding social harms, so that both may be reconciled at the nexus of social justice.  
This is precisely what I have tried to accomplish in this thesis.  
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The greatest challenge in writing this thesis has been trying to capture and 
articulate the intricate relationships between and among natural disasters, imperialism, 
and state crime in the multiple contexts of Haitian society.  Ambitiously, I have tried to 
tackle an unorthodox criminological topic (i.e., natural disaster) through the lens of a 
highly contested concept that is still vying for credibility in its application (i.e., state 
crime), and I made this attempt based on a current event that has yet to garner significant 
academic attention (i.e., the 2010 Haiti earthquake).  For all its unconventionality, 
controversy and unfamiliarity, however, this research attests to the intellectual merits of 
an approach that is not stifled by the boundaries of traditional criminological thinking.  
As a final thought, I return to the original sentiment that inspired my mind’s 
preoccupation with natural disasters: human suffering is an enduring reality.  If we strip 
this piece of work of all names, dates, theories, and numbers, what I am fundamentally 
talking about is the human capacity to care.  It is often said that a concentrated study of 
any subject is bound to leave one with more questions than answers.  Therefore, I end this 
work with the one question that remains unanswered:  Why does it take a natural disaster 
for us to pay attention to the plight and marginalization of fellow human beings?  By 
virtue of writing this thesis in the aftermath of one of the world’s greatest natural 
disasters, I too am guilty of the underlying implication of this question for the 
convenience of our compassion.  This is the burden of my conscience.  It is with the 
weight of this burden that I hope my research inspires readers to think through scenarios 
of chaos with a heightened sense of perspective and conscientiousness.  While we may 
never be able to answer this question to a satisfactory degree, our willingness to at least 
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APPENDIX 
 
The following is the full text version of the letter from twelve Haitian members of the 
IHRC.  This is the unofficial English translation of the French letter provided by Isabeau 




Santo-Domingo, 14 December, 2010 
 
Prime Minister Jean Max Bellerive, Co-Chair  
President William Jefferson Clinton, Co-chair  
Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission. 
 
We, the 12 Haitian members of the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) present at 
this meeting, on account of the experience we have accumulated on this Commission since its 
establishment, feel obliged to express the following, regarding the analysis of strategic plan on 
our agenda. 
 
The twelve Haitian members present here feel completely disconnected from the activities of the 
IHRC. There is a critical communication and information shortage at the TIC [Information and 
Communication Technology] on the part of the Executive Secretary and even more from the 
Executive Committee. In spite of our role in the governance structure of the institution, we have 
so far received no follow-up on the IHRC activities. 
 
In general, contact is only established one day before the board meetings. Board members have 
time neither to read, nor analyze, nor understand--and much less to respond intelligently--to 
projects submitted at the last minute, despite all the complaints expressed and promises made on 
this subject. 
 
Moreover, board members are not in a position to answer, for lack of basic information, the 





No actual functional relationship exists between the Executive Secretary and the Haitian side of 
the council, or between the latter and the Executive Committee. Projects are often forwarded as 
summary tables to the Board, only on the eve of meetings. Procedural changes related to the 
formalities around submission of online projects vary without notice. 
 
Staffing and consultant selection are undertaken unbeknownst to the Haitian members of the 
board. No documentation on hiring criteria or candidate selection was sent to inform board 
members. The same is true for selected consultants; the Haitian board members don’t even know 
the names of the consultants who work for the IHRC nor their respective tasks. 
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In view of these difficulties, distinguished co-chairmen, the Haitian part of the council had invited 
the Executive Director to explain how the two bodies should collaborate. The invitation was 
ignored. 
 
In reality, Haitians members of the board have one role: to endorse the decisions made by the 
Director and Executive Committee. Prof. Jean-Marie Bourjolly made a comment, in his October 
4, 2010 memorandum, which summarizes the situation well: “We should focus more on building 
a plan that is strategically and tactically consistent with the general principles set forth in the Plan 
of Action.” 
 
“Our actions have been bound to approving projects on, as far as I can judge, a first informed, 
first served basis. We risk ending up with a variety of ill-assorted projects, some or which are 
certainly interesting and useful taken individually, but which collectively can neither meet the 




As far as protocol goes, the way Haitians who are not members of the Executive Committee are 
being treated is very revealing of the desire to minimize their part in the council. This was made 
evident in the unacceptable reception they were given at the September 20, 2010 meeting in NY, 
where several Haitian members of this committee were not even granted a place at the table. 
 
As Haitians members of this committee, we consider it our particular responsibility to ensure the 
proper functioning of the commission in its mission, so that reconstruction of the country is 




Lucien Bernard  
Jean-Marie Bourjolly  
Jean Renald Clerisme  
Lucien Francoeur  
Claude Jeudy 
Gary Lissade  
Suze Percu Filippini 
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